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Within the present dissertation, determinants of leader dismissals, promotions, and 
demotions are explored.  A model of CEO dismissals is adapted to the context of the National 
Football League (NFL), whereby head coaches represent CEOs.  Building upon empirical studies 
of the CEO dismissal model, a proxy is established which is representative of actual candidates 
to replace an executive rather than proxies based on industry and firm characteristics.  Using the 
proxy for candidates provided statistically insignificant results that challenge the theoretical 
relationship between candidate availability and executive dismissals.  Additionally, the present 
dissertation proposed and found empirical justification for incorporating an additional socio-
political force within the empirically tested CEO dismissal model.  Interestingly, within the 
deviant culture of the NFL, deviant behavior may increase or decrease executive dismissal 
likelihood depending on the type of deviant behavior, punishments received for deviant behavior, 
and implementation of institutional policies regarding deviant behavior.  Finally, the present 
dissertation emphasized the relationship between executive dismissals and candidates available 
to succeed executives, and therefore, examined determinants of managerial promotions within 
the NFL.  Specifically focusing on race and centrality as promotion and demotion determinants, 
the present dissertation found race and centrality to be statistically significant factors in 
promotions and demotions, though the influence of these variables depends on whether the 
manager is being considered for promotion or demotion as well as their current rank within the 
organization (i.e., upper- or lower-level management).  Implications for practitioners and 




Leadership and managerial ability are important topics to scholars and practitioners 
(Farkas & De Backer, 1996; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Kippenberger, 2002).  
The substantial interest garnered by leaders, managers, and the activities of leaders and managers 
is a result of their potential influence on organizations (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Huson, Parrino, 
& Starks, 2001; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Parrino, 1997; Pedace & Smith, 2013), shareholders 
(Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Farquhar, 1995; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 
1999; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), firm employees (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Simpson, 2002), 
customers (Geis, 2007), taxpayers (Gobert & Punch, 2007; Rosoff, 2007) and local residents  
(Ermann & Lundman, 1982).  Though leadership research in the past century primarily focused 
on leader qualities and how leaders interact with followers, some scholars argue that an 
understanding of the context and role of leadership must first be understood (Hall et al., 2004; 
Selznick, 1957).  Early literature by Selznick (1957) provided a framework for much of the 
recent research examining previously neglected leadership factors, especially in the fields of 
strategic management and executive turnover (e.g., Chen, Luo, Tang, & Tong, 2014; Cowen & 
Marcel, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Gomulya & Boeker, 2015). 
In forging the framework for leadership in strategic management, Selznick (1957) 
defined leadership as an activity which revolves around critical decision-making as opposed to 
routine interactions between leaders and followers.  Therefore, Selznick (1957) proposed the 
“executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from administrative management to 
institutional leadership” (p. 4, 154).  Selznick (1957) used the notion of an executive as a 
statesman to demonstrate the political nature of leadership activities.  He described how political 
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power struggles between organizational units and personnel form within organizations.  Often 
these political contests are among personnel vying for top management team promotions.  
Moreover, promotions, and the dismissals that pave the way for others’ promotions, are decided, 
in part, by the institutionalization of rules and values within the organization as a result of 
current and past leaders whom have infused their values within the organization (Selznick, 
1957).  Selznick’s (1957) ideas of political competitions for promotions and dismissals being 
determined by organizations embodying the values of their leaders have led many scholars to the 
connection between politics and executive dismissals and promotions (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Daily 
& Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Frederickson et al., 1988; Gomulya 
& Boeker, 2015; Ocasio, 1999). 
Following Selznick (1957), research regarding executive departures has been identified 
as an important area of research (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  The 
importance of executive departures stems from the CEO being viewed as the most powerful 
member of an organization (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Farkas & De Backer, 1996) and responsible 
for organizational results (Farkas & De Backer, 1996; Soebbing & Washington, 2011).  Despite 
research findings to the contrary by some scholars (e.g., Day & Lord, 1988; Meindl, Ehrlich, & 
Dukerich, 1985), it is widely believed CEOs can have a substantial impact on organizational 
performance (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Hambrick & Quigley, 
2014), which could lead to their departure from the organization (Fredrickson et al., 1988; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
Executive Departures 
A substantial portion of the extant literature examining executive successions failed to 
identify whether the predecessors’ departures were voluntary prior to examining the causes of 
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those departures or subsequent organizational performance following the departure (Bennett et 
al., 2003; Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Puffer & Weintrop, 
1991).  Voluntary and involuntary executive departures occur as a result of retirements, 
resignations, deaths, or dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Furtado & 
Kuran, 1990).  More specifically, Weisbach (1988) identified 13 reasons CEOs voluntarily 
resign according to an examination of Wall Street Journal reports.  Some of these reasons 
include departing due to compulsory retirement policies, poor performance, disagreements with 
board of directors, and personal reasons.  However, during the process of a succession, the true 
reasons for the succession are often not revealed (Brown, 1982; Haynes et al., 2015; Maxcy, 
2013; Weisbach, 1988). 
Executive retirements, specifically, have received a marginal amount of attention from 
scholars.  Weisbach (1988) found a high correlation between the likelihood of a planned 
resignation and CEO age by connecting a substantial amount of resignations to CEOs’ 65th 
birthdays.  Specifically, Weisbach (1988) found about 38% of CEO turnover from 1974 through 
1983 to be a result of retirement.  Similarly, Maxcy’s (2013) study of college football coaches 
from 2002 through 2011 found 25% of head coach turnover was a result of retirements.  Though 
all successions can have organizational performance implications (Cannella & Rowe, 1995), 
there is little mystery in many retirement decisions.  Therefore, it appears retirement decisions 
are of less theoretical interest than dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
CEO Dismissals 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) defined a CEO dismissal as a “situation in which the CEO’s 
departure is ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or her will” 
(p. 255).  Frick et al. (2010) defined a dismissal as “the result of a premature termination of a 
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contract of employment.  It can be by mutual consent or without the explicit approval of both 
parties to the contract” (p. 151).  Between Fredrickson et al. (1988) and Frick et al. (2010), there 
seems to be a difference of opinion with regard to the consent of the dismissed party.  This 
difference of opinion may be cleared up through understanding the individual(s) who make 
dismissal decisions.  Puffer and Weintrop (1991) explained board of directors are typically 
responsible for making CEO turnover decisions.  For the similar position of head coaches in 
college football, it is the athletic director (Marburger, 2015). 
Dismissals are a tool used to hold CEOs accountable (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
Crossland & Chen, 2013).  In making the decision to dismiss a CEO, a board must evaluate the 
ability of that CEO and sometimes compare that CEOs ability to that CEO’s compensation in 
order to decide if the CEO is still valuable to the firm.  Ertgrul and Krishnan (2011) stated boards 
of directors assess the ability of their CEOs by examining various facets of their work (e.g., 
investment proposals, strategy initiatives, short and long-term decisions).  Borland and Lye 
(1996) argued board of directors will acquire private information on the CEO’s ability.  Since 
those stakeholders outside the firm typically do not have access to this private information, the 
market for CEOs will assume that CEOs retained by a firm are high-ability CEOs, which causes 
the CEOs wages to increase until the board of directors deems it unprofitable to retain the CEO 
relative to that CEO’s ability (Borland & Lye, 1996). 
Boards of directors appoint CEOs as leaders of their organizations to control and manage 
the outcomes of their organization (Soebbing & Washington, 2011).  However, these 
organizational outcomes are often multidimensional which can be measured a variety of ways 
(e.g., stock price, sales growth, return on assets, profit; Day & Lord, 1988; Donoher, Reed, & 
Storrud-Barnes, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  As a result of particular 
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organizational performance criteria, the overall consensus among scholars is poor performance 
results in higher dismissal probabilities (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
Though organizational performance is a significant factor, it has only been moderately 
effective in predicting dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000).  For instance, Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) 
found 49% of CEO dismissals occurred without evidence of poor stock performance in their 
industry which is one of many measures of organizational performance.  Similarly, other 
scholars concluded organizational performance accounts for less than half of the variance in the 
dismissal decision (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et al., 2000; Warner 
et al., 1988).  Nevertheless, when a CEO is dismissed, a replacement is required whom is often 
promoted from lower managerial ranks (Foreman & Soebbing, 2015) 
Managerial Promotions 
A firm seeking a candidate to replace their CEO may choose to search for the 
replacement using several different criteria depending on the situation.  These criteria may be 
based on whether to the firm should seek an internal candidate, a former CEO, a candidate with 
specific or general management experience, or a candidate whom possesses certain physical or 
personality traits.  Different circumstances will dictate whom the board of directors will seek to 
replace the CEO. 
When organizational performance within a firm is high, firms are more likely to promote 
top managers internally (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2006; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Furthermore, 
as time passes, more firms seek external candidates (Huson et al., 2001).  The trend toward 
external hiring is likely a result of top internal candidates not having internal promotion 
opportunities because top management turnover in more successful firms is less likely (Fee et al., 
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2006; Fredrickson et al., 1988), internal promotions in a given firm decrease the likelihood of 
future promotions within that firm (Acosta, 2010), and top candidates who are not promoted to 
CEO when opportunities arise often depart from the organization (Cannella & Shen, 2001). 
Successors with more general management experience typically have more relevant 
expertise to CEO positions than executives from more specialized backgrounds such as 
marketing (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).  However, consistent with the idea that better 
performing firms have fewer opportunities for upward mobility (Fee et al., 2006; Fredrickson et 
al., 1988), non-former CEOs typically come from firms with better performance than successors 
with CEO experience (Elsaid, Wang, & Davidson, 2011).  Nevertheless, the stock market reacts 
more favorably to firms that appoint former CEOs as opposed to successors with no CEO 
experience (Elsaid et al., 2011).  Additionally, this positive reaction occurs despite the fact that 
former CEOs may be hindered by past experiences or reliant on past experiences that occurred in 
different contexts (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015).  Since the contexts changed, but the CEOs 
decisions are based on the old context, the new decisions may be detrimental to firm 
performance (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015). 
 Top management promotion criteria may also be based on a candidate’s physical or 
personality traits.  For instance, hiring demographically homogenous candidates (i.e., candidates 
with the same demographic characteristics as the board of directors) increases acceptance and 
ease of communication (Kanter, 1977).  Therefore, powerful people tend to promote people 
similar to themselves (Useem & Karabel, 1986; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). 
 One of the most studied physical characteristics examined by scholars in the fields of 
economics, management, and sociology is race (Cook & Glass, 2014; Kanter, 1977; Solow, 
Solow, & Walker, 2011).  Overall, the consensus among the literature is there is a bias against 
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racial minorities in top management positions, sometime referred to as the glass ceiling (Cook & 
Glass, 2014; Kanter, 1977; Solow et al., 2011).  However, many of the studies which have 
examined racial bias in the labor market rely on survey data or labor force statistics which may 
not accurately reflect the capabilities of candidates or data regarding the supply of applicants 
(Solow et al., 2011).  Therefore, many scholars use sport as an empirical setting for examining 
racial discrimination in the labor market. 
Sport as an Empirical Setting 
 A number of studies examined various issues of importance related to management, 
economics, organizations, and leadership using sport (Day et al., 2012; Kahn, 2000; Wolfe et al., 
2005).  Sport has been used to examining non-sport-related phenomena for either its data or 
unique context (Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005).  Data from the sport industry are 
particularly advantageous because sport provides an ample amount of observable and accurately 
measured individual and organizational performance data spanning extended time periods 
(Borland & Lye 1996; Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005).  Moreover, data from sport comes 
from a setting which often uses highly incentivized and motivated participants which is a 
limitation faced by many researchers conducting traditional laboratory research (Goff & 
Tollison, 1990). 
 Research on managerial turnover and promotions in the corporate world is one area 
where access to information is often limited or poorly measured (Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et al., 2000; Solow et al., 2011).  
However, sport has been used as a viable empirical alternative to managerial turnover and 
promotion studies conducted in corporate settings (Day et al., 2012; Holmes, 2011; Solow et al., 
2011; Wolfe et al., 2005).  Several studies examined racial discrimination in the labor market 
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using sport as an empirical setting (e.g., Braddock, Smith, & Dawkins, 2012; Holmes, 2011; 
Madden, 2004; Solow et al., 2011). 
 Holmes (2011) adapted Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model of CEO dismissals to college 
football head coach dismissals.  Within, Holmes (2011) incorporated organizational 
performance, along with three of Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) four socio-political forces, to a 
model of head coach dismissals.  However, Fredrickson et al. (1988) warned “[t]hose interested 
in testing the present model should be aware that its ceteris paribus argument requires all 
variables to be included” (p. 268).  The one socio-political force identified by Fredrickson et al. 
(1988) that was missing in the Holmes (2011) model was the availability of qualified candidates 
to replace the CEO which was not present due to data limitations. 
 The empirical setting used in the dissertation is the National Football League (NFL).  
Given sociologists opine that sport reflects the greater society in which it exists, sport behaviors 
and practices seen in the NFL can also be observed in society (Coakley, 2015; Eitzen & Sage, 
1997).  For example, the implementation of the Rooney Rule in the NFL, which was established 
to provide minorities with more equal access to upper management positions, has been likened to 
affirmative action policies (Pike, 2011) and other organizational policies (Frier, 2015; Haselton, 
2017).  Another example comes from the NFL’s personal conduct policy which is representative 
of a growing trend of organizations holding their employees accountable for deviant behavior 
committed within and outside the workplace (Lyons et al., 2016).  Due to the availability of 
quality data from the NFL, combined with interesting policies established by the NFL, the NFL 
has proven an ideal setting for many labor and personnel studies that can be generalized to non-
sport industries (e.g., Lyons et al., 2016; Madden & Ruther, 2010).  The remainder of the 
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dissertation focuses on using data from the NFL to examine labor and personnel issues occurring 
within and outside sport. 
Dissertation Chapters 
 To fulfill the three-paper dissertation format set forth by the School of Kinesiology and in 
accordance with the Graduate School, this dissertation explores three separate research questions 
to further understand the leadership activities of dismissal and promotion of the executives.  
Similar to Holmes’ (2011) adaptation of the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model of CEO dismissals 
to football head coaches, I adapt the model for CEO dismissals to NFL head coaches in Chapter 
2.  In doing so, the focus is specifically on the pool of qualified candidates for head coaching 
positions.  In Chapter 3, I propose a fifth socio-political force of deviance to be incorporated 
within the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model of CEO dismissals and empirically test the model, as 
well as an NFL policy change regarding deviant behavior, using data from the NFL.  In Chapter 
4, I examine determinants of coach promotions in the NFL, specifically focusing on issues of 
race and centrality.  Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the three studies within this 
dissertation while offering overall contributions, implications, and avenues for future research 




THE ROLE OF CANDIDATE AVAILABILITY IN CEO DISMISSALS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE1 
 
Dismissing a chief executive officer (CEO) is a major event for an organization 
(Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) and one of the most 
important actions a board of directors takes (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006; Huson, Parrino, & 
Starks, 2001) as a CEO can represent part of the firms strategic resources (Keller, 2014). 
Fredrickson, et al. (1988) defined a dismissal as involuntary, where “[…] the CEO's departure is 
ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or her will” (p. 255). 
These CEO dismissals, and subsequent successions, may result in short-run financial losses for 
the firm and shareholders (Weisbach, 1988), long-run financial and organizational implications 
(Huson et al., 2001; Parrino, 1997), and organizational disruptions within the firm (Shen, 2003). 
In addition, “the dismissal of the CEO is particularly important to organizational theory because 
this form of succession most requires the understanding of organizational factors” (Fredrickson 
et al., 1988, p. 255).  
Little is known about the factors influencing decisions to dismiss CEOs (Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2006).  Organizational performance is a significant factor, however, it has only 
been moderately effective in predicting dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 
1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000).  Fredrickson et al. (1988) stated dismissing a CEO is 
not always a rational decision based on organizational performance and proposed a theoretical 
model for CEO dismissals incorporating socio-political constructs, those factors dealing with 
“interpersonal relations, coalitions, and power” (Fredrickson et al., 1988, p. 256).  These 
                                                 
1 This chapter previously appeared as Foreman & Soebbing, The Role of Candidate Availability in CEO Dismissals: 
An Examination of the National Football League, Journal of Management Policy & Practice, 2015. It is reprinted by 
permission of North American Business Press. 
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constructs identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) were the (a) board’s expectations and 
attributions, (b) board’s allegiances and values, (c) power of the incumbent CEO, and (d) 
availability of qualified candidates.  Furthermore, they warned “[…] those interested in testing 
the present model should be aware that its ceteris parabis argument requires all variables to be 
included” (p. 268).  Data limitations prevented many researchers from including all four socio-
political constructs in their models, predominantly excluding the availability of qualified 
candidates (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).  Due to data limitations providing only partial empirical 
tests of the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, “we are not yet in a position to test the whole model 
with large sample methods” (Pitcher et al., 2000, p. 626). 
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the comprehensive Fredrickson et al. 
(1988) model, specifically examining the role of candidate availability in CEO dismissals.  
Candidate availability is differentiated from other proxies such as firm and industry size and 
utilizes findings from previous research to develop a measurement of actual qualified candidates 
to fill CEO vacancies.  To test the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, NFL head football coaching 
involuntary dismissals from 1978 through 2012 are examined.  Previous research noted many 
similarities between the role and responsibility of an NFL head coach and a CEO (e.g., Ndofor, 
Priem, Rathburn, & Dhir, 2009).  Estimating a logistic regression model, the present research 
finds candidate availability does not impact dismissals.  This result challenges previous research 
using proxies for candidate availability which showed a significant impact.  As a result, the 
present research contributes to the literature by challenging the existing literature regarding the 
role that candidate availability plays in regards to organizations deciding to dismiss their CEO.  
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Literature Review 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) argued, in addition to organizational performance, socio-
political factors help explain boards’ decisions to retain or dismiss CEOs.  Three of the four 
socio-political factors identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) have been examined extensively in 
the literature.  Board’s expectation, proxied by financial analysts’ earnings and earnings per 
share forecasts, provided empirical evidence in support of CEO dismissals occurring after an 
organization, and by extension a CEO, achieves results which fail to meet expectations (Farrell 
& Whidbee, 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991).  Boards of directors who have allegiances toward 
CEOs will likely be less critical of the CEO’s performance, especially for directors who 
appointed the CEO (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).  Additionally, longer tenures shared between 
the directors and the CEO result in enhanced trust, and therefore, stronger allegiances (Kosnik, 
1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  CEO dismissals were also less likely to occur when CEOs 
hold power in a firm, whether through ownership (Boeker, 1992; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980), 
CEO duality (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), or CEO tenure (Lausten, 2002). 
The fourth socio-political factor identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) is the availability 
of qualified candidates.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) theorized if a supply of qualified candidates 
exists to replace the incumbent CEO, a dismissal is more likely to occur, holding constant all 
other socio-political factors.  Directly examining the link between candidate availability and 
CEO dismissals is a difficult task.  The hiring process of firms is secretive, further limiting the 
abilities of researchers to examine its effect on dismissals (Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 
2011).  Therefore, researchers examined the availability of qualified candidates by utilizing 
characteristics pertaining to country-specific industry and firm sizes (e.g., Crossland & Chen, 
2013; Parrino, 1997) or omitted the variable altogether (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). 
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One justification for excluding candidate availability from CEO dismissal models is the 
assumption that a Board of Directors would not dismiss a CEO if a pool of qualified candidates 
were not readily available (Crossland & Chen, 2013).  Neglecting candidate availability in the 
CEO dismissal model by assuming Board of Directors competence challenges the framework 
and warning brought forth by Fredrickson et al. (1988).  Furthermore, assuming Board of 
Directors’ competence instead of including qualified candidate availability in a model can be 
challenged by the irrationality in the succession decision making process (Khurana, 2002).  
Another discrepancy in assuming the existence of a qualified candidate pool is the pool of 
candidates with the necessary leadership experience is limited and may be further limited when 
searching for candidates with experience within the particular industry (Davidson, Ning, 
Rakowski, & Elsaid, 2008). 
Dalton and Kesner (1983) stated larger firms have more potential candidates.  Therefore, 
it is commonplace for researchers to proxy for internal candidates availability by using measures 
of firm size such as number of employees in a firm (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003) or sales figures 
(Huson et al., 2001).  These proxies often neglect the availability of external candidates and are 
highly correlated with other factors such as size of the Board of Directors (Huson et al., 2001), 
which may be linked to CEO dismissals due to decreases in profitability (Eisenberg, Sundgren, 
& Wells, 1998) or lack of consensus among directors (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  Thus, these 
factors are not necessarily due to increased candidate availability. 
Though many studies have either neglected candidate availability or attempted to proxy 
for candidate availability without examining the quantity of actual available and qualified 
candidates, researchers have been able to produce information regarding candidates for CEO 
vacancies.  Parrino (1997) stated “CEOs at firms in homogeneous industries are more likely to be 
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forced from their positions and are more likely to be replaced by executives from other firms in 
their industries” (p. 195).  Jalal and Prezas (2012) contributed to Parrino’s (1997) findings by 
revealing firms from larger industries (i.e., industries with larger numbers of firms) were more 
likely to appoint successors from within their industry.  Greve (2009) stated the labor market for 
CEOs is a national one, prompting Crossland and Chen (2013) to operationalize the availability 
of qualified candidate in their international research to a country-specific candidate pool. 
Previous research identified organizational performance, expectations, allegiances and 
values, CEO power, and candidate availability as possible causes of CEO dismissals.  The 
availability of qualified candidates is often neglected in empirical models, however, variables 
such as firm size are used as a proxy which does not necessarily reflect availability.  The NFL is 
examined to look at the role that candidate availability impacts decision to dismiss the CEO. 
Empirical Setting 
To test the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, data on head coaching dismissals in the NFL 
from 1978 through 2012 is used.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) compared NFL head coaches to CEOs 
in terms of tenure.  Previous research cited the usefulness of data available using sport as an 
empirical setting to quantitatively examine economic and managerial theories and phenomena, 
with executive turnover and succession being a common area of research (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 
2012).  
Formed in 1920, the NFL grew to become the most popular professional sport in the 
United States.  For the 2014-2015 season, the NFL has 32 teams in 30 U.S. Government defined 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas.  According to Forbes magazine, the average franchise value for 
an NFL team in 2013 was $1.17 billion.  In terms of examining involuntary dismissals, the NFL 
provides homogenous industry (i.e., specific to elite football) in which firm sizes (i.e., rosters and 
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coaching staffs) are similar and industry size is relatively stable (28 teams in 1976 to 32 teams in 
2014).  Contrary to other industries, the league, its member clubs, and its coaches represent a 
relatively closed group of individuals whereas one does not see a movement out of the industry 
(e.g., football coach to automobile company) compared to other industries. 
Method 
To examine coaching dismissals in the NFL, secondary data are utilized covering a 
sample period from the 1978-1979 season through the 2012-2013 season regarding head coach 
turnover and team and coach characteristics.  The unit of observation is a team-season.  The 35 
season sample period yields 1,041 team-season observations.  The binary dependent variable of 
involuntary dismissal (DISMISS) was coded with the value of 1 if the head coach who began the 
season was involuntarily dismissed from the team’s head coach position.  To decipher whether a 
coach left voluntarily or involuntarily, a review of newspaper articles was utilized through 
Factiva (academic license) where key terms synonymous with fired2 were used to separate 
voluntary from involuntary dismissals. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables revolve around the pool of available and qualified candidates 
who would be likely replacements for a dismissed head coach.  Most NFL head coach successors 
are already employed by an NFL team as offensive and defensive coordinators.  In addition, 
former NFL head coaches who departed from their previous position are also available to be 
hired (Mielke, 2007; Solow, Solow, & Walker 2011).  As a result, variables for available and 
qualified candidates for both NFL coordinators and former NFL head coaches are used.  The 
assumption made in the present research is NFL offensive and defensive coordinators aspire to 
                                                 
2 Other keywords used to differentiate dismissals from voluntary departures were dismissed, ousted, and forced to 
resign. 
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secure NFL head coaching positions, and are, therefore, available per the criteria established by 
Fredrickson et al. (1988).  Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2006) found NFL coordinators promoted to 
NFL head coaches were often high performing individuals on high performing teams.  Therefore, 
NFL coordinators are deemed to be available and qualified if they meet both of the following 
criteria.  First, in the observed season, they were on a team which exhibited sustained 
organizational performance defined by an average team winning percentage within the top 20 
percent of the NFL (which would be the top six teams in the current NFL structure, including 
any additional teams who are tied for a top six position) over the three year period prior to the 
observed season.  Second, in the observed season, their team had a top 20 percent offense 
(defense) in terms of points scored (allowed).  If an offensive (defensive) coordinator satisfies 
both of these criteria, he is included in the offensive and defensive coordinator pool 
(OCDCPOOL). 
For the pool of available and qualified former head coaches, head coaches who were 
involuntarily dismissed (e.g., did not retire or otherwise voluntarily leave the organization) in the 
observed or previous season and who were not hired as head coaches at the end of the observed 
season are considered to be available candidates for head coaching positions.  Since former head 
coaches already demonstrated their abilities as head coaches, and some of the uncertainty 
associated with promotions is reduced (Longley & Wong, 2011), coaches can be evaluated based 
on their head coaching performance.  Former head coaches are identified as qualified if they: (a) 
had more winning seasons (i.e., full seasons in which they won more games than they lost) than 
non-winning seasons or (b) won more than half of their games in their career as a head coach.  If 
a former head coach is available, qualified, and involuntarily dismissed in the previous season, 
he is included in the PREVYRHC pool of candidates and if the available, qualified head coach 
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was dismissed in the observed season, he is included in the CURRYRHC pool of candidates.3  
For teams dismissing their winning head coach during the season, one candidate is subtracted 
from CURRYRHC since the dismissing team is not likely to rehire the same head coach 
dismissed during the observed season.  The three aforementioned independent variables (i.e., 
OCDCPOOL, PREVYRHC, and CURRYRHC) are tabulated to form a fourth variable, the entire 
NFL head coach candidate pool (CANDPOOL). 
Control Variables 
To control for other confounding factors, 21 control variables are utilized.  These control 
variables fall into the following categories: (a) organizational performance, (b) the other three 
socio-political factors identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) (i.e., expectations and attributions, 
values and allegiances, and incumbent power), (c) candidate-related controls, (d) ownership 
types, and (e) demographic variables.  Regular season winning percentage in the observed season 
(WINPCT) is used to measure organizational performance. 
Expectations can be based on previous organizational performance, which may have 
established a standard for the organization, as well as current expectations.  Performance 
expectations are modeled in two ways.  The first way is based on historical organizational 
performance similar to Holmes (2011), accounting for performance in terms of regular season 
win percentage from the previous season (WINPCTj-1), two seasons prior to the observed season 
(WINPCTj-2), and three through 10 seasons prior to the observed season (WINPCTj-3→10).  For 
teams which have not been in existence one, two, or three years prior to the observed season, the 
observation is removed from the sample.  For WINPCTj-3→10, if a team has not been in existence 
                                                 
3 There was no significant difference between the raw number of fired head coaches and the number of head coaches 
standardized by the number of teams per season. 
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for the full 10 years prior to the observed season, the average for the available years in that time 
span is used.  
The second way looks at evaluations by outside individuals.  In non-sport businesses, 
these expectations generally come from outside investment analysts (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). 
These outside analysts provide estimates regarding key performance measures and “mediate 
information flows between companies and other market participants who may invest in or do 
business with these firms” (Pollock & Gulati, 2007, p. 347).  Previous research found upper 
managers of organizations not performing relative to the expectations are more likely to be 
dismissed (e.g., Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991).  
To model outside performance expectations, the percentage of regular season games a 
team covered against the point spread as established by the betting markets (COVERATS) is 
used.  A point spread is a prediction regarding the closeness of the game when including all 
relevant information (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010).  Despite various biases found in betting 
markets (e.g., sentiment bias), point spreads are still efficient predictors of actual game outcomes 
(Sauer, 1998).  In addition, unlike non-sport CEOs who actively manage external performance 
expectations (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003), NFL coaches do not actively manage point spreads. 
Frederickson et al. (1988) noted that board’s allegiances and values were also important 
indicators of a CEO dismissal.  Board’s allegiances and values are operationalized in three ways. 
The first allegiances and values variable accounts for the observed head coach’s win percentage 
against conference opponents which was also used by Holmes (2011).  Due to the scheduling 
differences between college football and the NFL, examining games against division opponents 
in the NFL would be highly correlated with overall winning percentages since for a large portion 
of this sample, half of a team’s opponents were from within their division.  Another allegiances 
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and values variable Holmes (2011) used was a bowl games variable which subtracts the number 
of bowl game losses from bowl game.  Holmes found this variable to be statistically 
insignificant.  Bowl games, which are postseason games typically played by highly visible and 
top performing college teams, are similar to playoff games in the NFL.  A head coach’s playoff 
success in this study was calculated in the same fashion as in the Holmes model with playoff 
losses subtracted from playoff wins (PLAYOFFS). 
The board of directors makes the CEO dismissal decisions (Mintzberg, 1983).  Therefore, 
if a relationship has been established and concurrent tenures have forged a partnership in which 
both parties have agreed on the desired direction of the organization, allegiances will be strong 
and CEO dismissal will be less likely (Mizruchi, 1983; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  To model this 
relationship, Holmes (2011) used a dichotomous variable indicating if the college had a new 
athletic director.  Athletic directors are responsible for making personnel decisions in athletic 
departments such as the dismissal of a head coach (Marburger, 2013).  In the NFL, a general 
manager who may also be responsible for personnel decisions regarding the hiring and firing of 
athletes (Brown, Farrell, & Zorn, 2007).  Instead of using a dichotomous variable to establish 
whether a new general manager was hired for an observed season, the present research uses a 
variable that subtracts the number of seasons the general manager has been employed by the 
team from the number of seasons the head coach has been employed by a team (HCGMDIFF). 
The remaining major factor influencing CEO dismissal according to Fredrickson et al. 
(1988) is incumbent power.  In the NFL, it is possible for the head coach to hold an additional 
position within the organization which allows him to make direct decisions on matters such as 
the hiring and firing of athletes such as a general manager or director of player personnel 
position.  A dichotomous variable (DUALROLE) in this study is used to identify whether a head 
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coach has this additional role and is coded with the value of 1 if he does have a dual role. 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) also stated that, due to the increasing power of the CEO over time, there 
is an inverse relationship between CEO tenure and the likelihood of dismissal.  Therefore, a 
variable for head coach tenure (TENURE) is included.  Additionally, to account for a possible 
reluctance to dismiss a CEO with less than one year of tenure, a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether a CEO is in his first year (coded with the value of one) or not (coded with the value of 
zero) is included in the models (FIRSTYR). 
To separate the effects of the candidate pool independent variables from often used 
proxies such as firm size, a firm size variable is included in the models (FIRMSIZE).4 FIRMSIZE 
is the size of the market for the metropolitan statistical area population (in millions) of the 
organization.  Since the independent variables of interest measure the supply of qualified 
candidates available for head coach positions, it is also important to control for candidate 
demand.  Consistent with Allen and Chadwick (2012), the number of head coaching vacancies in 
the observed season (OPENINGS) is included, regardless of head coach departures.5 This 
approach prevents artificially inflating the correlation among the observations with dismissals. 
Different types of ownership structures can result in distinct variations in the 
organizational decision-making process.  Carroll (1984) suggested founders of organizations 
typically possess characteristics which guide their decision-making differently from their 
successors.  Andres (2008) reinforced the idea that founders operate differently by examining 
differences between founding-family owned organizations and family owned organizations 
                                                 
4 Another often used proxy for candidate availability is industry size. The number of franchises in the NFL was 
included as a control variable, but since the number of franchises remained relatively constant (only varying from 28 
to 32) in the sample period and the variable is statistically insignificant and did not alter the other variable 
coefficients in terms of sign and significance, the variable was excluded from the model. 
5 For the observations in which a dismissal is recorded, the OPENINGS variable consists of the number of 
vacancies minus the vacancy which is a result of the observed dismissal. 
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which were not founders.  Therefore, a dichotomous variable indicating whether an owner was 
the original owner of the organization (ORIGINAL) is included in the model.  This variable is 
coded with a value of 1 for original owners and 0 otherwise. 
Though Fredrickson et al. (1988) focused on publicly owned organizations, the unique 
data set in the present study incorporates publicly owned, consortium owned, sole proprietor 
owned, and family owned organizations.  As stated previously, different ownership structures 
may cause an organization to behave differently (Winfree & Rosentraub, 2012).  Thus, four 
dichotomous and mutually exclusive ownership variables are used in the model with the 
reference group being franchises that are publicly owned.  The majority owner of each observed 
franchise is categorized as either owners by consortium (CONSORT), single owners (SINGLE), 
or family owners.  Acknowledging the first generation of family ownership may be significantly 
different from subsequent generations (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), family owners are partitioned 
into the first generation of family ownership (FIRSTGEN) and subsequent generations of family 
ownership (SUBGEN).  Data on ownership types were gathered from online media sites, which 
identified majority and original owners (primarily through pro-football-reference.com).  Once 
majority owners were identified, media sites were used to best decipher whether the majority 
owner was a sole owner, consortium owner, first generation owner, or subsequent generation 
owner. 
The final two control variables are demographic variable for the age of the head coach 
(AGE) and whether the head coach is a visible racial minority (MINORITY).  The minority status 
of head coaches in relation to dismissals has been examined in previous research regarding NFL 




The model takes the broad form: 
DISMISSij = β1(INDVAR)ij + β2(WINPCT)ij + β3(WINPCT)i(j-1) + β4(WINPCT)i(j-2) + 
β5(WINPCT)i(j-3→10) + β6(COVERATS)ij + β7(PLAYOFFS)ij + β8(DIVISION)ij + 
β9(HCGMDIFF)ij + β10(HCOWNDIFF)ij + β11(DUALROLE)ij + β12(TENURE)ij + 
β13(FIRSTYR)ij + β14(FIRMSIZE)ij + β20(OPENINGS)ij + β15(ORIGINAL)ij + β16(SINGLE)ij + 
β17(CONSORT)ij + β18(FIRSTGEN)ij + β19(SUBGEN)ij + β21(MINORITY)ij + β22(AGE)ij + eij 
where i indicates team, j indicates season, and e is the error term.  Since the dependent variable 
(DISMISS) is a dichotomous variable, discrete estimation techniques such as logit and probit 
should be used (Maddala, 1983).  In the present study, a logistic regression model is estimated.  
Estimation Issues 
The correlation coefficients between each of the variables in the model were examined to 
look for multicollinearity.  None of the coefficients exceeded the standard threshold of 0.8, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  A Hausman test 
was conducted and indicated controlling for random effects was more appropriate than fixed 
effects. 
In addition, some team-season observations are eliminated in the present research.  Some 
teams have not been in the NFL for at least three seasons.  The 1978 observations from the 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers and Seattle Seahawks were removed due to being established in 1976 
and not having sufficient data for WINPCTj-3→10.  Sufficient data were also not available for 
WINPCTj-3→10 for the Carolina Panthers or Jacksonville Jaguars in 1995, 1996, and 1997 since 
there first NFL season was in 1995.  Similarly, the Cleveland Browns emerged again in 1999 and 
the Houston Texans’ first season was in 2002, so each of these teams is missing data for 
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WINPCTj-3→10 for the first three seasons of their respective existences.  As a result of these 
eliminations, the final sample has 1,027 team-season observations. 
Results 
Summary statistics revealing the means and standard deviations of the dependent 
variable, independent variables, and control variables are exhibited in Table 2.1.  In this sample, 
the average annual dismissal rate was 15.1%.  An average of five coordinators and one dismissed 
Table 2.1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
DISMISS  0.151 0.358 0 1 0 
OCDCPOOL  5.022 1.527 1 9 5 
PREVYRHC  1.246 1.131 0 4 1 
CURRYRHC  0.339 0.675 0 3 0 
CANDPOOL  6.608 2.098 1 13 6 
WINPCT  0.501 0.188 0.000 1.000 0.500 
WINPCTj-1  0.502 0.188 0.000 1.000 0.500 
WINPCTj-2  0.502 0.189 0.000 1.000 0.500 
WINPCTj-3→10  0.496 0.117 0.000 0.786 0.494 
COVERATS  0.513 0.119 0.188 0.875 0.500 
PLAYOFFS  0.455 2.257 -4 12 0 
DIVISION  4.101 12.979 -18 67 2 
HCGMDIFF  -2.316 7.295 -45 22 0 
HCOWNDIFF  -14.844 16.567 -83 24 -11 
DUALROLE  0.136 0.343 0 1 0 
TENURE  3.467 4.279 0 28 2 
FIRMSIZE  4.309 4.196 0.220 19.832 2.857 
OPENINGS  5.828 2.251 1 11 6 
ORIGINAL  0.202 0.401 0 1 0 
SINGLE  0.394 0.489 0 1 0 
CONSORT  0.219 0.414 0 1 0 
FIRSTGEN  0.213 0.410 0 1 0 
SUBGEN  0.139 0.346 0 1 0 
PUBLIC  0.034 0.182 0 1 0 
MINORITY  0.097 0.297 0 1 0 
AGE  50.559 6.867 32 72 50 
N=1,027 
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head coach from the previous season were identified as for the proxy of being available and 
qualified for a head coach position.  About one head coach per three seasons who was dismissed 
within the season fit the criteria of being a qualified head coach candidate.  
 Table 2.2 displays the random effects logistic regression results.  In Table 2.2, five 
different models estimations are displayed.  The first three models include only one of the three 
elements of the candidate pool explained earlier in this article.  The fourth model includes each 
candidate pool qualification.  The final model includes a combined count of these three elements.  
The independent variables of interest OCDCPOOL, PREVYRHC, and CANDPOOL have 
negative coefficients and are statistically insignificant in each of the models.  On the other hand, 
CURRYRHC has a positive coefficient, but is also statistically insignificant. 
Table 2.2 












OCDCPOOL -0.052 -- -- -0.055 -- 
 (0.070)   (0.071)  
PREVYRHC -- -0.067 -- -0.043 -- 
  (0.097)  (0.100)  
CURRYRHC -- -- 0.156 0.153 -- 
   (0.152) (0.155)  
CANDPOOL -- -- -- -- -0.030 
     (0.052) 
WINPCT -6.194*** -6.149*** -6.165*** -6.162*** -6.177*** 
 (0.893) (0.893) (0.891) (0.893) (0.893) 
WINPCTj-1 -0.638 -0.638 -0.652 -0.616 -0.638 
 (0.729) (0.730) (0.729) (0.731) (0.730) 
WINPCTj-2 0.917 0.890 0.877 0.874 0.912 
 (0.641) (0.643) (0.642) (0.642) (0.642) 
WINPCTj-3→10 1.331 1.310 1.333 1.385 1.316 
 (1.120) (1.120) (1.117) (1.120) (1.120) 
COVERATS -2.431** -2.453** -2.453** -2.457** -2.438** 
 (1.211) (1.208) (1.209) (1.212) (1.209) 
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PLAYOFFS -0.231*** -0.226*** -0.224*** -0.230*** -0.229*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) 
DIVISION -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
HCGMDIFF -0.032** -0.031** -0.033** -0.032** -0.032** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
HCOWNDIFF -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
DUALROLE -0.432 -0.443 -0.460 -0.428 -0.435 
 (0.352) (0.351) (0.350) (0.353) (0.353) 
TENURE 0.102** 0.103** 0.104** 0.102** 0.102** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
FIRSTYR -1.511*** -1.488*** -1.496*** -1.493*** -1.502*** 
 (0.358) (0.357) (0.357) (0.358) (0.357) 
FIRMSIZE -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
OPENINGS 0.010 <0.001 -0.004 -0.009 0.008 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.047) 
ORIGINAL -0.285 -0.275 -0.264 -0.293 -0.281 
 (0.298) (0.297) (0.297) (0.299) (0.298) 
SINGLE 0.263 0.266 0.174 0.269 0.272 
 (0.794) (0.797) (0.794) (0.801) (0.799) 
CONSORT 0.723 0.718 0.602 0.707 0.733 
 (0.869) (0.870) (0.868) (0.876) (0.874) 
FIRSTGEN 0.245 0.240 0.158 0.245 0.250 
 (0.815) (0.815) (0.814) (0.819) (0.818) 
SUBGEN 0.140 0.147 0.012 0.143 0.155 
 (0.892) (0.894) (0.889) (0.902) (0.900) 
MINORITY 0.111 0.129 0.126 0.129 0.117 
 (0.367) (0.367) (0.367) (0.367) (0.367) 
AGE 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 0.442 0.340 0.297 0.509 0.397 
 (1.554) (1.540) (1.535) (1.554) (1.552) 
Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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In all five models, the variables WINPCT, COVERATS, PLAYOFFS, DIVISION, 
HCGMDIFF, and FIRSTYR all have negative and statistically significant coefficients.  TENURE 
is also statistically significant in each of the models, but has a positive coefficient.  All of the 
measures of previous winning percentages, HCOWNDIFF, DUALROLE, FIRMSIZE, 
OPENINGS, all of the ownership types, and both demographic variables were statistically 
insignificant in all five models. 
Robustness Checks 
Several robustness checks were conducted to analyze the robustness of the findings 
presented in Table 2.2, especially in relation to the independent variables.  Various other 
measures were utilized in an attempt to objectively identify and accurately measure the pool of 
candidates such as college coaches who were ranked in the top five of the team rankings and 
under the age of 50 years old, top offensive coordinators who worked under head coaches from 
defensive-minded backgrounds and vice versa, all head coaches who were dismissed the year 
prior who were unable to secure head coaching positions in the observed year rather than just 
those with winning records, and all head coaches who were dismissed during the observed 
season rather than just those with winning records.  Other control variables were included in the 
model such as tenure squared, organization age, season (i.e., year), dummy variables for major 
institutional changes within the NFL (i.e., the salary cap6 and the Rooney Rule7), and a count of 
voluntary exits in the season.  None of these variations significantly altered coefficient 
magnitudes or statistical significance of the independent or control variables which provides 
evidence for the robustness of the results presented in Table 2.2. 
                                                 
6 The salary cap was instituted in 1993 and set limits on how the collective salary of the team which could be paid 
by an NFL franchise. 
7 The Rooney Rule was instituted in 2003 and requires NFL teams to interview at least one minority candidate for 
head coaching vacancies (Solow et al., 2011). 
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Discussion 
 Understanding the socio-political determinants of CEO dismissals is an important area of 
research (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  The focus of the present study was to use the framework 
provided by Fredrickson et al. (1988) to develop a comprehensive model for dismissals which 
included the availability of qualified candidates by identifying actual candidates rather than a 
proxy for the variable such as firm or industry size.  Previous research guided the formation of a 
pool of available and qualified candidates to quantify the degree to which candidate availability 
increased the likelihood of CEO dismissals.  Additionally, other factors pertinent to CEO 
dismissal decisions were identified such as ownership types were included in this study. 
 Whether estimating regression models to examine the impact of each of the independent 
variables separately, together, or all combined in a single variable, the availability of qualified 
candidates, as defined in the present study, has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood 
of a CEO being dismissed.  Furthermore, with one exception, each of the independent variables 
measuring candidate pools had negative coefficients which, if statistically significant, would be 
counterintuitive since previous literature states candidate pools and CEO dismissals should have 
a positive relationship (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Parrino, 1997).  The statistically insignificant 
findings challenge the previous research which used firm and industry size to proxy for candidate 
availability.  The insignificant results may also be a reflection of candidate pools which include 
unqualified candidates or exclude qualified candidates, or the irrationality of decision makers in 
the CEO dismissal process. 
 The candidate pools were proxies for dismissed CEOs and promising top managers who 
could likely be promoted to fill a CEO vacancy.  Though necessary measures were taken to 
determine which candidates would be included within the candidate pools, it is probable that 
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candidates were included in the pool that was not being considered for any CEO vacancies, and 
conversely, there were candidates being considered for vacancies who were not included in the 
pools.  However, the extent to which these instances occurred are unknown since data are limited 
with the information pertaining to team’s candidate list.  One factor which could have 
significantly affected the candidates being considered to fill vacancies is the preferences of the 
firm and possible CEO-firm matches.  Fee et al. (2006) found no statistically significant 
difference in promotion rates between offensive and defensive coordinators, however, Solow et 
al. (2011) noted “[b]eing an offensive coordinator increases the probability of 
promotion…although [the effect is] small and only marginally significant” (p. 335).  Perhaps 
certain firms will be more inclined to hire a specific type of CEO, whether the criterion is based 
on the executive’s specialty, strategic philosophy, or what type of CEO the predecessor was. 
 Another possible explanation for the null results of the independent variables, and the 
explanation most supported by previous literature, is the idea of decision makers behaving 
irrationally.  Boards of directors have been known to behave irrationally when dismissing CEOs 
by not acting in the best interest of the firm.  These irrational decisions may come at the 
detriment of organizational performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988) and may not have included a 
complete set of information on which to base these important decisions (Khurana, 2002). 
Therefore, boards of director may dismiss CEOs without having a sufficient pool of candidates 
to secure a proficient successor. 
The FIRMSIZE variable was also statistically insignificant in this study.  Though 
previous studies have found significant results for this variable, the differences in the observed 
industries and proxies are likely the cause for the differences in results.  Firms within the NFL 
are relatively homogenous in terms of the number of the CEOs oversees.  Therefore, firm size is 
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largely controlled for already.  In comparison to the studies which have used firm revenues as 
measures of firm size and therefore candidate availability, the proxy used in the present study 
may not be representative of firm revenues due to unique attributes of the NFL such as revenue 
sharing.  Furthermore, even if revenue was an adequate proxy for firm size in the NFL, the data 
are not publicly available.  Even though firm size was not measured in this study, the relative 
homogeneity of firms within the NFL virtually controls for this factor. 
Despite evidence indicating ownership structures affect decision making, no evidence 
exists in the context of the present study to support this claim.  This lack of supporting evidence 
may be attributed to the varying degrees of involvement in decision making from the firm 
ownership.  Some NFL owners may play an active role in the decision to retain or dismiss CEOs, 
whereas other owners may leave this decision entirely to the discretion of general managers.  The 
lack of owner involvement by at least some organizations may have contributed to the 
statistically insignificant coefficients for the HCOWNDIFF variable when the HCGMDIFF 
variable was significant. 
 The regression models did, however, produce statistically significant results for 
organizational performance as well as at least one variable representative of each of the other 
three sociopolitical factors identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988).  Table 2.3 presents the actual 
change in the probability of dismissal.  As shown in Table 2.3, going from the worst 
organizational performance to the best organizational performance, within the scope of this 
sample, decreases the likelihood of CEO dismissal by 62%, with all other variables held constant 
at their means.  Organizational performance accounts for the most substantial change in CEO 
dismissal likelihood.  The second most substantial factor is that of CEO tenure which, according 
to Fredrickson et al. (1988), represents both the board’s allegiances and values and the 
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incumbent CEO’s power socio-political constructs.  CEOs with 28 years of tenure within an 
organization results in a 42% increase in the likelihood of dismissal when compared to a CEO 
with less than one year experience.  This positive relationship between CEO tenure and 
likelihood of dismissal is contrary to the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model for CEO dismissals, 
however, it is a relationship found in similar studies (Holmes, 2011).  Differences among 
previous literature and the present study may be attributable to the inclusion of a variable in the 
present study which measures difference in tenure between the head coach and board of 
directors.  The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant indicating an increase in 
CEO tenure, relative to board of director tenure, decreases the probability of CEO dismissal. 
This variable represents incumbent CEO power and reduced the likelihood of dismissal by 19% 
when examining the difference between the maximum years of CEO tenure less board tenure 
(i.e., 22 years) and the minimum years of CEO tenure less board tenure (i.e., 45 years) in this 
sample. 
The other significant variables representing the board’s allegiances and values were 
measures of career success against close rival and elite competitors.  A CEO with the maximum 
success against close rivals realizes a 16% decrease in dismissal likelihood when compared to a 
CEO with the minimum success against close rival competitors in this sample.  Similarly, a CEO 
with the most success against elite competitors can expect a 17% decrease in the likelihood of 
dismissal relative to the least successful CEO in terms of competing against elite rivals.  These 
two board allegiances and values variables are consistent with previous literature stating the 
more a CEO embodies characteristics valued by the board of directors, the less likely a CEO 
dismissal will occur.  The only statistically significant variable representing the board’s 
expectations was that of the expectations of the observed year (i.e., not expectations based on 
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previous organizational performance).  A CEO who meets or exceeds expectations the most in 
this sample experiences an 11% decrease in dismissal probability compared to a CEO who most 
infrequently meets or exceeds expectations. 
Table 2.3 












OCDCPOOL -0.027 -- -- -0.029 -- 
PREVYRHC -- -0.018 -- -0.011 -- 
CURRYRHC -- -- 0.035 0.035 -- 
CANDPOOL -- -- -- -- -0.023 
WINPCT -0.620 -0.616 -0.617 -0.615 -0.619 
WINPCTj-1 0.042 0.042 -0.043 0.040 0.042 
WINPCTj-2 0.060 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.060 
WINPCTj-3→10 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.064 0.061 
COVERATS -0.111 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.111 
PLAYOFFS -0.167 -0.164 -0.163 -0.166 -0.166 
DIVISION -0.160 -0.161 -0.161 -0.161 -0.161 
HCGMDIFF -0.192 -0.188 -0.200 -0.194 -0.189 
HCOWNDIFF -0.050 -0.047 -0.037 -0.045 -0.048 
DUALROLE -0.024 -0.025 -0.026 -0.024 -0.025 
TENURE 0.428 0.431 0.438 0.423 0.429 
FIRSTYR -0.070 -0.070 -0.070 -0.069 -0.070 
FIRMSIZE <-0.001 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 
OPENINGS 0.006 <0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.005 
ORIGINAL -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 
SINGLE 0.017 0.018 0.011 0.018 0.018 
CONSORTIUM 0.060 0.056 0.045 0.054 0.057 
FIRSTGEN 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.017 0.017 
SECONDGEN 0.010 0.010 <0.001 0.010 0.011 
MINORITY 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 





This research examined the role of candidate availability in CEO dismissal decisions by 
examining NFL head coaching dismissals.  The present study offered an original perspective on 
candidate availability in which candidates were viewed as individuals available for CEO 
vacancies rather than being proxied by industry or firm sizes.  The unique sample of data were 
able to control for both industry and firm size further isolating the effects of the candidate pools.  
The null findings contribute to the extent literature by challenging the effect of candidate 
availability on CEO dismissals and providing guidance on identifying candidate pools. 
Organizational theorists are encouraged to build upon this study to further evaluate the effect of 
candidate pools separate from firm and industry size. 
The present study is not without its limitations.  One limitation faced revolves around 
how the candidate pools were measured and the boards of directors make their decisions.  
Limited information is available regarding which candidates are interviewed to potentially fill 
CEO vacancies.  Furthermore, the criteria used by boards of directors to evaluate and select 
candidates are not disclosed to the public.  Future research can work towards reducing these 
limitations by searching through media sources to identify which candidates were actually 
interviewed for which vacancies to determine how firms decide who to interview and ultimately 
who they select.  A component of this may incorporate board’s allegiances and values in 
determining the pool of candidates.  Future research could also examine if the caliber of 
candidates influences decisions rather than limiting the candidate pool to a count of available and 
qualified candidates.  Future research can examine whether boards dismiss CEOs based on herd 
behavior in which boards decisions are based on the actions of boards at other firms (Banerjee, 
1992).  Finally, future research could build on the role of ownership structures in CEO 
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EXECUTIVE DEVIANCE AS A SOCIOLPOLITICAL FORCE IN CEO 
DISMISSALS 
Within Chapter 2, Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) provided a theoretical 
framework for understanding CEO dismissals.  They defined a dismissal as “a situation in which 
the CEO’s departure is ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or 
her will” (Fredrickson et al., 1988, p. 255).  These complex events are not solely based on the 
organization’s performance, but also on sociopolitical forces which span several domains 
including the expectation of the organizational performance, the CEO’s power within the 
organization, coalitions formed, and relations with others (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Chapter 2 
analyzed the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, paying particular attention to the role candidate 
availability plays in the dismissal or retention of a CEO. 
 Absent from Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model and subsequent research is a discussion 
regarding the impact of executive or employee deviance on CEO dismissals.  This absence is 
particularly interesting because executive deviance is a force that affects and is effected by 
interpersonal relations, coalitions, and power; thus making it a sociopolitical force that may 
contribute to CEO dismissals (e.g., Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2015; Haynes, Josefy, & Hitt, 
2015; Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2015; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013). 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand executive deviance as an additional 
mediating sociopolitical force in the model of CEO dismissals.  Executive deviance is a subset of 
elite deviance and encompasses executives own deviance but also the deviance of subordinates.  
In addition to understanding the mediating role that deviance plays in the dismissal decision, the 
present study explores how an institutional policy pertaining to the personal conduct of 
employees potentially moderates the relationship that deviance plays in executive dismissals.   
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To study these relationships, the present study uses data regarding coaching dismissals 
from the National Football League from 2000 through 2016.  During this sample period, not only 
are data on deviance inside and outside of the workplace available, but the league also instituted 
and modified a personal conduct policy outlining punishments for acting in such a way that is 
detrimental to the league.   
To analyze coaching dismissals, the present research estimates a hazard model.  The 
results indicate dismissals of executives based on executive deviance are not limited to the direct 
deviant actions of the executive, but also the deviant behaviors of subordinates within a given 
executive’s organization.  Empirical support indicates head coaches are held responsible for 
deviance committed by players when the players’ actions result in team consequences.  
However, following a policy modification emphasizing personal conduct in which team 
consequences are more prevalent following acts of deviance, head coaches may be able to 
forestall their dismissal by using player suspensions as an excuse for poor performance.  
Furthermore, prior to the institutional emphasis on personal conduct, head coaches were more 
likely to be retained if they had deviant players, however, after the increased emphasis on 
personal conduct, head coaches were more likely to be dismissed when players were being fined 
or incurring on-field penalties for their deviant actions.  Therefore, head coaches may be able to 
strategically utilize deviant behaviors and the PCP modification to forestall their dismissal. 
The findings in the present study make a number of contributions.  First, while previous 
research explored various elements of employee and organizational deviance and misconduct 
(e.g., Lyons et al., 2016; Michalak & Ashkanasy, 2013; Robinson & Bennett, 1995), limited 
research explores the reactions by internal and external stakeholders to these behaviors.  While 
Barnett (2014) explored the complexity related to the punishment of stakeholders, he noted that 
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“stakeholders’ attention is directed in certain ways that bound where they look, limit what they 
notice, bias their assessment, and constrain their willingness to act” (p. 694).  As such, my 
findings explore many of these bounds. 
Second, previous research explored the role of social control agents as it relates to 
deviance and misconduct among individuals and organizations (e.g., Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 
2012).  While social control agents have the legitimate authority to define specific conduct as 
right or wrong, little is known how misconduct or deviance defined by the social control agent is 
reacted to by other top executives.  The present study examines reactions of executive dismissal 
decision makers to deviance committed within and outside the organization and finds the 
likelihood of executive dismissals to increase following instances of deviance committed by the 
executive, subordinates engaging in job duties, and subordinates outside the workplace. 
Finally, the findings are important for scholars examining corporate governance or leader 
turnover because an understanding of the effects of leader turnover must begin with an 
understanding of the causes (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Both scholars and practitioners can 
benefit from the present study when considering the effects, whether intended or unintended, of 
implementing a policy emphasizing personal conduct within organizations. 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The “most theoretically interesting type of CEO exit is the dismissal” (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009, p. 168).  Understanding the limited role of organizational 
performance in executive dismissal decisions, Fredrickson et al. (1988) developed a model 
consisting of four sociopolitical forces in combination with organizational performance to 
provide a comprehensive theoretical model of CEO dismissals.  The first sociopolitical force 
they presented was the effect of the board of directors’ expectations and attributions of the 
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CEO’s performance on CEO dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  The rationale behind this 
sociopolitical force is simple: a CEO’s probability of dismissal increases with the board’s beliefs 
that the CEO can affect performance and perform at a high level.  The second sociopolitical 
force identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) was the boards’ allegiances and values.  Because the 
board of directors decides whether to dismiss or retain a CEO (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991), and 
may be motivated by self-interest (Fredrickson et al., 1988), they may choose to retain (dismiss) 
a poor (high) performing or low (high) ability CEO based on their individual interests or 
pressures they may face to make a particular decision (Mintzberg, 1983).  These biases, both 
conscious and unconscious, affect the perspectives of board members as they seek information 
regarding the CEO’s performance and ability (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Dahl, 1994; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988).  These self-interest directed CEO dismissal decisions may be based on 
how the CEO will affect directors’ fees, the overall personal wealth of the director, the status and 
reputation of the director, or directors’ various relationships (including the relationship with the 
CEO; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
 Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) third sociopolitical force was the availability of qualified 
candidates to replace the CEO.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) reasoned the CEO dismissal decision 
was at least partly contingent upon the pool of available and qualified candidates whom could 
replace the CEO.  Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) fourth sociopolitical force in their CEO dismissal 
model is the incumbent CEO’s power.  A CEO’s power may be derived from numerous sources 
including personal characteristics (e.g., charisma, prestige, founding CEO), control over 
resources (e.g., key relationships, intellectual property), and voting control (Fredrickson et al., 
1988). 
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Using Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model, several scholars empirically investigate the 
components.  Puffer and Weintrop (1991) concluded CEO dismissals to be more affected by 
gaps in financial analysts’ earnings expectations and actual earnings than by organizational 
performance.  Boeker (1992) found when an organization is exhibiting low organizational 
performance, directors whom were more closely tied to the organization and CEO were less 
likely to dismiss the CEO.  Following Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) assertion that industry size 
represents available candidates to replace an executive, Crossland and Chen (2013) found boards 
of directors of poor performing firms to be more inclined to dismiss a CEO when the CEO labor 
market is more developed (e.g., more firms in the industry).  Finally, CEO power was analyzed 
in terms of experience in the upper echelons of corporate structures and found to assist CEOs in 
protection from dismissal (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Ocasio, 
1994). 
Within sport, several studies incorporate some of or all the sociopolitical forces outlined 
by Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) research.  Holmes (2011) examined college football head coach 
dismissals using three of Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) four forces of CEO dismissals, excluding the 
availability of qualified candidates due to data limitations.  Holmes (2011) found negative 
relationships between head coach dismissals and head coach experience as well as post-season 
and rivalry game victories.  Consistent with Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) proposition that prior 
organizational performance is a determinant of executive expectations, Holmes (2011) found a 
negative relationship between past organizational performance and head coach dismissals. 
Similarly, using the NFL salary cap as a proxy for performance expectations, Allen and 
Chadwick (2012) found head coaches experience a higher probability of dismissal since the 
salary cap was instituted.  Though focused on the role of organizational structures and candidates 
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available to replace NFL head coaches on head coach dismissals, Foreman and Soebbing (2015) 
empirically examined all four of Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) socio-political forces of executive 
dismissal.  However, Foreman and Soebbing (2015) discovered no evidence to support their 
hypotheses of organization structures or candidate availability influencing head coach dismissals. 
In addition to the socio-political forces identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988), Holmes 
(2011) included a measure of deviance in the dismissal decision, namely, sanctions imposed on 
the program from a college football governing body.  He observed infractions increased the 
probability of head coach dismissal.  However, research regarding the effect executive deviance, 
whereby executives are responsible for their own deviance as well as the deviance of their 
subordinates (Simon & Eitzen, 1990), has on dismissals is limited.  At face value, the allegiances 
and values force within Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model may seem to encompass deviant 
behavior, however, allegiances and values do not refer to moral values or laws within the legal 
system, but to relationships between the board of directors, the CEO and the CEO’s predecessor.  
Therefore, the present study proposes the addition of a fifth socio-political force, executive 
deviance, to the Fredrickson et al. model of CEO dismissals.  
Executive Deviance 
 Corporate scandals and routine wrongdoing within firms are acts of elite deviance which 
includes financial, physical, or morally harmful behavior committed by elites and members of 
their organizations (Bangwanubusa, 2009; Simon & Eitzen, 1990).  The term elite may identify 
people who possess elite skills or knowledge within their respective industries or societies and 
may be considered elite due to their high ability, status, wealth, or position (Bangwanubusa, 
2009).  Additionally, some elites belong to more than one of these categories, such as wealthy 
and influential celebrity executives (Bangwanubusa, 2009; Hall, Blass, Ferris, & Massengale, 
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2004; Simon, 1996).  The focus of the present research is on a subset of elite deviance, namely 
executive deviance, whereby executives are responsible for their own deviance and the deviance 
of their subordinates.  Furthermore, executive deviance may be committed while acting on behalf 
of the organization or while off-duty (Lyons et al., 2016).  Within the literature on executive 
deviance, there are three areas of deviance important to the present study.  These areas are 
outlined below.   
Workplace Deviance of Executives.  Michalak and Ashkanasy (2013) defined 
workplace deviance as “a form of behavior that violates organizational norms and that 
consequently negatively impacts the well-being of the organization and its members” (p. 20).  
Workplace deviance is detrimental to organizations in several ways, including damaged 
reputations, exposure to lawsuits, and financial loss (Dilchert, Ones, Davis, & Rostow, 2007; 
Litzky, Eddleston, & Kidder, 2006; Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  Of the organizations faced with 
the aforementioned consequences of workplace deviance, executives are often responsible for 
several reasons such as often being directly involved with deviance or at least being aware of the 
deviant activities occurring within the organization (Beasley, Carcello, & Hermanson, 1999; 
Michel, Heide, & Cochran, 2014; Simon & Eitzen, 1990).  Furthermore, executives are not only 
responsible for their organizations public image and financial position, but the top executives 
within an organization are also the most likely people within in that organization to engage in 
deviant acts (Daboub et al., 1995; Litzky et al., 2006). 
Anecdotally, several accounts of workplace deviance committed by top executives led to 
dismissals at organizations such as Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth (Lease, 2006).  
Furthermore, empirical support establishing a relationship between executive deviance 
committed directly by the top management team and executive dismissals has been established 
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by a number of researchers (e.g., Gomulya & Boeker, 2015; Khanna et al., 2015; Wiersema & 
Zhang, 2013).  Wiersema and Zhang (2013) found CEO dismissal likelihood to increase 
instances of stock option backdating, a specific form of executive deviance committed directly 
by the top management team.  The likelihood of dismissal following instances of stock option 
backdating was further increased by the pervasiveness of the deviance and the media attention 
devoted to the deviance (Wiersema & Zhang, 2013). 
Khanna et al. (2015) examined fraud measured by instances of CEOs being named as 
respondents in lawsuits pertaining to corporate fraud.  They found, following instances of 
corporate fraud, stronger relationships with boards of directors can decrease the likelihood of 
CEO dismissal.  However, relationships between boards of directors and CEOs often become 
strained following instances of executive deviance (Gomulya & Boeker, 2015).  Due to the 
substantial implications of deviance and the often direct responsibility of top management in 
their organization’s workplace deviance and the effect of deviance on relationships between 
boards of directors and CEOs, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. Workplace deviance committed by an organization’s top management team 
increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
Workplace Deviance of Employees.  Even when top executives were not charged with a 
criminal violation or did not directly engage in wrongdoing, they were often aware of the illegal 
activities (Daboub et al., 1995; Litzky et al., 2006).  Additionally, top executives establish the 
culture, incentives, and reporting procedures which not only influence the ethical conduct of 
subordinates, but also help to reduce the link between the top executives and the unethical 
behavior (Daboub et al., 1995; Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011; Litzky et al., 2006).   
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Due to the leadership and responsibilities of CEOs, they may be held accountable for the 
transgressions of their subordinates and organization (Daboub et al., 1995; Simon, 1996).  In the 
Volkswagen scenario, the CEO was forced to resign as a result of workplace deviance committed 
by subordinates (Puzzanghera & Hirsch, 2015).  Executives may be held accountable for the 
deviant behaviors of their organizations because they are often held responsible for establishing 
the culture of their organization and disciplining subordinates (Daboub et al., 1995; Lease, 2006; 
Litzky et al. 2006, Lyons et al., 2016; Zahra et al., 2005).  Furthermore, executives may be used 
as scapegoats following instances of workplace deviance committed by employees, despite 
evidence that the CEO did not contribute nor had knowledge of the misconduct (Gangloff et al., 
2015). 
Deviance among employees may be categorized in two, often very different, types of 
deviance: minor workplace deviance and serious workplace deviance (Litzky et al., 2006; 
Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  The distinction between minor and serious violations is essentially 
a distinction between poor ethical behavior and minor policy violations, as opposed to more 
severe and excessive behavior which may even result in physical harm (Litzky et al., 2006; 
Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  Furthermore, some instances of workplace deviance could be acts 
committed by subordinates under the direction of executives (Daboub et al., 1995; Zahra et al., 
2005), whereas other transgressions result from behavioral issues, which often are a result of 
environmental and leadership issues within the organization (Litzky et al., 2006; Robinson & 
Bennett, 1995).  Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. Minor workplace deviance committed by organizational members under 
the direction of a given CEO increases the likelihood of that CEO’s dismissal. 
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Hypothesis 3a. Serious workplace deviance that is attached with a punishment only for 
the individual deviant actor increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
Hypothesis 3b. Serious workplace deviance resulting in punishment that impacts the 
function of the organization increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. 
Off-Duty Deviance.  Lyons et al. (2016) defined off-duty deviance (ODD) as “behaviors 
committed by an employee outside the workplace or off-duty that are deviant by organizational 
and/or societal standards, jeopardize the employee’s status within the organization, and threaten 
the interests and well-being of the organization and its stakeholders” (p. 464).  Research 
regarding ODD and its implications is limited, despite over 10% of Fortune 500 companies 
publicly provide information on their websites regarding their company ODD policies – and 
likely many more companies provide this information via internal documents (Lyons et al., 
2016).  Of the organizations that provided justification for company ODD policies, 82.8% of the 
organizations identified the reputation of the organization as a justification for the policies, 
however, several other justifications were provided such as employee safety or ability to perform 
at work.  Given that executives are ultimately responsible for their organizations’ reputations and 
subordinates’ work performance, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4. Off-duty deviance committed by organizational members under the 
leadership of a given CEO increases the likelihood of that CEO’s dismissal. 
 In summary, executive deviance can be partitioned into three types: workplace deviance 
by executives and top management teams, workplace deviance by employees, and off-duty 
deviance.  Figure 3.1 outlines these types along with the associated hypotheses.  The present 
study uses data from the NFL to test these hypotheses as well as the moderating relationship of 
the league’s policy governing personal conduct. 
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Empirical Setting 
Head coaches in professional and amateur sports leagues around the world have been a 
popular profession to study managerial and organizational theories and phenomenon, including 
issues of succession such as dismissals (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Frick, Barros, & Prinz, 
2010; Wolfe et al., 2005).  Both Soebbing et al. (2015) and Soebbing, Wicker, and Watanabe 
(2016) outlined some of the commonalities between head coaches and non-sport executives, 
including decisions regarding on-field tactics and off-field administration of players and 
members of the coaching staff.  In addition, head coaches must operate within hierarchical 
organizational structures (Brown, 1982; Keidell, 1987; Maxcy, 2013) where they are responsible 
for optimizing performance while being constrained by resources and rules (Cannella & Rowe, 
1995; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005).  These factors are particularly true for NFL 
coaches, who both hire and delegate responsibilities to coordinators and assistant coaches under 
their authority (Ndofor, Priem, Rathburn, & Dhir, 2009).  Thus, examining head professional 
football coaches represents an interesting setting to explore the likelihood of dismissals. 
Furthermore, the NFL adopted and modified its policy regarding personal conduct of employees.  
This policy is explained below.  
NFL Personal Conduct Policy 
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue (1989-2006) implemented a Personal Conduct Policy 
(PCP) in 2000 to deter off-field deviance in response to negative public attention from the media, 
fans, and politicians (Benedict & Yaeger, 1998; Edelman, 2008).  However, research reviewing 
the PCP noted many limitations and viewed the policy as insignificant in deterring behavior 
(e.g., Mahone, 2008).  For example, Mahone (2008) discussed that the policy was constructed to 
allow the commissioner to punish an individual only after all the legal proceedings had 
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concluded for an incident (e.g., trial and appeal) and the individual was found guilty.  He 
concluded that the initial policy not only failed to deter behavior but also protect the overall 
image of the league (Mahone, 2008). 
Since current Commissioner Roger Goodell was appointed in 2006, he placed an 
increased emphasis on NFL personnel (i.e., players, coaches, team staff, team owners, and 
administrators) conducting themselves properly off the field (Ambrose, 2007).  In response to 
growing concerns regarding NFL personal conduct deemed detrimental to the league, a modified 
PCP was adopted in April 2007 (Mahone, 2008).  The modified policy provided the 
commissioner with the power to act unilaterally to punish any person associated with the league 
if his/her conduct was deemed to harm the brand of the league in the eyes of the public and 
stakeholders, regardless of criminal charges being filed (Ambrose, 2007). 
 While much of the research directly examining the NFL’s PCP examined the policy and 
commissioner power from a legal perspective (e.g., Mahone, 2008), recent empirical research 
looked at the impact the policy plays in team decisions.  Allen (2015) examined rookie NFL 
Draft positions and the number of days veterans spent on the free agent market.  Results from his 
research indicated neither a rookie nor a veteran’s personal conduct impacts draft position or 
days on the free agent market, respectively.  Palmer, Duhan, and Soebbing (2015) also looked at 
the impact personal conduct had on NFL rookies’ draft positions.  Their findings suggest players 
who were in trouble the year prior to the draft were selected lower in the draft.  This result was 
particularly true for players labeled as defensive skill players.  The league’s increased efforts to 
police off-field personal conduct provide an interesting dynamic to empirically examine how off-
field player misconduct impacts dismissals of head coaches.  Given the increased media attention 
devoted to personal conduct and increased emphasis on holding personnel accountable in the 
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NFL, dismissal decisions based on executive and employee deviance may be more prevalent 
starting in the 2007-2008 season than in seasons prior. 
 Football coaches engaged in deviant acts including the promotion of dangerous behavior 
and violations of public trust (Ambrose, 2007; Coakley, 2015; Harary, 2002; Kidwell, 2004).   
For example, violating public trust involves falsifying injury reports and violating league rules 
that are intended to deter unfair competitive advantages (e.g., unapproved surveillance of 
opponents; Ambrose, 2007; Mahone, 2008; Statz, Cordell, Ham, Karcher, & Shukie, 2007).  In 
the corporate world, executives are more likely to be dismissed for similar acts of executive 
deviance in regards to violations of public trust, such as releasing deceptive financial documents 
(Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013).  Coaches typically promote dangerous 
behavior in two ways: by engaging in violent or aggressive acts themselves or condoning 
dangerous acts committed by subordinates.  For example, New Orleans Saints’ Defensive 
Coordinator Gregg Williams coordinated an incentive system whereby players received bonuses 
for injuring opponents (Pfleegor, 2013).  Though these incidents may initially result in fines if 
discovered by the league, evidence from the corporate world indicates dismissals may eventually 
occur, particularly in the wake of a modified policy regarding personal conduct (Haynes, Josefy, 
& Hitt, 2015; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999; Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2015; Persons, 2006). 
Thus, I hypothesize:  
 Hypothesis 5. Deviance committed by the team’s coach and its staff will increase the 
 likelihood of a CEO dismissal following a change in the corporate personal conduct 
 policy. 
 Due to the leadership and responsibilities of CEOs, they may be held accountable for the 
transgressions of their subordinates and organization (Daboub et al., 1995; Simon, 1996).  
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Notably in sport, coaches rewarded and coerced players to engage in deviant acts which often 
lead to fines or suspensions by the NFL (Ambrose, 2007; Harary, 2002; Pfleegor, 2013).  
Furthermore, the NFL’s PCP may raise additional concern and emphasis on employee deviance 
in the workplace.  Thus,  
 Hypothesis 6. Minor workplace deviance committed by organizational members under 
 the direction of a given CEO increases the likelihood of that CEO’s dismissal following a 
 change in the corporate  personal conduct policy. 
 Hypothesis 7a. Serious workplace deviance that is attached with a punishment only for 
 the individual deviant actor increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal following a change 
 in the corporate personal conduct policy. 
 Hypothesis 7b. Serious workplace deviance resulting in punishment that impacts the 
 function of the organization increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal following a 
 change in the corporate personal conduct policy. 
 In the NFL, issues regarding off-field behavior of players have become increasingly 
salient for the league and its teams (Ambrose, 2007; Statz et al., 2007).  A study by Benedict and 
Yaeger (1998) of the 1996-1997 NFL season found 21 percent of NFL players sampled were 
either arrested or indicted for a minimum of one crime in which the authors determined was a 
serious crime.  Ambrose (2007) commented that the perception in the 1990s was that “‘murder’ 
was the only criminal offense said to bar an athlete from playing in the NFL” (p. 1071).  
 Recent research examined trends in player off-field misconduct and their impacts on 
players and organizations.  Leal, Gertz, and Piquero (2015) compared player arrest rate to the 
arrest rate of the general population by three types of crime: property, public order, violent.  
Their findings indicated the arrest rate for NFL players for what they determined as property and 
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public order crimes were lower than the general population, while violent crime arrest rate was 
higher compared to the general population.  Subsequent research by Leal, Gertz, and Piquero 
(2016) found that a small percentage of NFL players were arrested multiple times over a 14 year 
period (2000 to 2014).  Those players that were repeatedly arrested, however, generally engage 
in violent crimes compared to players who are only arrested once during the sample period. 
As per performance impacts, Stair, Mizak, Day, and Neral (2008) found the number of player 
arrests did not impact organizational performance measured by the number of regular season 
wins.  Weir and Wu (2014) found a player’s deviance in the final year of college may have an 
adverse effect on draft position.  Once in the NFL, they found that arrests where the player was 
subsequently not charged along with the total arrests (regardless of if they were charged with an 
offense) had a positive effect of the number of starts per season in the NFL.  Specifically for 
running backs and wide receivers, total arrests led to an increase in total yards per season and 
touchdowns. 
 Operating in contrast to league policies, some coaches have discussed, condoned, and 
even encouraged criminal activity off the field (Ambrose, 2007; Harary, 2002).  Due to the 
increased concern among the league and teams regarding negative publicity (Ambrose, 2007; 
Statz et al., 2007) in combination with the role of the coach to instill discipline within the 
organizational culture of the team (Harary, 2002; Seifried, 2008; Statz et al., 2007), the 
transgressions of players occurring outside the workplace may result in the dismissal of a head 
coach.  Thus, I hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 8. Deviance committed by the team’s players outside the workplace will 
 increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal following the modification of the corporate  
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Figure 3.1. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
 In summary, literature and empirical evidence suggest deterring deviance is important to 
organizations and the organizational leader, or in the sport team context, the head coach, is 
responsible for deviance committed by organizational members (Lyons et al., 2016; Statz et al., 
2007; Seifried, 2008).  Given the wealth of attention devoted to post-succession organizational 
performance in Sport Management (e.g., Dohrn et al., 2015; Roach, 2016; Soebbing et al., 2015), 
there is a need to understand dismissal causes prior to understanding their effects (Fee et al., 
2006; Maxcy, 2013).  Within the literature, there is limited examination regarding deviance as a 
potential dismissal determinant (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011; Kidwell, 
2004; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013), and the presence of institutional policies which may be 
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affecting the deviance dismissal relationship (Lyons et al., 2016).  The present study 
hypothesizes expected behavior covering these two areas.  These hypotheses are tested below. 
Method 
To examine the impact of executive deviance on CEO dismissals, the present research 
examines NFL head coach dismissals from the 2000-2001 season through the 2015-2016 season.  
The unit of observation is a team-season.  For each of the 16 seasons, there is one observation 
per team that creates a unit observation of a team-season.  Each of the current 32 NFL teams 
were active throughout this 16 season period with the exception of the Houston Texans–a 
franchise which was established in the 2002-2003 season.  Therefore, the 16 season sample 
period yields 510 team-season observations.  To best account for when a given executive is 
responsible for a given organization, a team-season begins the day following the previous 
season’s final game and ends the final day of the observed season due to head coach turnover 
often occurring around the final game of a team’s season.  Therefore, team-season observations 
will be longer for teams with post-season games. 
Dependent Variable 
The dichotomous dependent variable is whether the head coach of the team-season was 
dismissed (DISMISS), which is coded with the value of 1 to represent a head coach dismissal and 
0 otherwise.  To determine if a head coach was dismissed, I examine whether there was a change 
in head coach after the beginning of the observed season and prior to the beginning of the first 
regular season game of the following season.  If the head coach of the observed season is 
different from the head coach of the following season, a head coach departure is noted.  To 
determine whether the departure was voluntary or involuntary (i.e., a dismissal), a review of 
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newspaper articles was conducted through Factiva (academic license) where key terms such as 
fire, oust, dismiss, or forced resignation were used to indicate a dismissal. 
Independent Variables 
To isolate the effects of executive deviance from the other four sociopolitical forces of 
CEO dismissals, the present research utilized data regarding (a) workplace deviance committed 
directly by the executives, (b) workplace deviance committed by employees, and (c) off-duty 
deviance committed by employees.  The data are aggregated for team-season units of 
observation.  
Hypothesis 1 examines deviance of the management staff.  To identify deviance 
committed by the coaching staff, I use the total amount of monetary fines assessed against the 
team’s coaching staff by the National Football League standardized by season (CFINEAMT).  To 
standardize the CFINEAMT variable by season, the mean coaching fine amount during the 
season in which the observation took place is subtracted from the observed coaching fine 
amount.  Then, the difference is divided by the mean coaching fine amount during the season, 
thus creating a standardized variable.  These fines can be attributed to various transgressions 
including verbal and physical altercations, falsifying injury reports, or off-field criminal activity.  
By standardizing the independent variables by season, comparisons may be made across seasons 
and variations in independent variables over time, such as increases in fines, can be analyzed 
within the context of the seasons in which they occurred.  
Hypothesis 2 examines minor workplace deviance.  To examine minor workplace 
deviance, penalties yards for the observed team are used and standardized by season (PENYDS).  
Data regarding penalty yards were obtained from Pro Football Reference (i.e., http://www.pro-
football-reference.com/).  Hypotheses 3a and 3b examine serious workplace deviance.  To 
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examine serious workplace deviance committed by players whereby only the individual player is 
affected by the punishment (H3a), player fines are included in the model and measured using the 
total dollar amount of monetary fines resulting from league violations for all the players on the 
team (PFINEAMT).  Similarly, serious workplace deviance committed by players with 
punishments having the potential to affect the performance of the organization (H3b) are 
measured by player suspensions using the total weeks players of a team were suspended due to 
violating league rules (SUSPWKS).  Data regarding player fines and suspensions were collected 
from the same sources as the coaching fine data (i.e., http://www.justfines.com/ and 
http://www.spotrac.com/).  Like CFINEAMT, both PFINEAMT and SUSPWKS are standardized 
by season. 
Hypothesis 4 examines employee behavior outside of the workplace measured by the 
total number of separate player incidents with law enforcement officers (LAW).  To examine 
outside of the workplace behavior, data were collected on all off-field player incidents through 
the San Diego Union Tribune website.  The website recorded any player incidents beyond a 
standard parking violation.  These incidents were confirmed and checked through various other 
secondary sources including national and local newspapers as well as sport websites such as 
ESPN.com to ensure the completeness of the database.  Similar to the variables regarding on-
field incidents, the total number of separate player incidents for the team are used and 
standardized by season (LAW). 
 To examine the PCP’s impact on deviance and executive dismissals, the variable 
GOODELL is incorporated into the present research.  This variable is coded 1 for the 2007-2008 
season and subsequent seasons, and 0 for seasons prior to the 2007-2008 season.  This variable is 
then interacted with the above deviance variables.  To test hypotheses 5, 6, 7, and 8, the variables  
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CFINGOOD, PFINGOOD, SUSPGOOD, PENGOOD, and LAWGOOD are used respectively. 
Control Variables 
Consistent with previous theoretical and empirical research involving executive and 
coaching dismissals, numerous control variables are included in the present study to control for 
organizational performance, socio-political factors, and other demographic characteristics.  As 
recent head football coach dismissal models used (e.g., Foreman & Soebbing, 2015; Holmes, 
2011), I control for current organizational performance using regular season winning percentage 
in the observed season (WINPCT).  In addition to overall regular season performance, I also look 
at the performance against close rivals (DIVISION) and in the postseason (PLAYOFFS). 
Following previous studies, DIVISION and PLAYOFFS are measured by subtracting career 
division or playoff losses from career division or playoff wins, respectively (Foreman & 
Soebbing, 2015; Holmes, 2011).  
Per the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model for CEO dismissals, each of the four socio-
political forces are accounted for in the present model.  Expectations and attributions are 
modeled by past organizational performance and evaluations by external analysts.  Past 
organizational performance is measured using regular season win percentages from the previous 
season (WINPCTj-1), two seasons prior to the observed season (WINPCTj-2), and the mean of 
three through 10 seasons prior to the observed season (WINPCTj-3→10; Foreman & Soebbing, 
2015; Holmes, 2011).  External analysts’ expectations are measured by the percentage of regular 
season games a team covered against the point spread in the observed season (COVERATS; 
Foreman & Soebbing, 2015; Humphreys, Paul, & Weinbach, 2016; Soebbing et al., 2015). 
Allegiances and values are modeled by the relationship between the executive and the 
executive dismissal decision maker (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  To operationalize this relationship 
 54 
in professional football, I use the number of seasons the general manager (GM) and the head 
coach have worked together (HCGMTOG).  HCGMTOG may also decrease the likelihood of 
dismissals resulting from deviance (Khanna et al., 2015). 
Alternatives to the incumbent executive are modeled using Foreman and Soebbing’s 
(2015) proxy of qualified NFL head coach candidates (CANDPOOL).  I operationalize the 
candidate pool as a count of current offensive/defensive coordinators and former head coaches 
whom exhibited either recent or career-long success in terms of points scored/allowed for 
coordinators and winning seasons for former head coaches (see Foreman & Soebbing, 2015 for a 
more detailed discussion).  
Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) final socio-political force is incumbent power.  Fredrickson et 
al. (1988) stated CEO power increases over time and cited experience as a CEO as a determinant 
of CEO power which decreases the probability of dismissal.  Therefore, the years of experience 
as an NFL head coach (NFLHCEXP) is included in the present model.  Additionally, to control 
for the reluctance of decision makers to dismiss new leaders (Foreman & Soebbing, 2015) an 
indicator variable is included in the model which is coded 1 for head coaches in their first year 
with the team and 0 otherwise (FIRSTYR).  Lastly, many head football coach dismissal studies 
examined demographic characteristics of head coaches (e.g., Audas, Goddard, & Rowe, 2006; 
Madden & Ruther, 2010; Volz, 2009).  Therefore, demographic variables such as age (AGE) and 
visible racial minority status (MINORITY) are included in the model. 
Empirical Specification 
To examine whether changes in an institutional policy regarding executive deviance 
impact the likelihood of executive dismissal, the present research follows previous head coach 
dismissal models (e.g., Holmes, 2011; Volz, 2009) in using survival analysis to examine NFL 
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head coach dismissals from the 2000-2001 season through the 2015-2016 season.  Survival 
analysis has many benefits over cross-sectional and panel data when examining factors that 
change over time and their effects on the likelihood of an event occurring over time.  For 
example, cross-sectional and panel data approaches are limited in their abilities to establish 
direction of causality, examine the time associated with reaching an event (e.g., dismissal), or 
estimate the function of the relationship between time and the dependent variable following a 
change in the independent variable (Blossfeld, Golsch, & Rohwer, 2007).  However, similar 
studies examining determinants of leader dismissals used limited dependent variable models, 
such as logit, probit, and tobit models (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009).  Therefore, a probit model is 
estimated so results can be compared between the two techniques, but the results and discussion 
will focus primarily on the survival analysis results. 
The unit of observation in survival analysis is an episode occurring prior to the event. 
However, when using time-dependent independent variables, episodes may be split into shorter 
durations (Blossfeld et al., 2007).  Therefore, to account for independent and control variables 
changing within a coaching episode in the present study, coaching episodes are split into NFL 
seasons and the unit of observation will be a team-season.  Within the 16-season sample period, 
505 team-season observations exist. 
The dismissal hazard function takes the following form: 
h(t) = h0(t)exp(β0 + β1Xit + β2GOODELL + β3XitGOODELLt + β4Zit + θt) 
where i indexes individual coaches, t indexes seasons, and θ denotes season fixed effects.  The 
vectors Xit and Zit represent vectors of independent and control variables, respectively, and θt 
denotes season fixed effects.   
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Estimation Issues 
 There are several estimation issues to acknowledge and potentially correct.  To ensure the 
use of season fixed effects was appropriate for the analysis, the Wald test was used to test the 
collective statistical significance of each season fixed effect and the result indicated season fixed 
effects are statistically significant (i.e., p < 0.01) and appropriate for the analysis.  The second 
estimation concern is multicollinearity, which I examine in two ways.  An examination of the 
correlation coefficients between each of the variables in the model were found to not exceed 0.7, 
indicating there is no need to omit variables to correct for multicollinearity (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007).  Moreover, none of the variance inflation factors for the independent and control 
variables exceeded a value of six.  This result further indicates multicollinearity is not an issue of 
concern in this model (Menard, 2002). 
Finally, I estimate parametric hazard models with exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz 
distributions as well as a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model.  These estimations are 
consistent with previous research by Volz (2009).  To determine the most appropriate model, I 
perform graphical checks of the models’ pseudo residuals against the Cox-Snell residuals and 
find the difference in residuals to be minimized under the Weibull distribution, indicating the 
Weibull distribution provides the best fit for the data in the given model (Blossfeld et al., 2009). 
Results 
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the model.  In this 
sample, 17.6% of head coaches were dismissed.  Within the sample period, 57% of the 
observations occurred after the implementation of Goodell’s PCP.  Among the independent 
variables, the mean fine amount attributable to the coaching staff, adjusted for inflation and 
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reported in 2015 dollars, is $2,650 with a maximum of $571,561.1  Among the observations in 
the sample, 95.6% had no coaching fines. 
The mean player fines accrued by a team in the sample in 2015 dollars is $225,866 with a 
maximum of $5,267,276 and 31.3% of the observations had no player fines.  The mean number 
of weeks players on a given team were suspended is 2.5, with a maximum of 48, and 65.3% of 
the observations had no player suspensions.  The mean number of penalty yards in the sample is 
843 with a minimum of 418 and a maximum of 1,313 yards.  The mean number of legal 
incidents in which players of a given team were involved is 1.6, with a maximum of 10, and 
25.9% of observations had no players involved in legal incidents. 
Exploring the performance, sociopolitical and demographic variables, average regular 
season winning percentage is 0.502 with the coaches in the sample winning an average of three 
divisional games.  On average, head coaches and GMs worked together for 2.45 seasons.  The 
average age of head coaches is 51 and they have an average of 5.5 years of head coaching 
experience.  In the sample, 16% of head coaches are visible racial minorities. 
Table 3.2 presents the results.  Within Table 3.2, a probit estimation is included for 
comparison against the survival analysis results.  For the purposes of the present research, the 
survival results will be the ones used for interpretation and discussion.  Hypothesis 1 looked at 
deviance of the head coach and top management team, operationalized by coaching fines.  The 
results indicate a positive and statistically significant effect on head coach dismissals.  Thus, one 
can fail to reject Hypothesis 1.  Hypothesis 2 examines minor workplace deviance through the  
                                                 
1 Monetary fines were transformed to account for inflation by calculating the real value of the fines in 2015 dollars 
based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) urban consumers price index (CPI-U) non-seasonally adjusted annual 
average. See http://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/data/consumerpriceindexhistorical_us_table.pdf 
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics (n=505) 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
DISMISS Head coach is dismissed (1=dismissed) 0.176 0.381 0 1 0 
GOODELL Goodell’s personal conduct policy in effect (1=in effect) 0.570 0.496 0 1 1 
CFINEAMT Sum of coaching staff fines standardized by season <0.001 0.744 -0.393 5.480 -0.177 
PENYDS Sum of penalty yards standardized by season -0.004 0.988 -3.151 3.012 -0.071 
PFINEAMT Sum of player fines standardized by season <0.001 0.985 -1.275 5.249 -0.301 
SUSPWKS Sum of weeks players were suspended standardized by season 0.001 0.928 -0.958 5.292 -0.240 
LAW Sum of legal incidents involving players standardized by season -0.003 0.979 -1.522 3.751 -0.284 
WINPCT Team win percentage in observed season 0.502 0.193 0 1.000 0.500 
DIVISION Head coach’s career division wins less losses  3.350 9.161 -16 46 2 
PLAYOFFS Head coach’s career playoff wins less losses 0.537 2.425 -7 13 0 
WINPCTj-1 Team win percentage in previous season 0.502 0.192 0 1.000 0.500 
WINPCTj-2 Team win percentage two seasons prior 0.501 0.193 0 1.000 0.500 
WINPCTj-3→10 Mean team win percentage from 3 to 10 seasons prior 0.497 0.106 0.125 0.789 0.500 
COVERATS Percent of games team covered against the spread 0.511 0.118 0.188 0.875 0.500 
HCGMTOG Years head coach and GM simultaneously employed by team 2.450 2.807 0 15 1 
CANDPOOL Estimated count candidates to replace head coach 7.626 1.868 5 11 7 
NFLHCEXP Years of NFL head coach experience 5.568 5.209 0 22 4 
FIRSTYR Head coach s in first year with team (1=first year) 0.214 0.410 0 1 0 
AGE Current age of head coach 51.123 6.783 32 69 51 




accumulation of penalty yards.  Penalty yards do not have a statistically significant effect on 
head coach dismissals, thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
Hypothesis 3 separates serious workplace deviance into penalties associated only with the 
individual (H3a) and penalties associated with the organization (H3b).  The present study uses 
player fines to operationalize Hypothesis 3a, which has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on head coach dismissals.  Thus, Hypothesis 3a is rejected.  Player suspension weeks are 
used to operationalize penalties that can hurt the organization.  Results from Table 3.2 show that 
player suspensions have a positive and statistically significant effect on head coach dismissals.  
As a result, one can fail to reject Hypothesis 3b.  Finally, Hypothesis 4 examines players’ off-
duty deviance measured by the cumulative number of player run-ins with law enforcement 
officers.  These incidents are not statistically significant, thus, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
Hypotheses were also developed to understand the potential changes that the NFL’s 
Personal Conduct Policy has on the decision to dismiss head coaches due to deviance by players, 
coaches, and the coaching staff.  Recall, the deviance variables are interacted with the 
GOODELL variable in order to understand this relationship.  There is no statistically significant 
separate effect of coaching fines assessed after the PCP modification, thus, Hypothesis 5 is 
rejected.  One can fail to reject Hypothesis 6 as penalty yards have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on head coach dismissals.  Player fines are positive and statistically significant 
following the modification of the league’s policy, failing to reject Hypothesis 7a.  The effect of 
suspensions on dismissals is negative and statistically significant.  As a result, Hypothesis 7b is 
rejected.  Run-ins with law enforcement officers are not statistically significant following the 




Model Results (Dependent Variable: DISMISS) 
 Weibull Distribution Survival Model Probit Regression Model 
Variable Hazard Ratio Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
GOODELL 0.760 -0.274 0.620 -0.332 0.529 
CFINEAMT (H1) 1.433** 0.360** 0.184 0.367*** 0.127 
CFINGOOD (H5) 0.750 -0.288 0.225 -0.242 0.170 
PENYDS (H2) 1.100 0.095 0.181 -0.008 0.126 
PENGOOD (H6) 1.358* 0.306* 0.181 0.381** 0.171 
PFINEAMT (H3a) 0.464*** -0.767*** 0.288 -0.444 0.320 
PFINGOOD (H7a) 1.908** 0.646** 0.300 0.358 0.333 
SUSPWKS (H3b) 1.873** 0.628** 0.312 0.405 0.294 
SUSPGOOD (H7b) 0.488** -0.718** 0.346 -0.539* 0.326 
LAW (H4) 1.056 0.054 0.242 0.109 0.150 
LAWGOOD (H8) 0.992 -0.008 0.282 -0.060 0.176 
WINPCT 0.056*** -2.879*** 0.907 -3.078*** 0.793 
DIVISION 0.934*** -0.068*** 0.025 -0.041** 0.019 
PLAYOFFS 0.899 -0.106 0.076 -0.140** 0.056 
WINPCTj-1 0.126*** -2.068*** 0.697 -1.194* 0.714 
WINPCTj-2 0.988 -0.012 0.804 1.063* 0.571 
WINPCTj-310 13.708* 2.618* 1.363 2.059** 0.822 
COVERATS 0.014*** -4.292*** 1.200 -4.648*** 1.170 
HCGMTOG 0.786*** -0.241*** 0.051 -0.041 0.054 
CANDPOOL 1.147 0.137 0.093 0.115 0.083 
NFLHCEXP 0.930 -0.073 0.045 0.019 0.022 
FIRSTYR 3.295*** 1.192*** 0.331 -1.320*** 0.261 
AGE 1.051** 0.050** 0.024 0.024** 0.011 
MINORITY 1.387 0.327 0.258 0.143 0.211 
Constant 0.009** -4.694** 2.126 -0.086 1.211 
ρ -- 3.020*** 0.234 -- -- 
Log Likelihood -- -40.273 -- -134.941 -- 
McFadden’s R2 -- -- -- 0.426 -- 
Count R2 -- -- -- 0.877 -- 
Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1% level denoted 
by ***. Season fixed-effects statistically significant at the 1% level for both models (i.e., p < 
0.001). Hypotheses addressed are in parentheses next to their corresponding variable. 
 
Examining organizational performance, the results indicate career playoff performance 
does not have statistically significant effect on head coach dismissal, however, career 
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performance in the division does have a significant and negative effect.  Examining overall 
regular season performance, I find negative and significant effects on regular season winning 
percentage in the current and the previous season.  Regular season winning percentage two 
seasons prior has no statistically significant effect on dismissal.  The average regular season 
winning percentage three to 10 seasons prior to the observed season has a positive and 
marginally significant impact on dismissals. 
The percent of games covered and the seasons the head coach and GM were simultaneous 
employed by the team are negative and significant.  Variables for first-year head coaches and the 
age of the head coach are positive and significant.  Finally, the number of qualified candidates 
for a head coach position, the years of NFL head coaching experience, and whether a head coach 
is a visible minority are not statistically significant. 
Discussion 
This dissertation chapter is designed to increase the understanding of executive deviance 
as a sociopolitical force in CEO dismissals as well as the mediating role of an institutional 
emphasis on personal conduct represented by a policy modification.  Previous research suggested 
deviance may affect executive dismissal decisions (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Ferrell & Ferrell, 
2011; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013).  However, it is unclear how institutional policies governing 
deviance impacted dismissal decisions.  The present research asked the question of whether the 
modification of the NFL policy moderated team behavior as it related to deviance and the 
likelihood of a head coach dismissal.  I looked at three types of deviance outlined within the 
literature: executive deviance, workplace deviance, and outside of the workplace deviance.  
Looking at head coaching dismissals in the NFL over 16 seasons, the findings yield some 
interesting insights.  Broadly, they indicate deviance does affect dismissals and its effects are 
 62 
contingent upon the type of deviant behavior and an institutional emphasis on personal conduct 
as represented by the implementation of a more stringent PCP. 
Looking at Hypothesis 1 regarding executive deviance, measured by fines levied by the 
league against the head coach and members of his staff (CFINEAMT), I found an increase chance 
of dismissal.  In Table 3.2, I calculate the hazard rates for each variable.  The interpretation of 
the hazard ratio is an increase/decrease of the chance of getting dismissed relative to the baseline 
hazard rate (1.000).  Thus, a one standard deviation increase in coaching fines for a given season 
increases the risk of head coach dismissal by 43.3%.  This finding is consistent with prior 
research regarding the role of executive deviance committed directly by the CEO or top 
management team in CEO dismissals (Daboub et al., 1995; Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Ferrell & 
Ferrell, 2011; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013).  
Examining Hypothesis 5 and the corresponding statistically insignificant relationship 
after the policy modification in regards to executive deviance, the result could be explained by 
the increased regulatory rules satisfying the organization in terms of adequate punishment being 
taken against the coaching staff.  Thus, the decision-makers responsible for dismissing the coach 
may be satisfied in terms of the actions already taken by the league.  In other words, teams may 
feel that the punishment received by coaches after modification of the policy is sufficient.  
Therefore, Goodell’s policy may have some unintended consequences which may be allowing 
head coaches and their staffs to engage in deviant acts without the head coach being held 
accountable beyond a coaching staff fine which is only a small fraction of the head coach’s 
salary.  
As an example, Mike Tice, who was the head coach for the Minnesota Vikings in 2005 
won nine out of 16 games, following a season in which the Vikings only won half their games, 
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but was dismissed at the end of the season after the coaching staff accrued $120,000 in fines 
($145,633 adjusted for inflation).  The fines accrued by the 2005 Vikings coaching staff were 
over 5.48 standard deviations above the mean in 2005 which increases dismissal risk by 618%, 
whereas winning nine out of 16 games only decreases dismissal risk by 80%.  However, if the 
coaching fines were accrued after the PCP modification, there would be no additional 
statistically significant increase or decrease in head coach dismissal risk. 
The second type of deviance I look at is deviance in the workplace.  Recall, the prior 
literature separates workplace deviance into minor and serious (Litzky et al., 2006; Robinson & 
Bennett, 1995).  In the present study, I examined serious workplace deviance in two ways: player 
fines and player suspensions.  Contrasting results show head coach dismissal risk decreased with 
player fines, contrary to Hypothesis 3a, but increased when those fines are incurred during the 
Goodell era, confirming Hypothesis 7a.  A head coach’s risk of dismissal reduces 53.6% 
following a one standard deviation increase in player fines accrued by the team.  However, when 
the player fines are accrued after the PCP modification, head coaches are less protected against 
dismissal.  Under Goodell’s PCP modification, the head coach of a team with player fines one 
standard deviations above the mean only experiences a 11.4% reduction in dismissal risk. 
Contrary to the effect of serious workplace deviance measured in the form of purely 
individual punishments, suspended players increase the risk of head coach dismissal by 87.3% 
for a one standard deviation increase in player suspensions, but decrease head coach dismissal 
risk by 8.7% after the PCP modification.  These results affirm Hypothesis 3b, but are contrary to 
Hypothesis 7b.  A possible explanation for the increased job retention of head coaches of teams 
with suspended players following the PCP modification is that suspensions may have been used 
as an excuse for poor on-field performance during the Goodell era (Palmer et al., 2015).  In 
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essence, the coaches were not able to use all their resources.  Given suspensions after the PCP 
modification in 2007 were more prevalent, team owners and GMs may view suspensions under 
the policy modification as being excessive, unavoidable, or forgivable, thereby excusing poor 
organizational performance resulting from suspensions.  Similar to coaching fines, the potential 
ability of head coaches to forestall their dismissal by having deviant players on their teams may 
be indicative of an unintended consequence of a PCP modification that allows for more player 
suspensions. 
The second type of workplace deviance, minor deviance, is measured by the total team 
penalty yards.  Similar to player fines, penalty yards increase head coach dismissal risk following 
the PCP modification, thus confirming Hypothesis 6.  However, prior to the PCP modification, 
penalty yards are not a statistically significant determinant of head coach dismissals, and 
therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported in the present study.  Deviant behavior associated with 
on-field penalties is similar to deviant behavior which would result in player fines.  This 
similarity is because both forms of punishment were used to decrease the perception of the NFL 
as being dangerous, thus creating a more marketable product.  With recent concerns regarding 
injuries to players, more rules have been implemented, and with the rise in media coverage, there 
is likely increased pressure on teams and their head coaches to decrease penalties associated with 
deviant behavior in the form of injury-causing actions or undesirable attitudes. 
The final area of deviance is actions that occur outside the workplace.  Here, I examined 
the number of off-field incidents of players.  The results from Table 3.2 show both variable 
coefficients for incidents and incidents under the modified policy to not impact coaching 
dismissals, thus Hypotheses 4 and 8 are unsupported in the present study.  This finding is 
surprising given one of the main reasons for the modification of the policy was to curb off-field 
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behavior (Mahone, 2008).  While the policy provided more power to the commissioner to punish 
employees of the league and its member clubs, one would have anticipated that incidents would 
reflect back on the head coach and potentially lead to his dismissal.  However, the results show 
that player misconduct outside of the workplace does not impact dismissal decisions.  The lack 
of significance may also be a result of the type of legal incidents in which the players were 
involved and potentially the action taken by league or team executives in regards to that 
behavior. 
Looking at the variables operationalizing the socio-political forces outlined by 
Fredrickson et al. (1988), there are several interesting results.  First, meeting or exceeding 
expectations (as measured by wins against the final point spread) led to a significant decline in 
the likelihood of being dismissed.  This finding as it relates to expectations playing a prominent 
role in coaching decisions is consistent with prior work examining coaching related activities 
such as dismissals (e.g., Humphreys et al., 2016) and compensation (e.g., Soebbing et al., 2016). 
I find stronger allegiances and values, defined as the number of seasons the GM and head 
coach have worked together, has a significant and negative impact on dismissals.  Specifically, a 
single season increase in cohesion between the GM and the head coach decreases head coach 
dismissal risk by 21.4%.  This finding supports previous findings by both Holmes (2011) and 
Foreman and Soebbing (2015).  Contrary to Foreman and Soebbing (2015), whom found a 
negative relationship between being a first-year head coach for a team and head coach 
dismissals, I find a strong positive relationship that increases dismissal risk by 229.5%, ceteris 
paribus.  Because Foreman and Soebbing (2015) used a sample period extending from 1978 
through 2012, this contradictory result may be indicative of an increased willingness to dismiss 
head coaches within their first year of tenure within the present study’s sample period of 2000 
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through 2015.  The trend of an increasing willingness to dismiss executives is consistent with 
previous management literature (e.g., Farquhar, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991). 
I find that both the pool of qualified and available coaching candidates along with 
incumbent power have no significant effect on head coach dismissal risk.  While the insignificant 
relationship regarding candidate pools is consistent with earlier findings by Foreman and 
Soebbing (2015), it is surprising that power is insignificant.  While there are many sources of 
power including access to resources, leadership characteristics, and external status (Fredrickson 
et al., 1988), it was expected that head coaching experience would encompass some of these 
sources.  In the end, the insignificant variable coefficient may signal that power in the 
organization may be with the owner or through the entire front office. 
Though some researchers found no evidence of age affecting head coach dismissal (e.g., 
Foreman & Soebbing, 2015; Volz, 2009), results from the present study are consistent with 
previous studies that found positive relationships between head coach age and dismissal (e.g., 
Allen & Chadwick, 2012).  More specifically, a one year increase in age increases dismissal risk 
by 5.1%, ceteris paribus.  Dissimilar to Madden and Ruther (2010) and Holmes (2011) but 
consistent with Foreman and Soebbing (2015), the present study found no statistically significant 
evidence of racial discrimination in the head coach dismissal decision.  
Conclusion 
The present study examined the effects of different levels and types of deviance on the 
risk of dismissal faced by the head coach before and after a policy change emphasizing personal 
conduct.  The evidence from this study indicates deviance may have both positive and negative 
effects on dismissals depending on the type and timing of deviant behavior.  Direct deviant 
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actions committed by the coaching staff increase head coach dismissal likelihood, as does minor 
workplace deviance, measured by penalty yards, committed after the PCP modification. 
The effect of serious workplace deviance on head coach dismissals depends on both the 
punishment type and whether the PCP was modified to be more stringent.  When punishments 
for serious workplace deviance only adversely affected the individual responsible for the deviant 
behavior, the deviance appears to have been welcomed, as evidenced by the probability of job 
retention for the head coach.  However, following an emphasis on personal conduct represented 
by the PCP modification in 2007, serious workplace deviance with punishments affecting only 
the deviant player increased the likelihood of head coach dismissal.  In contrast, when 
punishments for serious workplace deviance affected organizational performance in the form of 
player suspensions following the PCP modification, the policy may be used as a viable excuse 
for poor organizational performance, thus resulting in lower dismissal probabilities for head 
coaches of deviant teams.  Therefore, the modified PCP may have some unintended 
consequences that can promote deviant behavior if suspensions are used as punishments or deter 
deviant behavior by using player fines and penalty yards as punishments. 
The present study provides a number of theoretical and practical implications.  While 
dismissals have been of interest to many academic scholars both inside and outside of sport, 
empirical challenges exist to fully understanding the dismissal decisions.  Though data 
limitations have hindered many scholars from empirically testing the Fredrickson et al. (1988) 
dismissal model and introducing concerns regarding the validity of those studies, the present 
study examines all four socio-political forces together with various deviance variables.  The 
inclusion of deviance variables within the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model is important given the 
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interplay between deviant behavior and the socio-political forces of dismissal (Khanna et al., 
2015). 
Another important reason to examine a comprehensive model of deviance and 
Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) four socio-political forces is to separate the effects of each due to the 
similarities in determinants of deviance (Daboub et al., 1995) and the four socio-political forces 
(Fredrickson et al., 1988).  For example, studies in the corporate setting have used firm size, 
which is a determinant of deviance (Daboub et al., 1995), to operationalize the availability of 
candidates to replace an executive, as proposed by Fredrickson et al. (1988).  The present study 
separates the deviance variables from the socio-political forces for a better understanding of both 
issues. 
Though retention resulting from deviant behavior of subordinates prior to the PCP 
modification may seem counterintuitive, it makes sense within the empirical context.  Prior to the 
PCP modification, coaches and owners benefited from, and therefore wanted, excessively violent 
and aggressive players whom commit deviant acts (Ambrose, 2007; Coakley, 2015, Harary, 
2002; Statz et al., 2007).  However, as public awareness of deviance increased with media 
attention and various platforms (e.g., websites, talk radio, and television shows) dedicated to 
topics related to professional football, NFL administrators placed increasing value on deterring 
conduct deemed detrimental to the league (Ambrose, 2007; Rose et al., 2007).  Furthermore, 
there may be higher expectations of head coaches to instill an organizational culture conducive to 
the new emphasis on personal conduct (Ambrose, 2007; Rose et al., 2007; Seifried, 2008; Statz 
et al., 2007).  Therefore, head coaches of deviant players whom were punished as individuals 
could forestall their dismissal prior to the PCP modification, but experience less protection since 
the modification. 
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More specifically with respect to understanding the role of deviant behavior within 
organizations on the dismissal of organizational leaders, the present study develops an empirical 
test of the deviance-dismissal relationship.  Similar to attempts of scholars to empirically test the 
full Fredrickson et al. (1988) dismissal model, scholars face data limitations when trying to 
understand the deviance-dismissal relationship (Lyons et al., 2016).  However, the present study 
analyzes multiple levels of deviant behavior within an organization, namely, (a) deviance by 
management, (b) serious workplace deviance whereby only the perpetrator is punished, (c) 
serious workplace deviance whereby the organization is punished, (d) minor workplace 
deviance, and (e) deviance external to the organization.  Knowing the causes of dismissal is the 
first step in understanding how successions effect organizations (Fee et al., 2006; Fredrickson et 
al., 1988; Maxcy, 2013) and knowing the causes and effects of institutional policies, such as the 
NFL PCP, can assist institutions in implementing and modifying their policies to create the most 
beneficial situation for the institutions.  
The findings from the present study may be useful for league administrators, GMs, 
coaches, current and prospective athletes, and scholars of executive dismissals and successions.   
As it relates specifically to the NFL policy, the insignificant findings related to off-field deviance 
are potentially concerning to the league.  While the league developed the policy to punish 
employees for their conduct off-the-field, the belief that a team with numerous players running 
into issues off-the-field would reflect on the coach was tested.  The findings do not suggest that 
team owners and GMs take players’ off-field personal conduct into account when deciding to fire 
the head coach.  For a policy that league executives brand as looking out for the league, they may 
have to adjust the policy in penalizing head coaches and teams for players’ misconduct. 
 70 
The visibility of professional sports may affect the relationship between executive 
deviance and dismissals.  However, I believe results of executive deviance increasing dismissal 
likelihood within the NFL to be especially robust due to deviance-specific issues related to 
“locker room culture,” the promotion of violence, and the widespread media attention from 
numerous stakeholders (Coakley, 2015).  Therefore, studies examining the effect of executive 
deviance on dismissals outside violent industries (e.g., NFL, military) may be even more likely 
to see a positive relationship between deviance and dismissals.  A limitation of the present study 
was the fact fines were not separated into team fines and league fines, but combined which could 
be problematic in this study if teams fine their players in an attempt to establish a non-deviant 
culture.  Similarly, I do not possess data regarding actions taken after deviant acts, for example, 
if a coach or team rehabilitated or released a deviant player or member of the coaching staff. 
The present study found player suspensions may be used as an excuse for poor 
performance, but that effect may dissipate as teams become more aware of signing players whom 
have engaged in misconduct (Palmer et al., 2015).  Future research could examine the effect 
player deviance has on head coach dismissals when the head coach holds a front office position 
and has player personnel responsibilities.  Because an understanding of dismissal causes is 
required to understand post-succession organizational performance (Fee et al., 2006; Fredrickson 
et al., 1988; Maxcy, 2013), future research could also examine how organizational performance 
following a succession differs for dismissals based on different types of deviant behavior.  Due 
to the limitation in this study pertaining to unobserved coach reactions to deviant behavior, 
future research could examine how coaches react to deviance within their organizations and how 
their reactions mediate the executive deviance-dismissal relationship. 
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The present study found the inherently deviant culture of the NFL and the media attention 
the NFL receives may be contributing to the dismissal decisions of head coaches whom lead 
deviant organizations.  Future research could examine the effects of varying types and degrees of 
executive deviance in other sports, leagues, or industries which may have less deviant cultures or 
different levels of public exposure.  Similarly, changing public perceptions of certain legal 
incidents may have resulted in insignificant coefficients for the external deviance variables, so 
future research could examine head coach dismissals based on the type of legal incidents in 
which players are involved. 
 Lastly, this study examined the effects of various types and levels of negative executive 
deviance on head coach dismissals, therefore, future research can focus on how head coach 
dismissals are affected by positive forms of executive deviance.  Positive deviance includes 
behaviors that exceed expected norms (Heckert & Heckert, 2015).  Examples of positive 
deviance include selfless behaviors and extend to conscientiousness in rule-breaking such as 
allowing players to transfer, or missing games to be present for a child birth (Martin, Lopez, 
Roscigno, & Hodson, 2013).  Such positive deviant behaviors committed by coaches or players 
may be instrumental for organizational performance (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990; Shoenberger, 







EXAMINING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MANAGERIAL CAREER 
ADVANCEMENT AND CENTRALITY, RACE, AND THE ROONEY RULE 
Chapters 2 and 3 specifically explored dismissals, which prior research identified as an 
important area to examine (Crossland & Chen, 2013).  Research regarding the determinants and 
subsequent performance of the organization is common (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012).  Using the 
model developed by Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988), Chapter 2 operationalized the 
qualified pool of available candidates across several dimensions.  Across these various 
dimensions, the availability of qualified candidates did not statistically impact the likelihood of a 
head coaching dismissal. 
Chapter 3 expanded the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model to understand the mediating role 
that executive deviance plays in the likelihood of a head coach dismissal.  Head coaches are 
more likely to be dismissed if they engage in deviant behavior themselves or if their players’ 
deviant behaviors result in team punishments, however, individual player punishments may help 
head coaches forestall their dismissal.  Furthermore, the chapter explored the potential 
moderating influence that the National Football League’s (NFL) modified Personal Conduct 
Policy has on the relationship between deviance and dismissal.  Following the increased 
emphasis on personal conduct, more player fines or penalty yards increase head coach dismissal 
probabilities, however, suspensions may be viewed as an excuse for poor performance used by 
coaches to forestall their dismissal. 
While dismissals are a popular area of research both within and outside of the sport 
context, the research on promotions receives limited inquiry (Solow et al., 2011).  Promotions 
are defined as “…any increases in level and/or any significant increases in job responsibilities or 
job scope” either internal or external to the individual’s current organization (Seibert, Kraimer, 
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& Crant, 2001, p. 858).  Several determinants of promotions are provided in the literature (e.g., 
Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2006).  One important feature is diversity. 
Diversity and discrimination are important topics which have garnered substantial interest 
among Sport Management scholars (e.g., Agyemang & DeLorme, 2010; Cunningham, 2014; 
Finch, McDowell, & Sagas, 2011).  Within the realm of diversity and discrimination in sport, 
scholars revealed the presence of discrimination based on demographic characteristics (e.g., 
Braddock, Smith, & Dawkins, 2012; Day, 2015; Finch et al., 2011; Madden, 2004).  
Attempting to rectify the disproportionately low number of minority head coaches in the 
league, the NFL implemented the Rooney Rule in 2003.  The Rooney Rule is a league-level 
intervention directive intended to increase racial diversity in the head coaching ranks through 
requiring teams without named successors to interview minority candidates for vacancies 
(Solow, Solow, & Walker, 2011).  The impact of the rule on the diversity of NFL head coaching 
hires is mixed (Fee et al., 2006; Madden & Ruther, 2010; Solow et al., 2011). 
The current research regarding discrimination in the NFL led several scholars to suggest 
racial disparities may be occurring earlier in coaches’ careers, such as, prior to being considered 
for a head coach position (Braddock et al., 2012; Rider, Wade, Swaminathan, & Schwab, 2016; 
Solow et al., 2011).  For instance, racial disparities in the head coaching ranks may be a product 
of central position coaches, whom are predominantly White, being preferred head coach 
candidates (Braddock et al., 2012; Day, 2015).  While numerous studies examined racial 
discrimination among NFL head coaches and the effects of the NFL’s diversity initiative, the 
conflicting results and lack of research examining racial discrimination earlier in coaches’ 
careers demonstrate the need for further research. 
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The purpose of the present study is to examine the relationships between race, centrality, 
and an institutional diversity initiative on coach promotions and demotions throughout the NFL 
coaching ranks.  The present study examines the NFL from the 1984-1985 season through the 
2015-2016 season.  During the sample period, the NFL implemented its Rooney Rule diversity 
initiative in 2003 to increase diversity among NFL head coaches (Solow et al., 2011). 
Estimating logistic regression models examining coach promotions and demotions, 
empirical support of both racial disparities and preferences for central position coaches is found 
in the NFL during the sample period.  Additionally, no empirical support is found for the Rooney 
Rule increasing promotions of Black coaches in the NFL during the sample period.  The findings 
within the present study yield insights into how and when discrimination is occurring and the 
effectiveness of institutional policies intended to increase diversity among organizational leaders.  
The present study builds upon previous literature examining racial disparities in coach career 
advancement and practitioners can use the results of the present study when attempting to 
implement diversity initiatives. 
Literature Review 
For over 50 years, issues of racial disparities and central position preferences in the sport 
industry have been examined (e.g., Day, 2015; Grusky, 1963; Massengale & Farrington, 1977; 
Scully, 1989; Singell, 1991).  Earlier literature focused on central positions in baseball (e.g., 
Grusky, 1963; Scully, 1989), however, later research examined football, racial disparities in 
coaching labor markets, and the effectiveness of the Rooney Rule in increasing diversity (e.g., 
Braddock et al., 2012; Solow et al., 2011).  Though many studies have examined coach labor 
market issues related to race, centrality (i.e., central position preferences), and the Rooney Rule, 
findings have been mixed. 
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Centrality Preferences in Coach Promotions 
Early research pertaining to managerial promotions in sport originated around the idea of 
position centrality.  Centrality is defined in terms of interactions, whereby persons occupying 
more central positions within an organization interact more with peripheral members of that 
organization (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951).  Due to increased interactions resulting from 
position centrality, central position occupants receive benefits from their positions such as 
increased communication skills, leadership skills, and access to information (Grusky, 1963).   
Grusky (1963) applied the idea of centrality to baseball players who became team 
managers and found position centrality to increase the likelihood of players becoming managers.  
More specifically, players in central positions requiring more interactions with other players on 
the baseball field, such as second basemen and catchers, were more likely to become managers 
following their playing careers (Grusky, 1963).  Similar to Grusky’s (1963) findings in 
professional baseball, Scully (1989) found a disproportionate number of infielders from states in 
the northern United States to be hired as professional baseball managers.  Interestingly, Black 
professional baseball players were often from southern states and occupied non-central positions, 
such as outfielder (Scully, 1989).  Confirming the findings of Grusky (1963) and Scully (1989), 
Singell (1991) found centrality to increase the likelihood of players becoming managers.  
Additionally, consistent with Scully (1989), Singell (1991) found evidence of Black players 
being less likely to become baseball managers. 
Race, Centrality, and Promotions in Football 
Though the early literature regarding centrality and race as determinants of managerial 
promotions in sport has its origins in professional baseball, recent research explores the football 
context (e.g., professional and college).  Massengale and Farrington (1977) examined which 
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players became college football coaches in 1975 and found most head and assistant coaches to 
have previously played central positions such as quarterback, interior offensive lineman, or 
linebacker, suggesting centrality to be a determinant of the coach hiring or promotion decision in 
college football.  A similar study by Anderson (1993) focusing on college football coaches and 
athletic directors found centrality to be a determinant of who becomes coaches as well as 
evidence that Blacks are much more likely to play peripheral (i.e., non-central) positions in 
college–indicating a potential relationship between centrality and access to coaching positions 
for Blacks.  Anderson (1993) stated the lack of diversity among football coaches, which may be 
a result of Blacks not playing central positions in college, “is likely to continue in the absence of 
meaningful interventions” (p. 61). 
As Anderson (1993) provided an update to Massengale and Farrington’s (1977) study, , 
Finch et al. (2010) provided an update to Anderson’s (1993) research by examining college 
football 15 years later using 2005 data.  As predicted by Anderson (1993), Finch et al. (2010) 
confirmed a continuation of diversity lacking in the college football coaching ranks, likely due to 
centrality and a lack of meaningful interventions.  However, one potentially meaningful 
intervention which was proposed for college football is modelled after the NFL’s Rooney Rule 
(Gordon, 2008; Pike, 2011). 
Race and the Rooney Rule in NFL Coach Career Advancement 
Descriptive statistics contrasting the stark differences between the low percentage of 
minority head coaches and high percentage of minority players in the NFL are well documented 
(Lapchick, n.d.).  Furthermore, some scholars found additional evidence of racial discrimination 
in the NFL coaching labor market (Braddock et al., 2012; Finch et al., 2011; Madden, 2004); 
however, the broader scholarly research focused on uncovering preferential hiring and exit 
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discrimination among NFL coaches has presented mixed conclusions (Fee et al., 2006; Madden, 
2004; Malone, Coach, & Barrett, 2008; Braddock et al., 2012).  The Rooney Rule was designed 
and ultimately established based on the work of scholars (Solow et al., 2011).  For example, 
Madden (2004) examined NFL head coaches from the 1990-1991 season through the 2002-2003 
season and found evidence that Black coaches outperformed White coaches in their first year of 
tenure, throughout their tenures based on average performance in that period, and in their final 
year of tenure.  Based on the aforementioned findings, Madden (2004) concluded Blacks must 
work harder to secure and retain their head coaching positions.  Using information from 
Madden’s (2004) study, the Rooney Rule was implemented in 2003. 
Since Madden’s (2004) study, many scholars studied the role of race in NFL coaching 
career advancement as well as the effectiveness of the Rooney Rule (e.g., Braddock et al., 2012; 
Fee et al., 2006; Madden & Ruther, 2010; Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011).  Malone et al. 
(2008) presented a contrary view of Madden’s (2004) data.  Though not intending to study race 
as a factor in NFL promotions, Fee et al. (2006) included race as a control variable and found no 
statistically significant evidence of bias against Black coaches in the NFL labor market between 
1970 and 2001.  However, in two of the eight logistic regression models estimated by Fee et al. 
(2006), evidence of Blacks having a higher likelihood of promotion along with a lower 
likelihood of demotion emerged. 
Several other studies criticized Madden’s (2004) methods for examining racial bias in the 
coaching labor market without controlling for several pertinent factors or including partial 
seasons in the model (e.g., Fort et al., 2008; Malone et al., 2008).  Improving upon Madden’s 
model, Malone et al. (2008) included partial seasons in their logistic regression models to study 
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racial bias in the decisions to hire or fire NFL head coaches.  They found no statistically 
significant effect of race on head coach dismissals.   
Continuing work on potential racial bias in the NFL coaching labor market, Madden and 
Ruther (2010) analyzed the effectiveness of the NFL’s Rooney Rule.  Examining the NFL before 
and after the Rooney Rule, Madden and Ruther (2010) found first year performance, average 
performance throughout tenure, and likelihood of being fired are similar for Black and White 
coaches after the Rooney Rule, however, not before.  Based on these findings, Madden and 
Ruther (2010) concluded the Rooney Rule was effective in rectifying the racial disparities in 
NFL coach hiring and firing decisions. 
Taking a different approach, Goff and Tollison (2009) examined determinants of teams 
hiring a Black head coach from 1987 through 2007.  They found city characteristics such as the 
population, per capita income, and percentage of Blacks in the city to be significant determinants 
of whether a Black head coach is hired.  Furthermore, longer tenured team owners are less like to 
appoint a Black coach to the head coach position.  However, Goff and Tollison (2009) did not 
examine the effects of the Rooney Rule in their study. 
Solow et al. (2011) examined the NFL from 1970 through 2009 and found that 
“conditional on a coach reaching coordinator status, there is no evidence that race influences 
head coach hiring decisions” (p. 332).  Furthermore, Solow et al. (2011) found no evidence of 
the Rooney Rule increasing diversity in the head coach ranks.  Despite insignificant findings of 
relationships between race and promotions to head coach, as well as insignificant findings of the 
Rooney Rule increasing head coach diversity in the NFL, Solow et al. (2011) agreed with 
Malone et al. (2008) that other discrimination or bias may be occurring at lower levels of the 
coaching ranks. 
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Complimenting Solow et al.’s (2011) examination of the NFL head coach pipeline, 
Braddock et al. (2012) analyzed the NFL from 2000 through 2006.  Braddock et al. (2012) 
found, relative to their White counterparts, Black coaches to be 60% less likely to be head 
coaches, 63% less likely to be offensive or defensive coordinators, and 56% less likely to hold 
central coaching positions.  Furthermore, Braddock et al. (2012) found central position coaches 
more likely to be offensive or defensive coordinators, however, no significant effect was found 
for Black or White position coaches when separated by race.  Despite selecting a sample in 
which the Rooney Rule was implemented in the middle of the sample period, Braddock et al. 
(2012) did not attempt to examine the effects of the Rooney Rule. 
More recently, Rider et al. (2016) examined the NFL from 1985 through 2011 and did 
examine the effects of the Rooney Rule on increasing coach diversity.  Though Rider et al. 
(2016) found no significant evidence of the Rooney Rule increasing racial diversity among NFL 
coaches, significant evidence of racial disparities in coach hiring decisions was found.  More 
specifically, Rider et al. (2016) found Whites to be more likely to secure coaching positions than 
minorities.  In addition, Rider et al. (2016) provided no indication of central positions being an 
important factor in securing coaching positions.  
Given the contradictory results found in the studies discussed herein, the present study 
seeks to shed light on the relationship between Black coaches and promotions and demotions 
before and after the implementation of the Rooney Rule.  Additionally, the present study seeks to 
determine whether central position coaching experience is related to promotions and demotions, 
and whether this relationship is contingent upon the coach being Black.  Previous literature 
which accounts for race, centrality, and the Rooney Rule is scarce and much of the previous 
literature related to the aforementioned topics have not analyzed more than seven years 
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following the implementation of the Rooney Rule.  The present research is intended to address 
these concerns. 
Method 
To examine coach promotions and demotions, data from NFL seasons spanning from the 
1984-1985 season through the 2015-2016 season are used.  Though data were collected for the 
2016-2017 season, it is used to determine whether coaches were promoted or demoted in the 
season prior.  Consistent with Deephouse and Suchman (2008) and Seifried and Katz (2015) who 
recommended the use of media publications to understand organizational activities and decision-
making processes, NFL Record and Fact Books from 1984 through 2016 are utilized to classify 
promotions and demotions.  These NFL Record and Fact Books are official publications of the 
NFL and present brief biographies of each team’s coaching staff prior to the beginning of the 
season.  The biographical information includes coaching position titles, birth dates and places, 
and previous teams coached by year.  The unit of analysis is a coach-season, whereby each coach 
is observed for the duration of a season and characteristics of the team for the season are 
attributed to the coach who began the season with the team, according to the NFL Record and 
Fact Books. 
The binary dependent variables indicate whether the coach was promoted (PROM) or 
demoted (DEMO) from their current NFL position to a new NFL position.  Therefore, only 
observations in which the coach was coaching in the NFL in the observed season, as well as the 
following season, are included in the sample.  The dependent variable PROM is coded with the 
value of 1 to represent a promotion and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, the dependent variable DEMO is 
coded with the value of -1 to represent a demotion and 0 otherwise.  The coding of PROM and 
DEMO allow for an ordinal third dependent variable to be incorporated into the present study 
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which indicates whether a coach was promoted, demoted, or neither (PRODEM).  The ordinal 
dependent variable PRODEM is calculated as the sum of PROM and DEMO, and is, therefore, 
coded 1 for a promotion, -1 for a demotion, and 0 otherwise. 
To determine if a head coach was promoted or demoted, changes in coaches’ job titles 
from the observed season to the following season are identified as consistent with the definition 
of Seibert et al. (2001).  Each job title is divided into a category: Level 1 (i.e., head coaches), 
Level 2 (i.e., assistant head coaches and offensive/defensive coordinators), Level 3 (e.g., position 
coaches, special teams coordinators), and Level 4 (e.g., assistant position coaches, 
offensive/defensive assistants, and quality control coaches).  Based on the aforementioned levels, 
coaching changes to higher levels (i.e., moves from Level 4 to Levels 3, 2, or 1; Level 3 to 
Levels 2 or 1; and Level 2 to Level 1) are considered promotions and PROM is coded with the 
value of 1.  Similarly, coaching changes to lower levels (i.e., moves from Level 1 to Levels 2, 3, 
or 4; Level 2 to Levels 3 or 4; and Level 3 to Level 4) are considered demotions and DEMO is 
coded with the value of -1.  Finally, lateral moves or no changes in coaching positions are coded 
with the value of 0 for PROM, DEMO, and PRODEM.  
Independent Variables 
To examine the effects of potential racial disparities, central position preferences, and the 
Rooney Rule on coach promotions and demotions in the NFL, three independent variables are 
used and interacted with the race variable.  To analyze potential racial discrimination against in 
NFL coach promotions and demotions, a binary variable indicating whether a coach appears to 
be Black is included in the model (BLCK).  The indicator variable BLCK assumes a value of 1 if 
the coach appears to be Black and 0 otherwise.  Consistent with Fort et al. (2008), race was 
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verified from popular sources and the variation in race among NFL coaches is not so great where 
there exists a large portion of, for example, dark-skinned Hispanics. 
To examine the effects of the Rooney Rule on promotions and demotions in the NFL, a 
binary indicator variable is used to indicate whether the Rooney Rule is in effect during the 
observed season (ROON).  Therefore, the indicator variable ROON takes a value of 1 if the 
Rooney Rule is in effect (i.e., from the 2003-2004 season through the end of the sample period) 
and 0 otherwise.  To analyze possible central position preferences, a binary variable indicating 
whether a position or assistant position coach is primarily responsible for the performance of a 
central position (CENT).  The binary variable CENT is coded with the value of 1 if the coach is 
an assistant position or position coach for quarterbacks or linebackers and 0 otherwise.  To assess 
the effect of the Rooney Rule and preferential hiring for central position coaches on Black 
coaches, BLCK is interacted with ROON (BLCK*ROON) and CENT (BLCK*CENT). 
Control Variables  
Consistent with previous empirical research regarding coaching promotions, several 
control variables are included in the present study to control for human capital.  Current and 
previous coaching experience is controlled for by with variables numerically describing the 
amount of coaching experience in college football, other non-NFL professional football leagues, 
lower-level NFL coaching positions, the coach’s current coaching level, and higher-level NFL 
coaching positions.  Previous college football coaching experience is calculated using the sum of 
football seasons spent coaching college football at any level (e.g., head coach or assistant 
position coach) prior to the observed season (COLL).  Similarly, previous football coaching 
experience in other professional football leagues (e.g., arena football, Canadian Football League, 
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United States Football League) is calculated using the sum of seasons spent coaching non-NFL 
professional football at any level prior to the observed season (OTHR). 
Higher-level NFL coaching experience is measured using the sum of seasons spent in 
NFL coaching positions deemed higher than the current position (HLVL).  For example, if a 
coach currently holds a Level 3 coaching position as a wide receivers coach, but previously spent 
three seasons as a head coach and seven seasons as an offensive coordinator, the value of HLVL 
for this coach in the observed season would be 10.  Current-level NFL coaching experience is 
measured using the sum of seasons spent in NFL coaching positions deemed to be the same level 
of the current position (CLVL).  For example, the hypothetical wide receivers coach in the 
previous example may be in his ninth season as a wide receivers coach, and therefore, his CLVL 
for the observed season would be 9.  Consistent with HLVL and CLVL, lower-level NFL 
coaching experience is measured using the sum of NFL seasons the coach spent coaching as a 
lower-level assistant coach relative to the current coaching position (LLVL).  For example, LLVL 
is the sum of seasons as an assistant position coach for position coaches, as an assistant position 
coach and position coach for coordinators/assistant head coaches, and in non-head coach 
coaching positions in the NFL for head coaches. 
Also accounted for within the present study are the performance of the organization and 
the performance of the individual in the observed season.  To measure organizational 
performance, regular season winning percentage in the observed season (ORGP) is used.  To 
measure individual performance, the standardized performance metrics for a given coaching 
position are used (INDP).  For head coaches, individual performance is the same as 
organizational performance; however, the variable is expressed in standard deviations.  More 
specifically, to calculate the standardized winning percentages, the mean winning percentage for 
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the league in a given season is subtracted from each observed team’s winning percentage.  Then, 
the difference between the league mean and the observed winning percentage is divided by the 
standard deviation of the winning percentage for the observed season. 
The INDP variable for non-head coaches is calculated in a manner consistent with the 
aforementioned method, however, using different performance metrics based on coaching 
responsibility.  For offensive coordinators, the amount of points scored by the team in the 
observed season is used and standardized by season.  Similarly, for defensive coordinators, the 
amount of points scored by the teams’ opponents in the observed season is multiplied by -1 and 
standardized by season.  For assistant coaches at all levels without specified offensive/defensive 
responsibilities in their position title (e.g., assistant head coach or coaching assistant), 
standardized winning percentages are used.  Likewise, for assistant coaches only with offensive 
or defensive designations (i.e., not specific position coach primary responsibilities), standardized 
points scored and points allowed variables are used, respectively, consistent with coordinator 
individual performance measures. 
The INDP variable for position coaches and assistant position coaches varies by position 
coached.  Table 4.1 provides a description of individual performance measures used; separated 
by coach position title and the level that the title is associated with from the above discussion.  
As examples, for quarterback and wide receiver coaches, individual performance is measured by 
net yards per pass attempt, which is calculated as the difference of passing yards and sack yards 
divided by the sum of pass attempts and sacks.  For defensive backs coaches, individual 
performance is measured by opponents’ net yards per pass attempt multiplied by -1.  Consistent 
with the head coach and coordinator variables, each of these performances measured are 
aggregated at the season level to allow for cross-position comparisons.   
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Related to organizational performance is penalty yards.  Because coaches are responsible 
for the conduct of their players, especially on-field conduct and discipline (Seifried, 2008; Statz 
et al., 2007), penalty yards are controlled for in the present study and standardized by season to 
account for rule changes and other seasonal differences (PNYD).  When head coach turnover 
occurs, newly hired or promoted head coaches often assemble new coaching staffs, thus creating 
an environment in which entire coaching staffs lose their positions and are more likely to be  
Table 4.1 
Individual Performance Measures by Position Title 
Level Position Title Individual Performance Measure 
1 Head Coach Winning percentage 
2 Assistant Head Coach Winning percentage 
2 Defensive Coordinator Points allowed 
2 Offensive Coordinator Points scored 
3 Quarterbacks Net yards per pass attempt 
3 Wide Receivers Net yards per pass attempt 
3 Running Backs Rushing yards per attempt 
3 Tight Ends Offensive yards per play 
3 Offensive Line Offensive yards per play 
3 Defensive Line Opponents' rushing yards per play (negative) 
3 Linebackers Opponents' offensive yards per play (negative) 
3 Secondary Opponents' net passing yards per play (negative) 
3 Special Teams Yards per punt return 
4 Assistant Quarterbacks Net yards per pass attempt 
4 Assistant Wide Receivers Net yards per pass attempt 
4 Assistant Running Backs Rushing yards per attempt 
4 Assistant Tight Ends Offensive yards per play 
4 Assistant Offensive Line Offensive yards per play 
4 Assistant Defensive Line Opponents' rushing yards per play (negative) 
4 Assistant Linebackers Opponents' offensive yards per play (negative) 
4 Assistant Secondary Opponents' net passing yards per play (negative) 
4 Assistant Special Teams Yards per punt return 
4 Coaching Assistant Winning percentage 
4 Defensive Assistant Points allowed 
4 Defensive Quality Control Points allowed 
4 Offensive Assistant Points scored 
4 Offensive Quality Control Points scored 
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demoted, a variable for head coach turnover (HCTO) is included in the model.  Additionally, 
coach age, which is calculated by subtracting the coach’s birth year from the year of the first 
regular season game for the given observation (AGE) is included in the model.  Lastly, season 
fixed effects are included in the model to account for changes internal and external to the NFL 
which may impact promotions and demotions in the NFL. 
Empirical Specification 
To examine potential racial disparities and central position preferences as well as effects 
of an institutional policy regarding preferential hiring and promotion practices has on promotions 
and demotions, the present study follows previous coach promotion models (e.g., Braddock et 
al., 2012; Madden & Ruther, 2010; Malone et al., 2008; Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011) in 
using logistic regression models to analyze the NFL from the 1984-1985 season through the 
2015-2016 season.  The unit of observation is a coach-season in which each coach has no more 
than one observation per season.  Within the 32-season sample period, 12,548 team-season 
observations exist in which an NFL coach remained in the NFL the following season. 
From the above sample, 12 team-season observations spanning four coaches were 
removed due to limitations identifying birth years or pictures.  Three of the four coaches 
removed from the sample never experienced an NFL promotion or demotion, based on the 
criteria within this study, and remained Level 4 coaches for the duration of their NFL careers.  
The other coach removed from the sample spent three years in the NFL and was a Level 4 coach 
promoted to a Level 3 tight ends coach.  Therefore, the final number of team-season observations 
within the sample is 12,536. 
The logistic regression model takes the following form: 
L=log(P/1-P)=βXit 
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where L is the log odds ratio, P is the probability of promotion or demotion, and Xit is a vector of 
independent and control variables indexed by coach (i) and seasons (t).  To address and 
potentially correct for multicollinearity, correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors 
were examined.  With the exception of interaction terms and their components, an examination 
of the correlation coefficients between each of the variables in the model were found to not 
exceed 0.6, indicating there is no need to omit variables to correct for multicollinearity 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Moreover, none of the variance inflation factors for the non-
interacted independent and control variables exceeded a value of eight.  This result further 
indicates multicollinearity is not an issue of concern among non-interacted independent and 
control variables in this model (Menard, 2002). 
Results 
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the models.  In this 
sample, an average of 8.9% of coach-season observations included a promotion, whereas 3.8% 
of coach-season observations resulted in demotion within the NFL during the sample period.  
Among the observations, 26.2% represented coaches identified as Black and approximately half 
(i.e., 50.4%) of the observations occurred while the Rooney Rule was in effect.  Central position 
coaches compose 12.5% of the observations in the sample.  The average amount of college 
coaching experience is 8.7 seasons with a maximum of 40 seasons.  Other professional football 
league coaching experience is less common with a mean of 0.4 seasons and a maximum of 17 
seasons. 
Most coaches have no coaching experience at ranks above their current position with a 
median of zero and a mean of 0.6 seasons.  Coaching experience at the coach’s current level 
extends to a maximum of 29 seasons, but has a mean of 5.5 seasons.  Coaching experience at  
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Table 4.2  
Summary Statistics (n=12,536) 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
PROM Coach is promoted for the following season (1=promoted) 0.089 0.284 0 1 0 
DEMO Coach is demoted for the following season (-1=demoted) -0.038 0.191 -1 0 0 
BLCK Coach appears to be Black or African-American (1=Black) 0.262 0.440 0 1 0 
ROON Rooney Rule is active in the observed season (1=Rooney Rule) 0.504 0.500 0 1 1 
COLL Sum of seasons spent coaching college football at any level 8.723 7.481 0 40 8 
OTHR Sum of seasons spent coaching other football leagues 0.422 1.332 0 17 0 
CENT Coached central position (QB or LB) as primary responsibility 
in observed season (1=central position coach) 
0.125 0.331 0 1 0 
HLVL Sum of NFL seasons spent in a higher-level coaching position 0.569 1.956 0 28 0 
CLVL Sum of NFL seasons spent in the current coaching level 5.452 4.726 1 29 4 
LLVL Sum of NFL seasons spent in a lower-level coaching position 1.957 3.555 0 29 0 
ORGP Team performance measured by observed season win percentage 0.512 0.186 0 1 0.500 
INDP Individual performance measured in standard deviations 0.063 0.973 -2.944 3.441 0.094 
PNYD Sum of yards accrued against a team in the observed season -0.019 0.995 -3.424 3.343 -0.056 
HCTO Head coach did not retain position the following season 
(1=turnover) 
0.174 0.379 0 1 0 
AGE Coach age calculated as year of first game less birth year   46 10 19 79 46 
 




lower levels is also possessed by less than half of the coach-season observations with a median 
of zero seasons and a mean of 2 seasons.  Head coach turnover occurred following 17.4% of the 
observations and the average age of coaches within the coach-season observations is 45.9, which 
spans from 19 to 79 years old. 
Table 4.3 presents the ordered logistic regression results for (a) all the observations, (b) 
all Level 2 and 3 coaches, (c) only Level 2 coaches, and (d) only Level 3 coaches.  The coach 
level is presented for the coach during the observed year (i.e., not the level the coach was 
promoted/demoted to).  For the full model with all observations included, the variable for Black 
coaches is negative and marginally significant, central position coaches is positive and 
statistically significant, and Black central position coaches is negative and marginally significant. 
Because the central coach variable is positive (i.e., 0.637) and the Black central coach 
variable is negative (i.e., -0.408), the joint effect of the two central coach variables, irrespective 
of the Black coach variable, is the sum of the two effects (StataCorp, 2013), which is positive 
(i.e., 0.229).  To examine the statistical significance of the effect of the central coach variable 
irrespective of the Black coach variable, a joint significance test of the joint coefficient was 
conducted and found to be statistically insignificant (i.e., p=0.307).  Similarly, the joint 
significance of the Black coach variable, irrespective of the central coach variable, was examined 
and the joint coefficient of -0.607 is statistically significant (i.e., p=0.012).  Thus, being a Black 
coach, irrespective of being a central coach, has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
the upward career mobility of coaches. 
Regarding the control variables in the full ordered logistic regression model, higher level 
coaching experience, organizational performance, and individual experience are positive and 
statistically significant.  In contrast, lower level coaching experience, head coach turnover in the  





Ordered Logistic Regression Model Results (Dependent Variable: PRODEM) 
Variable Full Level 2 Level 3 
BLCK -0.200* -0.487* -0.177 
 (0.102) (0.264) (0.148) 
ROON 0.120 0.019 -0.998*** 
 (0.254) (0.552) (0.379) 
BLCK*ROON 0.160 0.460 0.145 
 (0.129) (0.341) (0.195) 
CENT 0.637*** -- 0.991*** 
 (0.083)  (0.108) 
BLCK*CENT -0.408* -- -0.486 
 (0.239)  (0.303) 
COLL -0.002 -0.024** 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) 
OTHR -0.019 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.022) (0.044) (0.031) 
HLVL 0.162*** 0.097** 0.155*** 
 (0.013) (0.043) (0.018) 
CLVL 0.009 0.022 0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.012) 
LLVL -0.143*** -0.032* -0.064** 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.027) 
ORGP 1.243*** 2.800*** 0.741*** 
 (0.168) (0.350) (0.268) 
INDP 0.102*** 0.020 0.243*** 
 (0.029) (0.057) (0.047) 
PNYD -0.046* -0.018 -0.095** 
 (0.028) (0.061) (0.043) 
HCTO -0.525*** -1.150*** 0.152 
 (0.083) (0.159) (0.120) 
AGE -0.0345*** -0.026** -0.026*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) 
Cut1 -4.619 -2.465 -4.718 
 (0.300) (0.649) (0.451) 
Cut2 1.577 2.784 2.216 
  (0.292) (0.652) (0.440) 
Observations 12,536 2,021 7,113 
McFadden’s R2 0.085 0.104 0.058 
    




(Table 4.3 continued) 
 Full Level 2 Level 3 
Log Likelihood -5241.007 -1099.023 -2306.138 
Joint BLCK+(BLCK*CENT) -0.607** -- -0.663** 
Joint CENT+(BLCK*CENT) 0.229 -- 0.505* 
Season FE P-value 0.006 0.955 0.085 
Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1% 
level denoted by ***. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below 
coefficients. 
 
following season, and age are negative and statistically significant.  Penalty yards are also 
negative, but only marginally significant. 
For the model limited to Level 2 coaches, only 2,021 observations are used and the only 
variable of the independent variables of focus in this study which is even marginally significant 
is the Black coaches variable, which is negative and marginally significant.  Variables 
representing higher level coaching experience and organizational performance are positive and 
statistically significant, whereas college coaching experience, head coach turnover, and coach 
age are negative and statistically significant in this model.  Lower level coaching experience is 
also negative in this model, but only marginally significant. 
The last ordered logistic regression model presented in Table 4.3 isolates Level 3 coach 
observations.  Within this model, the variable representing the Rooney Rule being active is 
negative and statistically significant, whereas the central position coach variable is positive and 
statistically significant.  The joint effect of the two Black coach variables is negative and 
statistically significant and the joint effect of the two central coach variables is positive and 
marginally significant.  College coaching experience, higher level coaching experience, current 
level coaching experience, organizational performance, and individual performance are positive 
and statistically significant.  In contrast, lower level coaching experience, penalty yards accrued, 
and coach age are negative and statistically significant.  




Table 4.4 presents the logistic regression model results for promotions only.  Analyzing 
all observations in which promotion is possible (i.e., not head coaches), the results of the logistic  
Table 4.4 
Logistic Regression Model Results (Dependent Variable: PROM) 
Variable Full Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
BLCK -0.453*** -0.575 -0.481** 0.013 
 (0.128) (0.558) (0.189) (0.208) 
ROON -0.010 0.897 -1.005** -1.180** 
 (0.291) (0.944) (0.437) (0.586) 
BLCK*ROON 0.247 0.714 0.243 0.006 
 (0.160) (0.674) (0.240) (0.249) 
CENT 0.557*** -- 1.076*** 0.463** 
 (0.087)  (0.113) (0.216) 
BLCK*CENT -0.045 -- -0.060 0.123 
 (0.248)  (0.300) (0.548) 
COLL -0.001 -0.026 0.014* 0.018* 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) 
OTHR -0.031 0.032 0.002 -0.147** 
 (0.029) (0.075) (0.036) (0.067) 
HLVL 0.166*** 0.143** 0.177*** 0.083*** 
 (0.014) (0.059) (0.020) (0.022) 
CLVL -0.015 0.036 0.056*** -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.037) (0.015) (0.021) 
LLVL -0.104*** -0.087** -0.034 -- 
 (0.016) (0.035) (0.033)  
ORGP 0.965*** 3.157*** 0.657** 0.406 
 (0.198) (0.590) (0.311) (0.303) 
INDP 0.108*** -0.004 0.251*** 0.021 
 (0.034) (0.096) (0.054) (0.052) 
PNYD -0.022 0.226** -0.099** 0.013 
 (0.033) (0.101) (0.050) (0.053) 
HCTO 0.572*** 1.650*** 0.642*** 0.226 
 (0.086) (0.241) (0.125) (0.146) 
AGE -0.035*** -0.066*** -0.047*** 0.016* 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -1.359*** -1.790 -1.349*** -1.443** 
  (0.334) (1.130) (0.494) (0.648) 
 
     




(Table 4.4 continued) 
 Full Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Observations 11,674 2,021 7,113 2,541 
McFadden’s R2  0.071 0.140 0.091 0.049 
Count R2 0.905 0.941 0.932 0.802 
Log Likelihood -3408.552 -396.463 -1609.631 -1203.472 
Joint BLCK+(BLCK*CENT) -0.497** -- -0.541* 0.136 
Joint CENT+(BLCK*CENT) 0.512** -- 1.016*** 0.586 
Season FE P-value <0.001 0.992 0.117 0.096 
Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1% level denoted by 
***. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below coefficients. 
 
regression estimation shows the Black variable to be negative and statistically significant and the 
central position coach variable to be positive and statistically significant.  The joint effects of the 
two Black coach variables and the two central coach variables are statistically significant, but the 
joint Black coach variable is negative and the joint central coach variable is positive.  The 
positive and statistically significant variables are those that represent higher level coaching 
experience, organizational performance, individual performance, and head coach turnover, 
whereas lower level coaching experience and coach age are negative and statistically significant.  
 Table 4.4 also presents the model for Level 2, 3, and 4 coaches with the dependent 
variable of promotions.  Within the model for Level 2 coaches, only six variables are statistically 
significant.  Higher level coaching experience, organizational performance, penalty yards, and 
head coach turnover are positive and statistically significant, whereas lower level coaching 
experience and coach age are negative and statistically significant.  Within the Level 3 coaches 
model, the Black and Rooney Rule variables are negative and statistically significant, but the 
central position coach variable is positive and statistically significant.  The joint effect of the two 
Black coach variables is negative and marginally significant and the joint effect of the two 
central coach variables is positive and statistically significant. 
 






Logistic Regression Model Results (Dependent Variable: DEMO) 
Variable Full Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
BLCK -0.471** -0.284 0.513 -0.635** 
 (0.198) (1.964) (0.325) (0.316) 
ROON 0.355 -0.915 0.308 0.921 
 (0.456) (2.458) (0.690) (0.729) 
BLCK*ROON 0.006 -0.193 -0.401 0.168 
 (0.260) (2.342) (0.418) (0.405) 
CENT -0.782*** -- -- -0.116 
 (0.213)   (0.235) 
BLCK*CENT 1.373*** -- -- 1.022** 
 (0.454)   (0.482) 
COLL 0.003 0.143 0.029** -0.032** 
 (0.009) (0.090) (0.013) (0.015) 
OTHR -0.008 -0.092 0.032 -0.008 
 (0.036) (0.236) (0.055) (0.069) 
HLVL -0.045 -- -0.061 -0.071 
 (0.040)  (0.057) (0.077) 
CLVL -0.082*** -0.452* -0.023 -0.047 
 (0.018) (0.240) (0.028) (0.029) 
LLVL 0.138*** 0.177 0.018 0.080** 
 (0.014) (0.135) (0.023) (0.039) 
ORGP -1.889*** 55.342 -3.020*** -0.872 
 (0.327) (40.746) (0.453) (0.561) 
INDP -0.083 -11.930 -0.021 -0.238** 
 (0.055) (7.983) (0.074) (0.099) 
PNYD 0.111** 0.842 0.123 0.122 
 (0.052) (0.540) (0.078) (0.089) 
HCTO 1.933*** -- 1.839*** 1.124*** 
 (0.118)  (0.167) (0.203) 
AGE 0.011 -0.020 0.010 -0.034** 
 (0.009) (0.083) (0.013) (0.017) 
Constant -3.594*** -27.317 -2.081** -2.251** 
  (0.547) (20.687) (0.824) (0.925) 
Observations 9,995 68 2,021 7,113 
McFadden’s R2  0.225 0.439 0.222 0.122 
Count R2 0.955 0.779 0.882 0.980 
Log Likelihood -1481.368 -25.859 -609.691 -604.719 




(Table 4.5 continued)     
 Full Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Joint BLCK+(BLCK*CENT) 0.902** -- -- 0.386 
Joint CENT+(BLCK*CENT) 0.591 -- -- 0.906** 
Season FE P-value 0.877 0.979 0.874 0.793 
Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1% level denoted by 
***. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below coefficients. 
 
Regarding the control variables for the Level 3 coaches model, higher level coaching 
experience, current level coaching experience, organizational performance, individual 
performance, and head coach turnover is positive and statistically significant, whereas penalty 
yards and coach age are negative and statistically significant.  In the Level 4 coach promotion 
model, the central position coach and higher level coaching experience variables are positive and 
statistically significant, whereas the Rooney Rule and non-NFL professional football coaching 
experience variables are negative and statistically significant.   
Table 4.5 presents the logistic regression results for the model with demotions as the 
dependent variable.  In the full model, the Black coach and central position coach variables are 
negative and statistically significant, while the Black central position coach variable is positive 
and statistically significant.  The joint effect of the Black coach variables is positive and 
statistically significant and the joint effect of the central coach variables is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. 
Regarding the control variables in the full demotion model, lower level coaching 
experience, penalty yards, and head coach turnover are positive and statistically significant, 
whereas current level coaching experience and organizational performance are negative and 
statistically significant.  When estimating the demotion model with head coaches, no variables 
are statistically significant.  For the assistant head coaches and coordinators, college coaching 
experience and head coach turnover are positive and statistically significant, whereas 




organizational performance is negative and statistically significant.  Finally, in the demotion 
model for Level 3 coaches, the Black variable is negative and statistically significant, whereas 
the Black central position coach variable is positive and statistically significant.  Additionally, 
college coaching experience, individual performance, and coach age are negative and statistically 
significant, while lower level coaching experience and head coach turnover are positive and 
statistically significant. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study is to examine potential disparities by race, before and after the 
Rooney Rule, and position title in NFL coach promotions and demotions.  The results of the 
logistic regression models indicate the existence of disparities in NFL coach promotions and 
demotions based on race and position title.  Furthermore, the results of the logistic regressions 
also reveal interesting promotion and demotion determinants other than race and position title.  
The present study begins the discussion of the logistic regression results with commentary 
regarding racial disparities in promotions and demotions, the ineffectiveness of the Rooney Rule 
in significantly increasing head coach diversity, and disparities in promotions and demotions by 
position title.  Then, the present study discusses other findings of interest pertaining to promotion 
and demotion determinants such as coach age, penalty yards accrued, head coach turnover in the 
following season, organizational and individual performance, football coaching experience 
outside the NFL, and NFL coaching experience at various levels relative to the current position 
level. 
In both the promotion and demotion models for Level 3 coaches, Black coaches appear to 
experience more difficulty securing higher ranking NFL coaching positions, as well as retaining 
their current coaching positions.  More specifically, holding all other variables constant at their 




means, Black coaches are 2.2% less likely to be promoted and 0.7% more likely to be demoted 
than their non-Black counterparts during the sample period.  Though, perhaps, 2.2% may seem 
trivial, the difference in promotion likelihood for Black coaches relative to non-Black coaches is 
greater than the difference in promotion likelihood for coaches whom won two out of 16 games 
relative to 13 out of 16 games.  Therefore, the finding that a significant disparity in promotions 
exists between Black and non-Black coaches is consistent with previous research by Rider et al. 
(2016). 
In addition to finding disparities in promotions and demotions by race, the Rooney Rule 
was ineffective in increasing the ability of Black coaches in the NFL to be promoted, even to the 
rank of head coach.  This finding is consistent with previous research by Solow et al. (2011) and 
Rider et al. (2016), but contradicts the conclusions drawn by Madden and Ruther (2010).  
Furthermore, the evidence presented in this study and similar studies before the present study 
(e.g., Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011) indicates similar policies implemented in other 
organizations, such as Facebook (Frier, 2015), Uber (Haselton, 2017), or college football 
(Gordon, 2008; Pike, 2011) may not be an effective means of increasing racial diversity. 
Regarding centrality, the findings in the present study indicate central positions coaches 
are more likely to be promoted, and consistent with previous research (e.g., Braddock et al., 
2012).  Notably, few Blacks in the sample are central position coaches.  For instance, Blacks 
comprise 31.1% of Level 3 coaches and 27.4% if Level 4 coaches in the sample.  However, 
among the 1,418 central position coaches and 152 assistant central position coaches in the 
sample, only 12.5% of central position coaches and 14.5% of assistant central position coaches 
are Black, which may be surprising given 71% of players and 38% of assistant coaches in the 
NFL in 2015 were Black (Lapchick, n.d.).  Therefore, if central position coaches experience an 




increased rate of promotion relative to non-central position coaches, the disparity in promotions 
by race could be due in part to a preference toward central position coaches or pigeonholing 
minorities into non-central positions. 
Central position coaches (i.e., quarterback and linebacker coaches) in the sample 
experienced a 7.4% increased promotion likelihood and assistant central position coaches 
experienced an 8.8% increased promotion likelihood.  Though Black position coaches are less 
likely to be promoted and central position coaches are more likely to be promoted, ceteris 
paribus, the present study found no significant increased or decreased likelihood of promotion 
for Black central position coaches.  However, Black central position coaches are less likely to be 
demoted by 1.9%.  Though Braddock et al. (2012) found central position coaches to have an 
advantage in promotions, examinations of Black central position coach promotion prospects have 
been limited, and studies examining demotions of non-head coaches are even more scarce.  
Therefore, the present study supports previous research findings of increased promotion 
probabilities for central position coaches (Braddock et al., 2012), and adds to the literature by 
finding no statistically significant difference in promotion opportunities for Black position 
coaches, but a decreased probability of demotion for Black central position coaches. 
In addition to disparities in promotion and demotion by race and organizational role, the 
present study found older coaches are less likely to be promoted relative to their younger 
counterparts, even after controlling for years of football coaching experience in the NFL, college, 
and other professional leagues.  Previous research also concluded older coaches have diminished 
career prospects (e.g., Fee et al., 2006; Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011).  The age ranges of 
Level 2 coaches in the sample span from 27 to 78 and a 78 year old coach experiences a 14.2% 
lower likelihood of promotion to head coach than a 27 year old coach.  For Level 3 coaches, ages 




range from 21 to 79 and, similar to Level 2 coaches, a 79 year old Level 3 coach experiences a 
14.8% decreased likelihood of promotion relative to a 21 year old Level 3 coach.  Additionally, 
older Level 3 coaches in the sample were more likely to be demoted, however, a 79 year old 
Level 3 coach only faced a 2.4% increased likelihood of demotion relative to a 21 year old Level 
3 coach. 
Penalty yards have varying effects on promotions and demotions among NFL coaches.  
For Level 3 coaches, too many penalty yards accrued by a team could decrease the likelihood of 
promotion by up to 3.4%.  However, for Level 2 coaches, more penalty yards accrued by a team 
could increase promotion likelihood by 5.8%.  This substantial difference in promotion 
probabilities between Level 3 and 2 coaches could be a result of Level 3 coaches being more 
closely associated with the primary perpetrators of the penalties, and therefore, if the penalties 
are not reduced by the players, more direct blame could be attributed to the Level 3 coaches. 
Moreover, Level 2 coaches may be able to use penalty yards as an excuse for poor 
performance to increase their likelihood of promotion by also placing blame on position coaches 
whom are closer to the penalty perpetrators, or placing the blame on the organizational leader–
the head coach–whom is responsible for the overall culture and discipline of the team (Seifried, 
2008; Statz, Cordell, Ham, Karcher, & Shukie, 2007).  Similarly, the excuse for poor 
performance could also be used as a means to prevent demotion, which is consistent with the 
results from the full demotion model, whereby penalties may decrease the probability of 
demotion by up to 1.5%. 
Interestingly, head coach turnover the following season is actually beneficial for 
promotions and helps protect against demotions after controlling for performance-related factors 
such as winning percentage.  More specifically, Level 2 coaches in the sample experienced a 




10% increase in promotion likelihood while Level 3 coaches experienced a 3.9% increase in 
promotion likelihood.  Additionally, Level 2 coaches were 23.4% less likely to be demoted while 
Level 3 coaches were 1.9% less likely to be demoted following head coach turnover.  Though 
head coach turnover may be thought to increase the likelihood of demotions and decrease the 
likelihood of promotions, Fee et al. (2006) found internal promotions to be more prevalent when 
head coach turnover occurs within successful organizations.  Therefore, the effect presented in 
the present study of head coach turnover increasing promotion probabilities and decreasing 
demotion probabilities may be due to head coaches being replaced by internal candidates. 
Consistent with previous research, higher organizational performance increases the 
likelihood of promotion (e.g., Fee et al., 2006; Goff & Tollison, 2009; Malone et al., 2008; Rider 
et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011).  However, increases in organizational performance may not 
increase promotion probabilities for Level 4 coaches.  For Level 2 coaches, organizational 
performance could increase promotion likelihood by up to 14.3%, whereas Level 3 coaches can 
experience a 3.3% increase in promotion likelihood attributable to organizational performance. 
Interestingly, organizational performance also increases Level 2 coach demotion 
probabilities by up to 28.5%.  Similarly, Level 3 coaches experience an increased likelihood of 
promotion when individual performance is high, but also an increased likelihood of demotion.  
More specifically, high individual performance could increase the probability of promotion by 
up to 8.8%, but could increase the probability of demotion by up to 1.8%. 
Collegiate and non-NFL professional football coaching experience also influences 
promotion and demotion probabilities for NFL coaches.  Though, like Rider et al. (2016), the 
present study did not find statistically significant evidence of college coaching experience 
increasing the likelihood of promotion, an effect was found for demotions.  College coaching 




experience assists Level 2 coaches in preventing their own demotion, however, Level 3 coaches 
with more college coaching experience are more susceptible to demotion. 
The aforementioned contradictory finding may be a result of the level of college coaching 
experience, which was not examined in the present study, but could be assumed based on the 
position level within the NFL.  For example, Level 2 NFL coaches likely held higher level 
college coaching positions than Level 3 NFL coaches.  Therefore, the higher level of experience 
in college may be what is assisting Level 2 NFL coaches in preventing demotion, and lower level 
college coaching experience accrued by Level 3 NFL coaches may be viewed as less meaningful 
and contribute to increased demotion probabilities. 
Similarly, Level 4 NFL coaches with professional football coaching experience outside 
the NFL are less likely to be promoted.  During the sample period, non-NFL professional 
football league coaching experience decreased Level 4 coach promotion probabilities by up to 
17.8%.  The negative relationship between non-NFL professional football coaching experience 
and promotions for Level 4 coaches may be more profound for Level 4 coaches than other NFL 
coach ranks due to expanding coaching staffs allowing for more Level 4 coaches to secure NFL 
positions later in the sample period (Mielke, 2007).  The rise of Level 4 coaches later in the 
sample period coincides with the rise of less competitive non-NFL professional football leagues 
to rival the NFL (e.g., the United States Football League), thus devaluing non-NFL professional 
football league coaching experience. 
Similarly, too much coaching experience at lower levels within the NFL can also 
adversely impact a coach’s career advancement.  Level 2 coaches may experience a decrease in 
promotion likelihood of up to 52.1% for 29 years of coaching experience as a Level 3 or 4 coach.  




However, for Level 3 coaches, having 19 years of coaching experience as a Level 4 coach could 
reduce the probability of demotion by 3.7%. 
Though the two aforementioned findings may seem contrary, they could be product of the 
level of advancement team owners, general managers, and head coaches are comfortable with 
pertaining to amount of experience at various levels of an organization.  For example, team 
owners and general managers may not feel comfortable relying on a head coach with little 
experience in the higher coaching ranks (i.e., Levels 1 and 2), however, position coaches with 
many years of experience as assistant position coaches may be valuable right where they are.  
This finding of more experience decreasing career advancement opportunities may be why some 
previous studies (e.g., Fee et al., 2006; Rider et al., 2016) found statistically insignificant results 
when not differentiating between the levels of previous NFL coaching experience. 
Position coaches with too much experience as assistant position coaches may not be too 
desirable for promotion to assistant head coach or coordinator, unless they secure more 
experience at their current level.  More experience in current coaching levels is advantageous for 
Level 3 coaches seeking promotion and could increase their chance of promotion by up to 
12.6%.  This finding is consistent with previous studies which used years of experience as a 
measure of human capital accumulated on the job (e.g., Braddock et al., 2012; Malone et al., 
2008; Rider et al., 2016). 
As lower levels of coaching experience may be devalued, higher levels of coaching 
experience may be highly valued.  In fact, for all three levels of NFL coaches eligible for 
promotion (i.e., non-head coaches), experience at the next higher level is a significant 
determinant of promotion.  Within the sample, Level 2 coaches increased their probability of 
promotion by up to 19.7% for 15 years of head coach experience.  Level 3 coaches increased 




their probability of promotion by up to 66.6% for 22 years of assistant head coach or coordinator 
experience. 
Level 4 coaches increased their probability of promotion by up to 52.3% for 28 years of 
Level 3 coaching experience.  Therefore, it appears if the coach was trusted to perform a higher 
level job in the past, and may have secured additional human capital relative to his peers, he is 
more likely to be trusted with the job again in the future.  This finding is consistent with previous 
findings related to both human capital accumulation (Braddock et al., 2012; Malone et al., 2008; 
Rider et al., 2016) and the positive relationship between previous promotions with future 
promotions (Acosta, 2010; Malone et al., 2008). 
Though many interesting, confirmatory, and contradictory results were found in the 
present study, the predictive abilities of the promotion models, as evidenced by the pseudo-R2 of 
each promotion model was not high.  The low predictive abilities of the models are indicative of 
the difficulty of determining, not only who would be a good candidate for promotion (Longley & 
Wong, 2011), but also who good candidates for promotion are.  Therefore, studies which 
examine candidate pools as determinants of dismissals (e.g., Foreman & Soebbing, 2015) may 
experience difficulty when estimating qualified candidates for promotions.  Finally, based on the 
decreasing pseudo R2 values of the promotion models from Level 2 coaches to Level 4 coaches, 
there appears to be more difficulty in determining promotions further down the organizational 
hierarchy. 
Conclusion 
 The present study was designed to contribute to the present literature regarding the 
statistical relationships between managerial career advancement in the NFL and race, centrality, 
and the Rooney Rule.  It found no evidence of racial disparities in the head coach or 




coordinator/assistant head coach ranks as well as no evidence of the Rooney Rule increasing 
racial diversity, even among head coaches.  However, the findings in the present research 
indicate Black Level 3 coaches may experience more career advancement and job retention 
difficulty than their non-Black counterparts. 
Additionally, central position coaches, who are predominantly White, are more likely to 
be promoted; however, the findings in the present study do not support the conclusion that Black 
central position coaches experience more career advancement difficulty than their White central 
position counterparts.  The present study also found older coaches to be more likely to be 
promoted and penalty yards accrued by a team help the career advancement of Level 2 coaches 
but simultaneously harm the careers of Level 3 coaches.  Next, head coach turnover the 
following season helped coaches get promoted and decreased the likelihood of demotion and too 
much lower-level coaching experience adversely impacted career advancement. 
 The present study has implications for organizational practitioners and scholars.  With 
other organizations, inside (Gordon, 2008; Pike, 2011) and outside (Frier, 2015; Haselton, 2017) 
sport, looking to the NFL’s Rooney Rule to increase diversity among their employees, the 
present study concurs with previous literature (e.g., Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011) that 
indicates the Rooney Rule is an ineffective policy for increasing diversity.  Therefore, 
organizations seeking to adopt a policy similar to the Rooney Rule should not implement a 
policy such as the NFL’s with the expectations that it will increase diversity. 
 Though many interesting findings resulted from the present study, the promotion models 
within the study demonstrated the difficulty of determining how promotion decisions are made 
by practitioners.  Therefore, studies attempting to examine candidates for promotion (e.g., 
Foreman & Soebbing, 2015) may experience substantial difficulty in determining which 




candidates are being considered for promotion.  To increase the ability of promotion models to 
identify actual candidates, future studies can incorporate socio-political forces (Foreman & 
Soebbing) as well as social ties (Brandes, Brechot, & Franck, 2015; Fast & Jensen, 2006) into 
the model.  Additionally, future promotion models can incorporate efficiency by examining 
inputs, such as player ability, into the model (Fort et al., 2008).  Another determinant to consider 
concerns the level of coaching success and responsibility in college and other professional 
leagues.  
Pertaining to issues of race, future research could examine if racial disparities exist based 
on the promotability of the position or the difficulty level of retaining a position within a certain 
organization (Cook & Glass, 2014).  Future research could also examine whether minority head 
coaches are more likely to hire or promote minority assistant coaches relative to their White 
counterparts.  Finally, research could examine the probability of coaches securing subsequent 
head coaching positions after being dismissed from a head coaching position in the past, and 
whether factors such as race or age affect those subsequent head coaching opportunities. 
  






Executive dismissals and successions can be difficult to accurately examine for several 
reasons.  The sport industry provided important data to assist in examining executive dismissals 
and successions; however, difficulties still exist in identifying factors related to dismissals, and 
subsequently, successions.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) developed a framework to better understand 
executive dismissals, which, in turn, provides for a better understanding of successions but this 
model of CEO dismissals is not perfect.  As an example, research based on their four socio-
political forces of CEO dismissals often resulted in inconsistent or contradictory results.  
Inconsistent or contradictory results may be due to misinterpretations of the model, difficulties 
operationalizing the four socio-political forces, errors in accurately measuring organizational 
performance or any of the four socio-political forces, or an incomplete model proposed by 
Fredrickson et al. (1988). 
 Executive dismissals and successions are also contingent upon successors, candidate 
pools, and determinants of promotions.  Though executive successions require an understanding 
of executive dismissals, executive dismissals require an understanding of candidate pools, and 
candidate pools require an understanding of promotions from the lowest rung of the career 
ladder, they are often disjoined in the literature.  Executive dismissal research typically identifies 
candidate pools based on firm and industry size proxies, which are often based on sales figures, 
number of employees in a firm, or number of firms in an industry (e.g., Crossland & Chen, 2013; 
Parrino, 1997).  These proxies do not consider how tall or wide organizational structures are or 
how qualified candidates to replace executives are. 




 A large body of previous literature examines issues such as executive successions, 
executive dismissals, and career trajectories (Fee et al., 2006; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Foreman 
& Soebbing, 2015; Ward, Sonnenfeld, & Kimberly, 1995), however, without understanding the 
antecedents of executive successions, fully understanding executive successions themselves may 
not be possible (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model of CEO dismissals 
remained a leading theory for understanding executive dismissals for almost three decades and 
has been influential in molding research questions and empirical examinations.  Yet, minimal 
revisions or additions to the dismissal model have been proposed in that time. 
 The present dissertation improved upon empirical studies using the Fredrickson et al. 
(1988) model of CEO dismissals by establishing a proxy for actual candidates to replace an 
executive rather than proxies based on industry and firm characteristics.  Using the proxy for 
candidates provided statistically insignificant results that question the theoretical relationship 
between candidate availability and executive dismissals.  Additionally, the present dissertation 
proposed and found empirical justification for incorporating a fifth socio-political force within 
the Fredrickson et al. (1988) CEO dismissal model.  Interestingly, within the deviant culture of 
the NFL (Coakley, 2015; Statz et al., 2007), deviant behavior may increase or decrease executive 
dismissal likelihood depending on the type of deviant behavior, punishments received for deviant 
behavior, and implementation of institutional policies regarding deviant behavior. 
Finally, the present dissertation emphasized the relationship between executive dismissals 
and candidates available to succeed executives, and therefore, examined determinants of 
managerial promotions within the empirical setting examined (i.e., the NFL).  Specifically 
focusing on race and centrality as promotion and demotion determinants, the present dissertation 
found race and centrality to be statistically significant factors in promotions and demotions, 




though the influence of these variables depends on whether the manager is being considered for 
promotion or demotion as well as their current rank within the organization (i.e., upper- or lower-
level management). 
Generalizability of Findings and Limitations 
Though the findings within this dissertation were conducted within the context of sport, 
they can largely be generalized to broader corporate contexts for several reasons (Day et al., 
2012; Kahn, 2000; Wolfe et al., 2005).  Studies using NFL data are beneficial due to amount of 
accurately measured data available (Borland & Lye 1996; Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005).  
More specifically, findings such as deviance increasing the likelihood of executive dismissal are 
especially robust given the increased acceptance of deviant behavior within the culture of the 
NFL (Coakley, 2015).  Furthermore, the specific NFL policies examined in the dissertation (i.e., 
Rooney Rule and personal conduct policy) are relevant to non-sport industries (Frier, 2015; 
Haselton, 2017; Lyons et al., 2016; Pike, 2011), though, due to data limitations, pose difficulties 
with empirical examinations (Day et al., 2012; Lyons et al., 2016; Wolfe et al., 2005).  
Therefore, the NFL has provided an ideal setting to examine organizational phenomena 
regarding managerial labor mobility and policies affecting managerial labor mobility.  Still, the 
empirical setting of the NFL is not without generalizability concerns. 
Though numerous benefits emerge from using sport as an empirical setting for 
organization and management studies, the setting of sport is not flawless.  In particular, many 
scholars identified key differences between sport and non-sport industries which may pose 
problems when attempting to generalize results.  As identified above, though they generate 
millions of dollars annually, sport teams are not large multi-faceted organizations in terms of 
personnel or operating divisions (Brown, 1982; Maxcy, 2013), therefore, Wright, Smart, and 




McMahan (1995) advised caution when attempting to apply sport-related organization studies to 
these larger organizations. 
Another warning came from Wolfe et al. (2005) regarding results of diversity research 
within the sport context being generalized outside of sport, stating that social norms and 
regulations are especially unique in sport.  However, because sport is a less progressive social 
world (Nelson, 1994), results which indicate a lack of discrimination become more robust.  
Cannella and Rowe (1995) also noted some generalizability differences based on the unique 
sport context by expressing how sports teams, confined by tight regulations and more difficulties 
associated with changing organizational performance, yield conservative, rigorous inferences 
when investigating the effects of new executives.  Cannella and Rowe (1995) also stated sport 
teams are very similar organizations within the same industry and “inferences about the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables are stronger than may be the case with 
some other types of organizations” (p. 73). 
Sport teams are also unique based on various elements affecting entry-level employees 
(i.e., players) which may pose problems for generalizing results outside of the sport context.  
Entry-level employees in sport are unique because their salaries are substantially higher than 
salaries of entry-level employees in other industries and greater than their executives (Harder, 
1992).  Further, the performance of employees (i.e., players) could be affected by the wealth of 
public information available about them (Harder, 1992). 
Another unique characteristic of entry-level employees in sport involves the high degrees 
of loyalty to their work groups relative to the loyalty of work groups in most non-sport industries 
(Adler & Adler, 1988).  Yet, Adler and Adler (1988) identified other work groups may exhibit 
high degrees of loyalty, but also share other characteristics of professional athletes such as high 




initial compensation (e.g., surgical teams) or a substantial degree of media attention (e.g., 
astronaut work groups).  Therefore, results may be more generalizable to the aforementioned 
work groups with similar characteristics to professional sport teams.  Performance teams are also 
unique in structure (Wolfe et al., 2005).  Wolfe et al. (2005) explained that members of 
performance teams are the primary drivers of organizational performance.  As the primary 
drivers of organizational performance, it is the responsibility of others in the organization to 
shield performance teams from external disturbances so the performance team can perform their 
duties free of distraction to achieve higher levels of organizational success (Wolfe et al., 2005). 
Wolfe et al. (2005) identified the differences in time among various types of teams (i.e., 
performance teams and non-performance teams) as being either temporary task forces or at least 
somewhat permanent teams or crews.  Wolfe et al. (2005) stated crews, such as airline cockpit 
crews, use members for short periods of time to conduct specific tasks and inferred that the high 
prevalence of player mobility indicates that sports teams are most similar to crews.  However, 
this seems like a quite subjective choice to classify a sport team as a crew due to player mobility.  
One could argue that cohesion within an elite, highly talented and competitive performance team 
would require more time together in order to remain or become competitive in their sport than an 
airline cockpit crew which does not have to compete against rival airline cockpit crews in order 
to produce a quality product.  Most non-sport work teams are also accustomed to a relatively 
stable work pace; however, performance teams expend much of their effort during their training 
and performances which typically deviate from the consistent pace of work experienced in most 
occupations (Wolfe et al., 2005). 
Additionally, Wolfe et al. (2005) described how sport teams differ from other non-
performance teams in terms of boundaries.  Boundaries are much different for sport teams and 




their members than teams in other industries for two reasons: they (a) perform in the public eye 
and (b) are often exposed to the public, usually through the media, even when not performing 
(Wolfe et al., 2005).  Issues revolving around attention outside the field of play may be 
compounded due to the size of the team’s metropolitan area or fan base as well as the fact that 
members of sport performance teams are also often responsible for off-field public relations, 
merchandise sales, and advertising, rather than simply producing a scripted performance product.   
Though Wolfe et al. (2005) identified multiple potential problems with the 
generalizability of sport studies to non-sport industries, they also stated sport research remains an 
attractive and beneficial empirical setting despite these issues.  In many instances, there still 
exists sufficient contextual overlap for results to generalize outside of sport.  Though there are 
peculiarities associated with any industry, and generalizability is never perfect for all 
organizations, sport research, similar to research in other industries, is useful for providing 
insight into similar industries and positions being examined (Brown, 1982; Humphreys et al., 
2011). 
Lastly, though data are available in sport for examining social networks (e.g., Brandes, 
Brechot, & Franck, 2015; Fast & Jensen, 2006), the studies within this dissertation did not 
incorporate social networks with the models.  However, opportunities for coaches to be among a 
pool of candidates for a given position may be stronger when a social connection exists between 
the potential candidate and the employer.  Furthermore, within minority coaching communities, 
networks may be even more useful for securing higher ranking positions in the NFL, which is 
likely the motivation behind the Rooney Rule. 
Therefore, limitations studies in Chapters 2 and 4 may face limitations when examining 
the role of candidate availability on head coach dismissals, or determinants of external 




promotions, respectively, when excluding analyses of social networks.  Therefore, future 
research opportunities exist for analyzing social networks in conjunction with candidate pools 
and visible minority status when examining managerial labor mobility in the NFL.  However, 
several other future research opportunities stemming from the present dissertation also exist. 
Future Research Opportunities 
There are several opportunities for future research stemming from the research contained 
in this dissertation.  Regarding the influence of candidate availability on executive dismissal 
decisions, future research could explore candidate quality rather than quantity, candidate-firm fit, 
and which candidates decide to secure employment at certain firms.  Regarding the relationship 
between deviance and executive dismissals, future research could examine other empirical 
settings with varying levels of deviance and perceptions of deviance, media exposure related to 
deviance, whether executives with personnel decision responsibilities are held to higher 
standards, and what type of leaders are more likely to lead deviant organizations. 
Furthermore, future research regarding dismissals and successions could examine 
whether dismissal decisions based on different socio-political forces may affect post-succession 
organizational performance.  Regarding managerial promotions and demotions, future research 
could examine if minority or non-central position coaches are disproportionately assigned to 
more precarious managerial positions, whether minority head coaches are more likely to hire or 
promote minority assistant coaches, or if demographics influence the ability of previously 
dismissed head coaches to secure future head coach positions.  Lastly, future research could 
examine the dynamic between internal employees being more likely to be promoted when 
organizational performance is high (Fee et al., 2006), more internal promotions positively 
influencing future promotions within the same organization (Acosta, 2010), and interim CEOs 




being more likely to leave their organization after not being selected as CEO (Cannella & Shen, 
2001). 
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The two areas of executive dismissal literature consist of understanding why executives 
are dismissed and determining the effect of dismissals on organizational performance (Holmes, 
2011).  However, to truly understand the effects of dismissals, an understanding of why 
executives are dismissed is also required (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988).  In an 
attempt to better understand executive dismissals and successions, researchers have utilized the 
context of sport (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Wolfe et al., 2005).  This 
literature review begins with a review of sport as an empirical setting, followed by a brief 
overview of leadership, which includes leadership styles and leadership as an activity.  
Following the review of leadership, I present a review of the literature regarding top executive 
dismissals and successions.  This literature review concludes with some brief insight into 
elements which are currently missing from the literature and a few avenues for future research. 
Sport as an Empirical Setting for Executive Dismissal and Succession Research 
A number of studies examined various issues of importance related to management, 
economics, organizations, and leadership using sport (Day et al., 2012; Kahn, 2000; Wolfe et al., 
2005).  Sport has been used to examining non-sport-related phenomena for either its data or 
unique context (Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005).  Sociologists often opine that sport reflects 
the greater society in which it exists, indicating sport behaviors and practices seen can also be 
observed in society (Coakley, 2015; Eitzen & Sage, 1997).  For example, the implementation of 
the Rooney Rule in the NFL, which was established to provide minorities with more equal access 
to upper management positions, has been likened to affirmative action policies throughout 
society (Pike, 2011).  Furthermore, scholars identified several ways in which sports parallel 




work, especially with regard to performance, adhering to rules, organizational structures (Keidel, 
1987). 
Data from the sport industry are particularly advantageous because sport provides an 
ample amount of observable and accurately measured individual and organizational performance 
data spanning extended time periods (Borland & Lye 1996; Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005).  
Moreover, data from sport comes from a setting which often uses highly incentivized and 
motivated participants which is a limitation faced by many researchers conducting traditional 
laboratory research (Goff & Tollison, 1990).  The data advantages available in sport may be 
particularly useful for studying events and environments where information may be hard to 
obtain or often inaccurate such as sensitive executive dismissals and successions. 
Research on executive dismissals and successions in the corporate world is hindered due 
to access to information often being limited or poorly measured (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 
2000; Solow, Solow, & Walker, 2011).  One factor limiting data collection in this field is that 
obtrusive instruments (e.g., surveys) for examining executive dismissals would cause too much 
measurement error and response bias to be useful (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Furthermore, 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) noted the difficulties associated with obtaining enough board members 
as research participants needed to conduct legitimate research.  Even more specific to the 
executive dismissal data issue is the difficulty in determining the types of dismissals (e.g., 
retirement, firing) as well as the reasons of the decision makers (Fredrickson et al., 1988; 
Haynes, Josephy, & Hitt, 2015; Koning, 2003; Weisbach, 1988).  These data limitations led 
numerous researchers to advocate for better proxies in evaluating executive dismissal decisions 
(Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et al., 2000).  Sport data provide 




clarity regarding overall measures of organizational performance (Borland & Lye, 1996; Day et 
al., 2012; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986), expectations for that organizational performance (Allen 
& Chadwick, 2012; Humphreys, Paul, & Weinbach, 2011), and the circumstances of the 
executive turnover (Borland & Lye, 1996; Holmes, 2011; Koning, 2003).  Scholars using sport 
data to gain insight into non-sport settings often viewed team head coaches as executives (e.g., 
Cannella & Rowe, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Giambatista, 2004; Holmes, 2011) 
Head Coaches as Executives 
In many of the contexts in which sport managers are used to examine managerial and 
organizational theories, head coaches of team sports are often viewed as non-sport industry 
executives due to the many similarities between the two positions (Day et al., 2012; Frick, 
Barros, & Prinz, 2010; Wolfe et al., 2005).  Both head coaches and non-sport executives analyze 
competition and industry changes (Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi, & Guermat, 2010), implement 
competitive strategies (Brown, 1982; Hughes et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011; Maxcy, 2013; 
Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005) and devise tactics (Brown, 1982; Hughes et al., 
2010; Humphreys et al., 2011) to gain a competitive advantage in their respective industries.  
Head coaches and non-sport executives are also often responsible for acquiring (Brown, 1982; 
Hughes et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011; Maxcy, 2013; Rowe et al., 2005; Soebbing & 
Washington, 2011) and developing (Hughes et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2005) personnel. 
Head coaches and non-sport executives are also similar in the way they are viewed by the 
public.  Part of the responsibilities of the head coach and the corporate executive is to manage 
public relations (Hughes et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011).  Given their public relations 
responsibilities and position atop their organization, head coaches and executives often receive 
media attention akin to pop culture celebrities (Hall, Blass, Ferris, & Massengale, 2004).  




Furthermore, many corporate executives believe head coaches are similar occupations to 
corporate executives and studying head coaches through various media outlets can provide 
information generalizable to the corporate world (Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005). 
Specific to dismissals and successions, head coaches and corporate executives are also 
similar in several capacities.  Both head coaches and executives must operate within hierarchical 
organizational structures (Brown, 1982; Keidel, 1987; Maxcy, 2013) where they are responsible 
for optimizing performance while being constrained by resources and rules (Cannella & Rowe, 
1995; Rowe, et al., 2005).  However, if organizational performance declines, head coaches and 
non-sport executives may be held responsible and subsequently dismissed (Cannella & Rowe, 
1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Rowe, et al., 2005).  The frequency of successions in both sport 
and the corporate world are also similar (Bennett, Phillips, Drane, & Sagas, 2003; Fredrickson et 
al., 1988) along with the tools for increasing organizational performance (Cannella & Lubatkin, 
1993).  Therefore, to acquire future positions, both head coaches and non-sport executives rely 
on their reputations which vary based on their abilities, previous experiences, and performance 
of their organizations (Cannella & Rowe, 1995). 
Multiple scholars also advocated head coaches are not just similar to non-sport 
executives, but actually positioned them as chief executive officers (CEOs) (e.g., Frick et al., 
2010; Maxcy, 2013).  Though Hughes et al. (2010) pointed out English Premier League (EPL) 
managers are involved with external and strategic activities analogous to CEOs, they also 
suggested EPL managers could be more akin to chief operating officers (COOs) due to the focus 
on internal duties (e.g., solving workplace problems and nurturing talent) shared by both 
positions.  Similarly, Day and Lord (1988) claimed head coaches are more comparable to 
middle-level managers than top executives because head coaches are not solely responsible for 




long-term strategies regarding personnel and the quality of players is the primary determinant of 
on-field success.  Further, Day and Lord (1988) suggested changes in team ownership would 
constitute a more comparable top executive for succession literature.  However, Giambatista 
(2004) specifically addressed Day and Lord’s (1988) suggestion that team owners are more like 
executives than head coaches by finding that leader life cycles and team performance are 
stronger fits with head coaches than team owners in professional basketball. 
Generalizability of Sport Research 
Though numerous benefits emerge from using sport as an empirical setting for 
organization and management studies, the setting of sport is not flawless.  In particular, many 
scholars identified key differences between sport and non-sport industries which may pose 
problems when attempting to generalize results.  As identified above, though they generate 
millions of dollars annually, sport teams are not large multi-faceted organizations in terms of 
personnel or operating divisions (Brown, 1982; Maxcy, 2013), therefore, Wright, Smart, and 
McMahan (1995) advised caution when attempting to apply sport-related organization studies to 
these larger organizations. 
Another warning came from Wolfe et al. (2005) regarding results of diversity research 
within the sport context being generalized outside of sport, stating that social norms and 
regulations are especially unique in sport.  This unique social environment in sport can be both 
advantageous and disadvantageous.  As mentioned earlier in this section, the Rooney Rule which 
is an NFL-specific regulation does not exist in most industries, however, it is useful to study for 
a better understanding of bias and discrimination within society.  Some differences in sport, such 
as in discrimination research may be especially useful for generalizing outside of sport.  Since 
sport is a less progressive social world (Nelson, 1994), results which indicate a lack of 




discrimination in sport become more robust.  Cannella and Rowe (1995) also found some 
generalizability based on the unique sport context by expressing how sports teams, confined by 
tight regulations and more difficulties associated with changing organizational performance, 
yield conservative, rigorous inferences when investigating the effects of new executives.  
Cannella and Rowe (1995) also stated since sports teams are very similar organizations within 
the same industry, “inferences about the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables are stronger than may be the case with some other types of organizations” (p. 73). 
Sport teams are also very unique based on various elements affecting entry-level 
employees (i.e., players) which may pose problems for generalizing results outside of the sport 
context.  Entry-level employees in sport are very unique because their salaries are substantially 
higher than salaries of entry-level employees in other industries and greater than their executives 
(Harder, 1992).  Further, the performance of employees (i.e., players) could be affected by the 
wealth of public information available about them (Harder, 1992).  Another unique characteristic 
of entry-level employees in sport involves the high degrees of loyalty to their work groups 
relative to the loyalty of work groups in most non-sport industries (Adler & Adler, 1988).  Yet, 
Adler and Adler (1988) identified other work groups may exhibit high degrees of loyalty, but 
also share other characteristics of professional athletes such as high initial compensation (e.g., 
surgical teams) or a substantial degree of media attention (e.g., astronaut work groups). 
Wolfe et al. (2005) explained sport teams are performance teams which produce the 
organization’s primary product of entertainment similar to a concert or play.  Wolfe et al. (2005) 
further stated performance teams differ from other types of teams in training and development, 
structure, time, and boundary conditions.  In terms of training and development, Wolfe et al. 
(2005) argued in performance teams, innate abilities are emphasized more than effort and their 




time is mostly spent on coordinating rather than strategizing, innovating, or learning.  However, 
these characteristics were probably more specific to scripted performers as opposed to open-sport 
performers whose product promotes uncertain outcomes, such as in professional football. 
Performance teams are also unique in structure (Wolfe et al., 2005).  Wolfe et al. (2005) 
explained that members of performance teams are the primary drivers of organizational 
performance.  As the primary drivers of organizational performance, it is the responsibility of 
others in the organization to shield performance teams from external disturbances so the 
performance team can perform their duties free of distraction to achieve higher levels of 
organizational success (Wolfe et al., 2005). 
Wolfe et al. (2005) identified the differences in time among various types of teams (i.e., 
performance teams and non-performance teams) as being either temporary task forces or at least 
somewhat permanent teams or crews.  Wolfe et al. (2005) stated crews, such as airline cockpit 
crews, use members for short periods of time to conduct specific tasks and inferred that the high 
prevalence of player mobility indicates that sports teams are most similar to crews.  However, 
this seems like a quite subjective choice to classify a sport team as a crew due to player mobility.  
One could argue that cohesion within an elite, highly talented and competitive performance team 
would require more time together in order to remain or become competitive in their sport than an 
airline cockpit crew which does not have to compete against rival airline cockpit crews in order 
to produce a quality product.  Most non-sport work teams are also accustomed to a relatively 
stable work pace, however, performance teams expend much of their effort during their training 
and performances which typically deviate from the consistent pace of work experienced in most 
occupations (Wolfe et al., 2005). 




Lastly, Wolfe et al. (2005) described how sport teams differ from other non-performance 
teams in terms of boundaries.  Boundaries are much different for sport teams and their members 
than teams in other industries for two reasons: they (a) perform in the public eye and (b) are 
often exposed to the public, usually through the media, even when not performing (Wolfe et al., 
2005).  Issues revolving around attention outside the field of play may be compounded due to the 
size of the team’s metropolitan area or fanbase as well as the fact that members of sport 
performance teams are also often responsible for off-field public relations, merchandise sales, 
and advertising, rather than simply producing a scripted performance product.  Though Wolfe et 
al. (2005) identified multiple potential problems with the generalizability of sport studies to non-
sport industries, they also stated sport research remains an attractive and beneficial empirical 
setting despite these issues.  In many instances, there still exists sufficient contextual overlap for 
results to generalize outside of sport.  Though there are peculiarities associated with any 
industry, and generalizability is never perfect for all organizations, sport research, similar to 
research in other industries, is useful for providing insight into similar industries and positions 
being examined (Brown, 1982; Humphreys et al., 2011). 
Recent Organization and Management Studies Using Sport 
Bennett et al. (2003) advocated for an analysis of the work using sport as an empirical 
setting.  Shortly after, Wolfe et al. (2005) published an examination of research related to Sport 
Management from five leading non-sport journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy 
of Management Review, Journal of Management, Organization Science, and Strategic 
Management Journal.  Day et al. (2012) later examined studies published from 1963 through 
2011, without limiting the search to specific journals.  In their examination, they identified three 
themes which the articles reviewed were associated with: (a) manager/leader successions, (b) 




motivation (e.g., pay dispersion and goal-setting), and (c) analyses of performance over time (for 
individuals and/or teams).  Though Day et al. (2012) also encountered studies outside of these 
three themes, they limited their review and analyses to the studies associated with these themes. 
As an update to these two studies (i.e., Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005), I searched 60 
journals ranked as an A* and A by the Australian Business Dean’s Council.  The five journals 
identified by Wolfe et al. (2005) were included within the list (i.e., Academy of Management 
Journal, Academy of Management Review, Journal of Management, Organization Science, and 
Strategic Management Journal).  The 60 journals were selected based on the relevance of their 
topic areas to typical sport-related studies.  The sample period began with 2012 to continue from 
where Day et al.’s (2012) study finished and extended through 2015.  Only published journal 
issues were examined and no online first (i.e., in press) articles due to not all journals providing 
access to in press articles.  Of the 60 journals, 38 published sport-related articles.  In total, the 38 
highly ranked non-sport specific journals published 177 sport-related articles in the four-year 
sample period. 
The majority (n=101) of the sport-related articles were published in journals with the 
word Economic in the title.  Thirty-six of the 101 sport-related articles in specifically economic 
journals were from Applied Economics, followed by 17 in Economic Inquiry, 15 in Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 10 in Economics Letters, and the remaining 23 dispersed 
among 10 other Economics journals.  The only other journal with at least eight sport-related 
articles published in the four-year sample period is European Journal of Operational Research 
(n=15).  The complete breakdown of articles, ordered alphabetically by journal, can be found in 
Appendix B. 




Similar to Day et al. (2012), I divided the 177 articles into broad categories.  To devise 
article categories, I build on Day et al.’s (2012) four primary categories of (a) Manager 
Succession and Organizational Performance; (b) Rewards, Motivation, and Performance; (c) 
Performance Over Time; and (d) Sport Science.  However, since Day et al. (2012) reviewed a 
narrower scope of articles that fit nicely in these four categories, I broaden the scope of each 
category to be more inclusive of the 177 articles I am categorizing.  Therefore, instead of 
limiting successions to managers, I use a broader category of Labor and Personnel Issues, which 
includes turnover of both managers and employees, as well as related issues regarding 
recruitment, staffing, discrimination, diversity, training, scheduling, health insurance, and well-
being. 
Day et al.’s (2012) category Rewards, Motivation, and Performance included studies 
about goal-setting, incentives, and pay equity.  Due to the many articles dedicated to the related 
issues of competitive balance and uncertainty of outcomes which can affect performance 
incentives and pay dispersion, the revised category I use includes articles about competitive 
balance and uncertainty of outcomes.  Day et al.’s (2012) Performance Over Time category was 
used to classify articles that predict and model performance and changes in performance.  I use 
the same category, however, I broadly identify performance as sport, financial, or betting market 
performance.  Additionally, a few studies examine sport or Sport Management changes through 
history which I include in Day et al.’s (2012) Performance Over Time category that I re-label as 
Modeling Change/Performance. 
Day et al.’s (2012) final category Sport Science was dedicated to psychology-based 
studies on topics such as choking under pressure, momentum, loyalty, passion, and career-
transitions.  Therefore, I re-label the Sport Science category as Psychology and include the same 




types of studies in the category, as well as one other study regarding athletes engaging in 
violence after competitions.  Finally, I add a fifth category which is not considered by Day et al. 
(2012) that I label as Venues which includes articles related to facilities, mega events, and other 
sport and recreation sites.  Though many articles contain elements of multiple categories, I 
categorized each article into its most contextually appropriate category so no article is in more 
than one category. 
Of the 177 articles, 44% (n=78) fit into the Modeling Change/Performance category.  
Within this category, the topics most frequently studied revolved around gambling markets 
(n=11), bias in officiating and judging sports contests (n=8), predicting or improving rankings in 
sports (n=7).  An interesting and emerging area of scholarly interest within this category is 
related to deviant behavior (n=6) where issues of such as penalties, criminal behavior, and 
sabotage are central themes. 
Following the Modeling Change/Performance category, the Labor and Personnel Issues 
category has the second most articles with 29% (n=51) of the 177 articles.  Though a broader 
category than Day et al.’s (2012) Managerial Successions and Organizational Performance is 
used, it is important to note 8% (n=14) of the 177 articles specifically addressed leadership (e.g., 
top managers, coaches) and several others discussed implications for leaders and managers.  
Other issues frequently discussed among the articles in the Labor and Personnel Issues category 
include labor movement and personnel decisions (n=17), racial or gender issues in the labor 
market (n=14), human or social capital accumulation or benefits (n=9), and employee 
compensation (n=6). 
Twelve percent (n=22) of the articles belong to the Rewards and Motivation category and 
11% of the articles are in the Psychology category.  Among the articles in the Rewards and 




Motivation category, uncertainty of outcomes (n=8) and competitive balance (n=7) are the most 
discussed topics and are typically in reference to attendance (n=6).  Venues is the category with 
the least amount of articles with the remaining 4% (n=7) articles.  Within this category, publicly 
funded spaces are discussed in three articles and mega events in two of the articles.  Also, three 
of the four articles from journals that have the term urban in the title are in this Venues category. 
Conclusions from Examination of Recent Sport Studies 
With at least 177 sport-related articles being published in top-tier non-sport-specific 
management-related journals in the past four years, several opportunities exist for sport 
management scholars.  Sport management scholars can use the information produced by Wolfe 
et al. (2005), Day et al. (2012), and within this literature review to gauge areas of interest to the 
greater management community as well as identify sport-related studies which may not receive 
attention in sport-specific journals.  By analyzing sport studies published in non-sport journals, 
sport management scholars may also identify journals in which their studies may fit.  These 
journals outside sport management may offer a broader audience for applied and theoretical 
contributions.  Furthermore, sport management scholars who publish both within and outside of 
sport-specific journals may be able to increase the attention and legitimacy of both sport-specific 
journals as well as sport-related research overall. 
Though the authors of these 177 articles have been able to contribute to the body of 
scholarly literature within the sport management and general management fields, they also 
provide numerous opportunities for future research.  Due to the substantial breadth of subjects 
discussed in these 177 articles, I will limit the discussion of future research opportunities from 
these articles to a couple topics which are relevant to this literature review: the effect of status on 
performance and human capital accumulation following employee mobility. 




Status is often associated with job mobility and performance in several ways (e.g., 
Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, & Bresser, 2015; Fralich, 
2012; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Westphal & Khanna, 2003).  Within the 177 articles examined in 
this section, Bothner, Kim, and Smith (2012) examined the effect of status on individual 
performance in professional golf and stock car racing and Marr and Thau (2014) examined 
performance following declines in status among professional baseball players.  Their results 
indicate high status individuals perform below their maximum ability (Bothner et al., 2012), 
especially following a decline in status (Marr & Thau, 2014).  While these results may have 
substantial implications for management and sport management scholars and practitioners, many 
questions arise from these studies.  Future research regarding the nature of status and its effects 
on performance could examine (a) individuals occupying various levels within an organization 
(e.g., supervisory, middle, and top managers), (b) how status is distributed among groups (e.g., 
normal, flat, bimodal, zero-sum), (c) whether status loss generally occurs abruptly or slowly over 
time, (d) if status and the effects of states are affected differently by different behaviors (e.g., on-
field performance, off-field deviance), or (e) if individual status behaves in a similar manner as 
organizational status with respect to all of the aforementioned considerations. 
In a study of EPL teams, Pazzaglia, Flynn, and Sonpar (2012) found firms can capitalize 
on employee mobility due to human capital accumulated in a given firm and used against another 
firm.  Kahane, Longley, and Simmons (2013) also examined the effects of employee mobility on 
human capital accumulation and subsequent organizational performance improvements, but this 
time in professional hockey.  Kahane et al. (2013) concluded teams that hire multiple European 
players from the same country are able to increase their human capital without causing too much 




disruptions from language and cultural differences which may occur on teams with European 
players from different countries. 
In the 2014 special issue of the Journal of Management on the topic of strategic human 
capital, two articles use sport to delve deeper into human capital theory.  Crocker and Eckardt 
(2014) discovered that the relationship between individual human capital and individual 
performance is dependent on unit-level human capital.  Specifically, they found the ability of 
MLB pitchers to convert their knowledge and skills to lower earned run averages (ERAs) was 
dependent on the human capital of the coaching staff.  Campbell, Saxton, and Banerjee (2014) 
examined the effects of employee mobility on the human capital of movers and incumbents in an 
organization.  Similar to Kahane et al. (2013), Campbell et al. (2014) concluded that, though 
mobility causes initial performance to decrease, when mobility occurs with colleagues, the 
performance declines diminish. 
Most recently, among the 177 aforementioned articles, those published in 2015 related to 
mobility and human capital build on the works of Kahane et al. (2013) and Campbell et al. 
(2014) by emphasizing the importance of heterogeneity in work teams.  Smith and Hou (2015) 
noted performance benefits from diversity can decrease over time as groups become more 
homogenous and diverse groups experience more difficulties due to communication and culture 
barriers.  Additionally, Smith and Hou (2015) used evidence from the NBA to propose the use of 
redundant heterogeneity for improving diversity benefits in organizations.  They found that when 
team members move up a hierarchical structure and experience similar levels of diversity, at both 
the lower and higher hierarchical level, the impacts of diversity are improved.  Similarly, 
Brandes, Brechot, and Franck (2015) examined mobility which occurred in conjunction with 




social ties and found trades among managers with social ties were detrimental to team 
performance, which may be a result of increasing homogeneity within a group. 
These studies regarding the relationships between human capital, mobility, and 
organizational performance provide several opportunities for future research.  For example, 
future studies could examine various forms of heterogeneity and the human capital derived from 
these diverse organizations.  More specifically, how do differences in demographics (e.g., age, 
race, sex, hometown, education, family status), deviant behavior, types of work experiences, or 
organizations affect future performance?  Furthermore, can employees with similar 
characteristics come together to be more cohesive and which characteristics would make them 
less cohesive?  Do networks affect cohesion or human capital benefits from heterogeneity?  
Additionally, examining how human capital, mobility, and organizational performance interact 
with each other at various organizational levels would be interesting, especially in executive 
positions where industry knowledge is especially important and could be obtained through 
interviews with candidates. 
Not only does this literature review provide sport management scholars with a list of 
potential outlets to submit research and viable areas of future research relevant to sport 
management and general management scholars, but sport management could also benefit from 
the theoretical and empirical contributions of the greater management community.  Reciprocally, 
the greater management community may be able to benefit from the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of sport management scholars, as evidenced by the large number of sport studies in 
the management literature.  Additionally, early work by Grusky (1963) using baseball data to 
examine managerial successions has established a foundation for much of the empirical 
managerial succession research conducted today.  Furthermore, sport studies which have been 




widely cited within top management journals (e.g., Giambatista, 2004; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, 
& Gorman, 2005) demonstrate the continued applicability of sport research to the greater 
management community.  The literature reviewed in the Sport as an Empirical Setting for 
Executive Dismissal and Succession Research section has highlighted the contributions sport can 
provide non-sport scholars and practitioners and the following sections of this literature review 
will continue to demonstrate the mutually beneficial research which has, or can be, established 
between sport and non-sport scholars, particularly with respect to leadership, dismissals, and 
promotions. 
Leadership 
Managers are responsible for the performance of others (Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; 
Kippenberger, 2002), whereas, leaders influence groups toward common goals (Fletcher & 
Arnold, 2011; Hall et al., 2004; Kippenberger, 2002).  Though many subtle distinctions have 
been drawn between the two terms, they are very similar.  Both leadership and management 
typically involve influence, interpersonal relations, and goal accomplishment and both leaders 
and managers often operate in the capacity of the other (i.e., managers often perform leadership 
tasks and leaders often perform management tasks) (Fletcher & Arnold, 2011).  Therefore, an 
examination of managers would not be complete without a discussion of leadership. 
Two overarching approaches to examining leadership exist: focusing on the downward 
influence of leaders on followers and leadership as an activity (Hall et al., 2004).  The leadership 
literature in the last century has primarily focused on how leaders influence followers (Hall et al., 
2004), however, leadership as an activity is an important area of research which can inform and 
provide context to research regarding leaders influencing followers (Selznick, 1957). 
 




The Influence of Leaders on Followers 
Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) described three types of leadership styles: autocratic, 
democratic, and laissez-faire.  Using the aforementioned leadership styles, Lewin et al. (1939) 
categorized groups based on behaviors such as dominance and control asserted by the leaders.  
These basic styles of leadership lead to the emergence of behavior-based leadership styles which 
dominated the leadership styles literature until the 1960s (Kippenberger, 2002). 
Building upon the work of Lewin et al. (1939), various researchers developed more 
complex versions of leadership styles.  For instance, Stogdill and Shartle (1955) used Lewin et 
al.’s (1939) leadership styles to theorize a continuum of leadership styles based on leaders’ 
consideration of followers where more considerate leaders were similar to Lewin et al.’s (1939) 
democratic leaders and less considerate leaders were similar to autocratic leaders.  Blake and 
Mouton (1964) contributed to both Lewin et al.’s (1939) behavior-based leadership styles and 
Stogdill and Shartle’s (1955) leadership style continuum by devising a nine-by-nine grid.  Within 
this two dimensional continuum, leadership styles can be classified based on concern for people 
and results.  Additionally, Blake and Mouton (1964) stated leaders are able to use different 
leadership styles depending on the situation. 
Likert (1967) dichotomized Lewin et al.’s (1939) autocratic leadership style into 
benevolent authoritative and exploitative authoritative while providing more clarification into 
two other styles: democratic and participative.  Likert’s research showed participative and 
democratic styles to be more successful than the authoritative styles, however, it received 
criticism for not accounting for situational factors (e.g., crisis situations where autocratic styles 
are often viewed as essential).  Based on the criticism of Likert’s (1967) research and Blake and 
Mouton’s (1964) idea that leaders may use different leadership styles depending on the situation, 




a new era of leadership styles research evolved which was situation-based rather than solely 
behavior based. 
Though studies concerning behavior-based leadership styles were still prevalent through 
the 1960s, situation-based leadership styles research began to emerge around the late 1950s when 
Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958) proposed managers can employ various leadership styles based 
on the situation.  To Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), situational factors included aspects such 
as the leader’s personality, followers’ personalities, and culture of the organization.  However, 
Tannenbaum and Schmidt’s (1958) model was still largely behavior-based with the leader 
positioned as the sole controller of power in the group. 
Building on the situation-based ideas of followers’ personalities influencing leader 
decisions proposed by Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), Fiedler (1967) developed a model of 
leadership effectiveness that examined leader power, relationships between leaders and 
followers, and characteristics of tasks undertaken by the group.  Dependent on these various 
situational factors, Fiedler (1967) determined there is an optimal leadership style–either task-
oriented leadership or people-oriented leadership.   
Adding to Fiedler’s (1967) leadership style framework, Hersey and Blanchard (1969) 
examined the competence and commitment of followers and ultimately found there to be optimal 
leadership styles for certain characteristics of followers which involved leadership styles with 
varying degrees of direction and support provided to followers.  Vroom and Yetton (1973) 
advanced Hersey and Blanchard’s (1969) research by developing a decision-making model based 
on five choices of leadership styles (i.e., autocratic I and II, consultative I and II, and group 
consensus).  Similar to Hersey and Blanchard (1969), these five leadership styles were based on 
optimal ways of leading followers depending on follower competence and commitment. 




Following Vroom and Yetton (1973), Chelladurai and Haggerty (1978) developed a 
decision-making model for leadership styles among sport coaches which was later updated (see 
Chelladurai, 1990).  As previous researchers outside of sport did in this field, Chelladurai’s 
(1990) model is based on athletes’ preferred leadership styles among coaches as well as the 
leadership styles which are most conducive for task completion–two outcomes which are highly 
correlated according to Chelladurai (1990).  Also consistent with Vroom and Yetton (1973) as 
well as numerous other scholars of leadership styles, Chelladurai (1990) based the leadership 
style preferences around autocratic, consultative, and participative themes. 
More recently than the situation-based leadership models, various other types of 
leadership styles have been proposed such as charismatic and transforming leadership 
(Kippenberger, 2002).  Charismatic leadership is characterized by a confident and assertive 
personality, powerful vision, and strong conviction (Kippenberger, 2002).  Charismatic leaders 
are especially effective in periods of crisis or change, however, their charisma also has the power 
to be dangerous if their powerful vision is not an optimal one (Kippenberger, 2002).  A key 
distinction between charismatic leadership and previous leadership styles presented is that 
charismatic leadership is not a leadership style which can be selected from a range of leadership 
style options because only leaders with charisma can be charismatic leaders (Kippenberger, 
2002). 
Burns (1978) paved the way for research addressing transforming leadership, as opposed 
to transactional leadership.  Transactional leadership is based on reciprocal relationships between 
leaders and followers in which leaders reward followers for their production by compensating 
them with external rewards such as bonuses, promotions, or praise (Burns, 1978).  However, 
Burns (1978) argued transactional leadership alone was insufficient since people need to be 




empowered instead of controlled by hierarchical organizational structures.  In contrast to 
transactional leadership, Burns (1978) described transforming leadership as leadership based on 
mutual support rather than leaders as an authority with resources to bestow upon compliant 
followers without seeking followers’ motivations.  Burns (1978) further argued transforming 
leadership, which is based on characteristics such as trust, understanding, and commitment, 
attempts to merge organizational members’ motivations with the mission of the organization, 
thereby creating a more ethical and moral environment. 
Although leaders may come from several occupations and organizational levels (e.g., 
coaches, managers, work team leaders), Farkas and De Backer (1996) identified five leadership 
styles adopted by specifically by CEOs.  Farkas and De Backer (1996) call these five styles the 
strategic, human assets, expertise, box, and change approaches.  CEOs who use the strategic 
approach are often concerned with the overall organization as a whole, the direction the 
organization is going, and how the organization can compete against industry rivals.  CEOs using 
the strategic approach spend the vast majority of their time obtaining and analyzing information 
while delegating day-to-day operations to others (Farkas & De Backer, 1996).  Though most 
CEOs view many of the characteristics associated with the strategic approach as part of their 
duties, only about 20% of CEOs in Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample of CEOs in large 
companies viewed this strategic approach as the defining role of their position. 
The human assets approach revolves around personnel.  CEOs who adopt the human 
assets approach place emphasis on hiring strategies, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of 
their personnel, developing skills and traits in their personnel, empowering personnel, and 
rewarding personnel.  Human assets CEOs typically spend the majority of their time talking to 
their employees and ensuring company objectives, standards, and values are being upheld.  




About 22% of CEO’s in Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample primarily used the human assets 
approach. 
About 15% of Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample was composed of CEOs whom 
favor the expertise approach.  Expertise CEOs believe a specific, proprietary expertise should 
provide focus to the organization, and therefore, these CEOs spend most of their time 
investigating new technologies and advancing the technical knowledge of employees.  CEOs 
using the expertise approach often increase research and development budgets and rely heavily 
on the recruitment and feedback of engineers, scientists, and other technical experts. 
The most prevalent approach CEOs in Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample used was 
the box approach, which included about 25% of the sample.  CEOs that employ the box approach 
place emphasis on controlling the organization and ensure compliance with procedures, 
organizational culture and values, and numerical goals and targets.  CEOs using the box 
approach spend their time ensuring the right boundaries are set for the organization and 
following up on instances when boundaries were crossed (e.g., missed deadlines or financial 
goals).  Though the box approach is practiced by CEOs in numerous industries, this approach is 
most prevalent in highly regulated industries. 
The final approach identified by Farkas and De Backer (1996) is the change approach 
which is the predominant approach of about 18% of the sample of CEOs.  CEOs using the 
change approach view organizational transformation as central to the organizations mission.  
Change can occur in operating procedures, compensation programs, or even water cooler 
conversations.  CEOs employing the change approach spend most of their time inspiring change 
by communicating with and motivating personnel at all organizational levels.  Though CEOs 




often use elements of each of more than one approach, Farkas and De Backer (1996) found most 
CEOs to focus on one, or sometimes two, approaches. 
Similarly, Hanin (2007) described four types of head coaches which are the player 
developer, emergency leader, national team head coach, and international-level coaches working 
abroad.  Similar to the CEO using the human assets approach (Farkas & De Backer, 1996), the 
player developer is often very analytical and creative, but also very skilled in interpersonal 
relations with their players, team leaders, and team management (Hanin, 2007).  The emergency 
leader is often more task oriented and skilled in inspiring change within the team, however, the 
emergency leader is often motivated by challenge and may experience difficulties forging 
relationships with players and team management (Hanin, 2007).  Successful national team head 
coaches need strong communication skills as well as the ability to forge strong interpersonal 
relationships with both internal and external stakeholders (Hanin, 2007).  Additionally, national 
team head coaches need sensitivity to lead key players (Hanin, 2007).  Finally, international-
level coaches working abroad require, in addition to professional skills and coaching 
experiences, cross-cultural competence, an appreciation for diversity, and a strong understanding 
of management practices in the host country. 
Hanin (2007) described the four types of head coaches, in part to acknowledge the unique 
skillsets required for certain types of coaches to influence their followers, but also to characterize 
the context in which different types of coaches lead.  Hanin (2007) stated the player developer, 
whom is skillful in developing relationships as well as players, experience success over longer 
durations and typically stay with a team for longer than most coaches (i.e., five to six years).  In 
contrast, the emergency leader is a short-term answer to a crisis situation (Hanin, 2007).  The 
emergency leader, inept at forging long-term relationships and motivated by excitement and 




challenges, must regularly transfer from team to team in order to achieve success and fulfill 
internal desires (Hanin, 2007).  More unique in terms of tenure and mobility are the national 
team head coaches and the international-level coaches working abroad.  National team head 
coaches and international-level coaches working abroad can be especially vulnerable to dismissal 
based on their abilities to communicate with and understand various internal and external 
stakeholders (Hanin, 2007). 
Leadership as an Activity 
Often the lines between leadership styles and leadership as an activity can be blurred due 
to the substantial overlap that exists between the two areas of leadership research.  For example, 
the behaviors, human capital, and social/political abilities of leaders contribute to both leadership 
styles and activity (Hall et al., 2004; Soucie, 1994).  These various aspects of both leadership 
styles and activities can contribute to interactions between leaders and followers, organizational 
outcomes, and even the promotion or retention of leaders (Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et 
al., 1988; Hall et al., 2004; Olafson & Hasting, 1988; Selznick, 1957; Soucie, 1994; 
Thoroughgood & Padilla, 2013). 
Though the bulk of leadership research in the past century focused extensively on leader 
qualities and how leaders interact with followers, some scholars argued that an understanding of 
the context and role of leadership must first be understood (Hall et al., 2004; Selznick, 1957).  
Largely neglected due to the greater research attention on leadership styles were “factors like the 
analytic and perceptual ability of leaders, their intelligence and experience, or their capacity to 
differentiate good from bad decisions are not incorporated into frameworks that focus only on 
style” (Day & Lord, 1988, p. 459).  Early literature by Selznick (1957) provided a framework for 
much of the recent research examining these aforementioned neglected leadership factors, 




especially in the field of strategic management and executive turnover (e.g., Chen, Luo, Tang, & 
Tong, 2014; Cowen & Marcel, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Gomulya & Boeker, 2015). 
In forging the framework for leadership in strategic management, Selznick (1957) 
defined leadership as an activity which revolves around critical decision-making intended to 
address the needs of social situations.  Selznick’s (1957) definition of leadership differs from 
definitions based on routine interactions between leaders and followers due to the emphasis on 
critical decision-making as opposed to routine decision-making.  Therefore, Selznick (1957) 
proposed the “executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from administrative 
management to institutional leadership” (p. 4, 154). 
Selznick (1957) used the notion of an executive as a statesman to demonstrate the 
political nature of leadership activities.  He described how political power struggles between 
organizational units and personnel form within organizations.  Often these political contests are 
among personnel vying for top management team promotions.  Moreover, promotions, and the 
dismissals that pave the way for others’ promotions, are decided, in part, by the 
institutionalization of rules and values within the organization as a result of current and past 
leaders whom have infused their values within the organization (Selznick, 1957).  Selznick’s 
(1957) ideas of political competitions for promotions and dismissals being determined by 
organizations embodying the values of their leaders have led many scholars to the connection 
between politics and executive dismissals and promotions (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Daily & Johnson, 
1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Frederickson et al., 1988; Gomulya & Boeker, 
2015; Ocasio, 1999). 
Following Selznick (1957), research regarding executive departures has been identified 
as an important area of research (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  The 




importance of executive departures stems from the CEO being viewed as the most powerful 
member of an organization (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Farkas & De Backer, 1996) and responsible 
for organizational results (Farkas & De Backer, 1996; Soebbing & Washington, 2011).  Despite 
research findings to the contrary by some scholars, it is widely believed powerful CEOs have a 
substantial impact on organizational performance (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Daily & 
Johnson, 1997; Day & Lord, 1988; Hambrick & Quigley, 2014).  
Executive Departures 
A substantial portion of the extant literature examining executive successions failed to 
identify the whether the predecessors’ departures were voluntary prior to examining the causes 
of those departures or subsequent organizational performance following the departure (Bennett et 
al., 2003; Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Puffer & Weintrop, 
1991).  Voluntary and involuntary executive departures occur as a result of retirements, 
resignations, deaths, or dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Furtado & 
Kuran, 1990).  More specifically, Weisbach (1988) identified 13 reasons CEOs voluntarily 
resign according to an examination of Wall Street Journal reports.  Some of these reasons 
include departing due to compulsory retirement policies, poor performance, disagreements with 
boards of directors, and personal reasons.  However, during the process of a succession, the true 
reasons for the succession are often not revealed (Brown, 1982; Haynes et al., 2015; Maxcy, 
2013; Weisbach, 1988). 
Executive retirements, specifically, have received a marginal amount of attention from 
scholars.  Weisbach (1988) found a high correlation between the likelihood of a planned 
resignation and CEO age, which he attributed to being largely due to a substantial amount of 
resignations occurring on CEOs’ 65th birthdays.  Weisbach (1988) found about 38% of CEO 




turnover from 1974 through 1983 to be a result of retirement.  Similarly, in Maxcy’s (2013) 
study of college football coaches from 2002 through 2011, 25% of head coach turnover was a 
result of retirements.  Though all successions can have organizational performance implications 
(Cannella & Rowe, 1995), there is little mystery in many retirement decisions, therefore, 
retirement decisions are of less theoretical interest than dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
CEO Dismissals 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) defined a CEO dismissal as a “situation in which the CEO’s 
departure is ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or her will” 
(p. 255). Frick et al. (2010) defined a dismissal as “the result of a premature termination of a 
contract of employment.  It can be by mutual consent or without the explicit approval of both 
parties to the contract” (p. 151). Between Fredrickson et al. (1988) and Frick et al. (2010), there 
seems to be a difference of opinion with regard to the consent of the dismissed party.  This 
difference of opinion may be cleared up understanding the individual(s) who make dismissal 
decisions.  Puffer and Weintrop (1991) stated boards of directors are responsible for making 
CEO turnover decisions.  For the similar position of head coaches in college football, it is the 
athletic director (Marburger, 2015). 
Dismissals are a tool used to hold CEOs accountable (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
Crossland & Chen, 2013).  In making the decision to dismiss a CEO, a board of directors must 
evaluate the ability of that CEO and sometimes compare that CEOs ability to that CEO’s 
compensation in order to decide if the CEO is still valuable to the firm.  Ertgrul and Krishnan 
(2011) stated boards of directors assess the ability of their CEOs by examining various facets of 
their work (e.g., investment proposals, strategy initiatives, short and long-term decisions).  




Borland and Lye (1996) argued boards of directors will acquire private information on the 
CEO’s ability.  Since those stakeholders outside the firm typically do not have access to this 
private information, the market for CEOs will assume that CEOs retained by a firm are high-
ability CEOs, which causes the CEOs wages to increase until the board of directors deems it 
unprofitable to retain the CEO relative to that CEO’s ability (Borland & Lye, 1996). 
Boards of directors appoint CEOs as leaders of their organizations to control and manage 
the outcomes of their organization (Soebbing & Washington, 2011).  However, these 
organizational outcomes are often multidimensional which can be measured a variety of ways 
(e.g., stock price, sales growth, return on assets, profit; Day & Lord, 1988; Donoher, Reed, & 
Storrud-Barnes, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
As a result of particular organizational performance criteria, the overall consensus among 
scholars is poor performance results in higher dismissal probabilities (Allen, Panian & Lotz, 
1979; Boeker, 1992; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Eitzen & Yetman, 1972; Farrell & Whidbee, 
2003; Fizel & D’Itri, 1997, 1999; Frick et al., 2010; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Gamson & Scotch, 
1964; Grusky, 1963; Pieper, Nüesch, & Franck, 2014; Puffer & Weintrop 1991; Warner, Watts, 
& Wruck, 1988; Zhang, 2006).  Though organizational performance is a significant factor, it has 
only been moderately effective in predicting dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Finkelstein et 
al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000).  For instance, Ertugrul 
and Krishnan (2011) found 49% of CEO dismissals occurred without evidence of poor stock 
performance in their industry which is one of many measures of organizational performance.  
Similarly, other scholars concluded organizational performance accounts for less than half of the 
variance in the dismissal decision (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et 
al., 2000; Warner et al., 1988).  One potential confounding factor reducing the effect of 




organizational performance on CEO dismissal could be the relationship between financial fraud 
and organizational performance (Black, 2005).  Other factors could be explained by Fredrickson 
et al.’s (1988) CEO dismissal model which incorporates four key socio-political factors (i.e., the 
allegiances and values of the board of directors, incumbent CEO’s power, expectations and 
attributions of the CEO, and availability of alternative candidates to replace the CEO) to explain 
the non-performance based portion of the CEO dismissal decision. 
Socio-Political Dismissal Forces 
The dismissal process is an informal, sociopolitical process, more than it is a formal 
process (Hall et al., 2004) and dismissals can be best explained by social and political forces 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Selznick, 1957).  Fredrickson et al. (1988) 
modelled CEO dismissals using four socio-political forces.  The four sociopolitical forces 
identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) are the (a) allegiances and values of the board of directors, 
(b) incumbent CEO’s power, (c) expectations and attributions of the CEO, and (d) availability of 
alternative candidates to replace the CEO.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) defined these socio-political 
forces as pertaining to interpersonal relationships, coalitions, and power.  Interpersonal 
relationships, coalitions, and power are key factors in dismissals because board members are 
self-interested actors with concerns for wealth, reputation, and friendships–all of which are often 
considered in a CEO dismissal decision (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Therefore, several factors 
associated with the board or directors, the CEO, the former CEO, the firm, and the industry all 
interact to play a role in the dismissal decision (Flickinger et al., 2015; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  
Fredrickson et al. (1988) further explained these four socio-political forces, in conjunction with 
organizational performance, affect the likelihood of CEO dismissals in a ceteris paribus fashion.   
 




Boards of Directors’ Allegiances and Values 
Since the board of directors decides whether to dismiss or retain a CEO (Puffer & 
Weintrop, 1991), and may be motivated by self-interest (Fredrickson et al., 1988), they may 
choose to retain (dismiss) a poor (high) performing or low (high) ability CEO based on their 
individual interests or pressures they may face to make a particular decision (Mintzberg, 1983).  
These biases, both conscious and unconscious, affect the perspectives of board members as they 
seek information regarding the CEO’s performance and ability (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
Dahl, 1994; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  These self-interest directed CEO dismissal decisions may 
be based on how the CEO will affect directors’ fees, the overall personal wealth of the director, 
the status and reputation of the director, or directors’ various relationships (including the 
relationship with the CEO) (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
Additionally, board members who are involved in governance changes that may be 
detrimental to the interests of executives are more likely to become increasingly socially isolated, 
both in the firm experiencing governance changes and in external firms (Westphal & Khanna, 
2003).  The increased isolation experienced by board members is especially evident for those 
board members whom do not already possess a high social status (Westphal & Khanna, 2003).  
Furthermore, board members who previously experienced social distancing are less likely to 
engage in governance changes that are incongruent with the interest of the firm’s executives 
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003). 
Acknowledging the difficulty in directly measuring the allegiances and values of the 
board of directors, Fredrickson et al. (1988) identified several possible determinants of boards of 
directors’ allegiances and values.  Additionally, through examining head coaches in college and 
professional football using the Fredrickson et al. (1988) CEO dismissal model, a few additional 




insights can be provided based on the wealth of accurately measured and available data in sport.  
Further, examining the sport industry and non-sport industry perspectives of allegiances and 
values in dismissal decisions may be helpful in providing a more complete picture of the effect 
of allegiances and values in executive dismissal decisions. 
Interpretations of allegiances and values from sport.  In Holmes’ (2011) examination 
of college football head coach dismissals, Holmes stated the college’s allegiances and values are 
based on the coach’s win-loss record in rivalry and bowl games.  With this interpretation of 
allegiances and values in college football dismissal decisions, Holmes (2011) found a negative 
relationship between team performance in rivalry games and dismissals, however, a bowl game 
win was no more significant than a regular season win.  Therefore, Holmes (2011) concluded 
that allegiances and values (measured by success against rival teams) was a significant factor that 
was negatively related to executive dismissals, as hypothesized.  Though not specifically 
identified by Holmes (2011) as allegiances and values for dismissal decision makers, race and 
alumnus variables for the head coaches are included within the dismissal models and could affect 
network, status, and reputation building for athletic directors. 
Personal connections.  Holmes (2011) found alumni hired as head coaches are less 
likely to be dismissed within their first three years of tenure at their alma mater.  He explained 
universities may benefit from hiring an alumnus coach as a result of favorable media attention or 
improved alumni relations–each having a potential financial benefit.  Additionally, Holmes 
(2011) noted an alumnus head coach may enjoy personal connections to university decision 
makers which could decrease the head coach’s dismissal probability.  He suggested alumni head 
coaches may be better at their positions because they are more willing to give up opportunities to 
coach at more prestigious schools so they could coach at their alma mater.   




Cohesion among boards of directors.  The more cohesive a board of directors is, the 
less likely dissenting opinions will arise regarding the CEOs lack of ability or low performance 
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  This cohesion could be measured by the size 
of the board of directors, the average tenure of board members, or the variation in tenure among 
board members (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Larger boards of directors 
(i.e., more board members) are less manageable because they become more factionalized, and 
therefore, less cohesive (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Thus, as the size of a 
board of directors increases, so does the rate of CEO dismissals at that firm (Finkelstein et al. 
2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
Board member tenure can represent cohesion among board members in a similar way as 
the size of the board of directors (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  A board of directors’ average tenure 
represents board member cohesion based on board members who have shared a long period of 
service together (Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Boards of 
directors with too much variation in or too short of an average tenure will be too diverse and 
factionalized to agree on retaining a CEO (Daboub et al., 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  
Fredrickson et al. (1988) elaborated on this phenomenon stating that board members evaluate 
executives on various potentially conflicting factors, causing CEO dismissal probabilities to 
increase. 
Donoher et al. (2007) noted firms with boards of directors possessing longer tenures, as 
well as substantial business experience, are less likely to produce misleading financial 
disclosures, which could be a confounding factor which also decreases the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal.  Additionally, board members’ tenure which is shorter than that of the CEO can 
represent allegiances to the CEO based on being appointed by the CEO (Cannella & Lubatkin, 




1993; Daboub et al., 1995; Donoher et al., 2007; Fredrickson et al., 1988) or simply having 
closer ties to the CEO due to being socially integrated in an environment with that CEO 
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Therefore, shorter tenures of board members 
are likely associated with greater allegiances to the CEO. 
Board of directors’ ownership interests.  Another characteristic of boards of directors 
that may influence CEO dismissal decisions through the socio-political force of allegiances and 
values are boards of directors’ ownership interests (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  However, contrary to common intuition that large shareholder boards of directors are 
more motivated to be discriminant of and dismiss CEOs (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988), greater share ownership among board members does not have an 
adverse effect on CEO tenure (Allen, 1981).  Allen and Panian (1982) found that CEOs who 
were not members of the firm’s controlling family had shorter tenures than CEOs who were 
family members suggesting that some firms (e.g., family controlled) have goals which extend 
beyond bottom-line performance measures such as profitability.  Huson, Parrino, and Starks 
(2001) elaborated that the large amounts of stock controlled by founding families allow family 
member CEOs to remain in their positions longer than non-family member CEOs.  Therefore, 
members of exclusive controlling groups (e.g., families) represented on the board of directors 
may be motivated to protect CEOs from their same groups (Allen & Panian, 1982; Finkelstein et 
al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  These allegiances and values are often based on motivations 
to preserve power, however, predecessor CEOs who maintain relationships within their former 
organizations may also preserve some of their power within that organization. 
Predecessor’s characteristics.  The predecessor of a CEO may be able to affect the 
incumbent CEO’s dismissal probability in a variety through allegiances and values (Fredrickson 




et al., 1988; Gilmore & Ronchi, 1995).  Fredrickson et al. (1988) identified four determinants of 
allegiances and values which involve the predecessor: (a) the predecessor’s tenure, (b) the 
predecessor’s departure conditions, (c) the predecessor’s connectedness, and (d) whether the 
predecessor founded the organization.  As CEO tenure increases, the board of directors will feel 
more allegiance for that CEO.  Additionally, the performance of a CEO is often evaluated 
relative to the predecessor CEO (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Gilmore & 
Ronchi, 1995).  Therefore, when a predecessor CEOs had a long tenure with the organization and 
board of directors, and subsequently accrued a substantial degree of allegiance from the board of 
directors, new CEOs will experience more difficulties when their actions or organization’s 
performance deviates from that of the predecessor (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 
1988). 
CEO dismissal probabilities may also be affected by the predecessor’s departure 
conditions.  CEOs who voluntarily depart from a firm cause the perceived judgment of their 
former position to be deemed as inferior which may result in a smaller pool of available 
candidates, a rush to secure any CEO without being too discriminant, and ultimately even 
reduced expectations for the new CEO (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  In contrast, a predecessor 
CEO who has been fired may have already created factions within the board of directors, 
uncertainty among employees, or a reluctance show allegiance to a new CEO, which could result 
in a higher likelihood of dismissal for that new CEO (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  That departed predecessor may also affect CEO dismissal through continued associations 
and connections with the firm (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  The 
predecessor CEO can maintain an official role with the firm by becoming chairman of the board 
of directors, a board member, or a consultant (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; 




Ward, Sonnenfeld, & Kimberly, 1995).  A predecessor CEO taking one of these positions 
indicates that there is not only an experienced former CEO closely monitoring the new CEO, but 
there is also a highly qualified replacement for the CEO readily available (Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  Under these conditions, the new CEO may find it difficult to earn the support of the 
board of directors, thus increasing dismissal likelihood (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et 
al., 1988).  Predecessors who take these roles associated with the organization they once led are 
often major stockholders or founding CEOs. 
The predecessor CEO also being a founder of the organization could further increase the 
dismissal rates of new CEOs due, in part, to additional disruptions which are caused when a 
founding CEO departs an organization or the possibility of a new CEO taking the organization in 
a new direction (Carroll, 1984; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Additionally, board members will be 
cognizant of the high abilities and performance of the founding CEO as well as all of the 
disadvantages to losing a founding CEO (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Subsequently, the board 
members may exaggerate the contributions and ability of the founding predecessor leading to a 
higher likelihood of dismissal for the new CEO (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  All of these 
predecessor characteristics are early vulnerability factors and, for quantitative analyses, need to 
include interactions between these variables and the CEO’s tenure which has been identified by 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) as a determinant of two socio-political constructs: boards of directors’ 
allegiances and values as well as incumbent CEO’s power. 
Incumbent CEO’s Power 
As a result of their power, some CEOs are better situated to prevent their dismissal than 
others (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Thus, numerous studies have examined the effects of CEO 
power on turnover (e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Furtado & Karan, 1990; Lausten, 




2002; Pi & Lowe, 2011; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011; Zhang, 2006).  
This power may be derived from various sources including access to resources (e.g., clients, 
regulatory contacts, proprietary technology) (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pi & Lowe, 2011), 
ownership/voting control (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pi & Lowe, 2011), personal characteristics 
(e.g., charisma, expertise) (Finkelstein, 1992; Fredrickson et al., 1988), and prestige or external 
status (Finkelstein, 1992; Fralich, 2012; Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
Some of the effect CEO power has on CEO dismissals may be based on the strength of 
the firm.  Though a CEO’s perception of a possible relationship between his/her own reputation 
and his/her firm’s wealth may not influence profitability (Zajac, 1990), firm performance and 
CEO power are interrelated and have positive effects on each other (Daily & Johnson, 1997).  
Additionally, Haynes et al. (2015) stated that even without stock options, CEOs are often 
motivated to increase the current success of their companies for the sake of their own 
reputations.  Though power may also be viewed as authoritativeness in regard to subordinates, 
most studies regarding the effect of CEO power on turnover do not address this form of power.  
However, some insights may be drawn from related literature. 
Power over subordinates.  Several scholars suggested that managers who attempt to 
control their environments through excessive use of power may incite counterproductive 
workplace deviance (Griffin & Lopez, 2013; Sims, 2010).  These acts of deviance may reduce an 
executive’s power and their ability to retain their positions (Holmes, 2011).  Though power may 
indirectly increase dismissal probability as a result of deviance, power itself directly corresponds 
to a lower probability of dismissal which would override the deviance effects.  Therefore, a 
separate measure of deviance may need to be incorporated as a sociopolitical factor in the ceteris 
paribus model of CEO dismissals to separate the effects of power and deviance.  Additionally, 




this deviance may be reflected in an executives’ reputation which also can diminish power, and 
therefore, increase the probability of dismissal. 
Personal characteristics.  In the market for elite executive talent, the perception of the 
executive is as important as any actual skills or attributes (Ward et al., 1995).  Farquhar (1995) 
echoed this sentiment, stating CEO’s relationships with their constituents and other top 
executives may be more important than proven traits or skills.  Furthermore, search committees 
do not only look for the right CEO in terms of qualifications, but also anticipate how 
stakeholders' relationships will vary over time based on the CEO selected (Farquhar, 1995).  Hall 
et al. (2004) noted stakeholders are influenced by leader reputations which include human 
capital, social capital, and leadership style.  Some of these stakeholders are board members who 
make dismissal decisions (Hall et al., 2004).  Therefore, when CEOs improve their reputations, 
they also decrease their chance of dismissal (Hall et al., 2004). 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) cited personal characteristics such as charisma as sources of 
CEO power used to avoid dismissal.  Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) added the “[c]reation of a 
personal mystique or patriarchy…may induce unquestioned deference or loyalty” (p. 124).  
However, not all CEOs can communicate and network at the same level as these leaders with 
special personal characteristics (e.g., charismatic leaders).  Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) 
suggested early dismissals result from personality clashes or strategic disagreements, but they 
did not find any statistically significant evidence that this was occurring in their dataset.  It is 
important to note their results were based on career prospects of early fired CEOs relative to late 
fired CEOs as well as operating performance around the time of dismissal.  However, if 
personality clashes were really the reason for early dismissal, which Ertugrul and Krishnan 
(2011) admit the data would be hard to collect since dismissals based on personality clashes are 




not often reported, the dismissed CEOs are likely less desirable candidates for their next jobs as 
well.  The desirability of dismissed CEOs following personality clashes with the board of 
directors may be further diminished because boards of directors are often looking for likable 
CEOs with communication skills and charisma (Hall et al., 2004), as well as prospective CEOs 
within their network (Ward et al., 1995). 
Personal connections were previously discussed in reference to boards of directors’ 
allegiances and values, however, networks can also provide a CEO with additional power which 
can prevent dismissal, or at least provide opportunities for CEOs after dismissal (Fredrickson et 
al., 1988; Ward et al., 1995).  There exists a relatively closed network of executives and board 
members who serve on interconnected boards of directors who protect the interest of one another 
(Ward et al., 1995).  These networks may also overlap with religious, school alumni, or other 
club or organization networks (Ward et al., 1995) and reflect the social capital of the upper 
echelon of society (Flickinger et al., 2015).  These networks are capable of providing access to 
additional resources, including human and social capital, for executives and board members 
(Flickinger et al., 2015).  In addition to the social and human capital benefits which can be 
reaped from elite networks, the networks and outside directorships can positively affect 
executives’ social status (Westphal & Khanna, 2003), prestige (D’Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein, 
1992), and power (Palmer & Barber, 2001). 
Prestige power and external status.  CEO power derived from prestige operates 
differently than those sources of power derived through other means (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 
1994; Fralich, 2012).  Unlike other sources of CEO power, prestige power does not necessarily 
increase with tenure (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994).  This is partly due to the fact that prestige 




power comes from social relationships (D’Aveni, 1990) which promote loyalty and cooptation 
(Finkelstein, 1992). 
CEOs with different levels of prestige also behave differently from one another based on 
these prestige levels (Fralich, 2012).  CEOs with low levels of prestige often elect not to deviate 
too much from the central industry tendency, whereas high levels of prestige allow CEOs to be 
shielded by external pressure so they may differentiate themselves from industry competitors as 
they seek a competitive advantage and increased levels performance for their organization 
(Fralich, 2012).  Similarly, when CEOs enjoy a higher status than the chairman of the board of 
directors, the CEO is more protected from dismissal, even in times of poor organizational 
performance (Flickinger et al., 2015).  Flickinger et al. (2015) inferred a high status chairman of 
the board of directors may be less willing to accept extended periods of inferior performance due 
to the associated risks of diminishing their own status and reputation.  Therefore, research 
examining relative statuses of CEOs and board of directors’ chairmen may need to include 
interaction variables between the status of the chairman of the board of directors and the duration 
of poor firm performance.  In addition to prestige, networks provide access to valuable resources 
(Flickinger et al., 2015). 
Access to resources.  Related to the socio-political force of the board of directors’ 
allegiances and values, and more specifically, the founding CEO, is the idea of certain CEOs 
having additional power due to access to resources.  These resources may be personal skills, 
contacts with major clients or regulatory agents, proprietary information, or other external 
resources (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  When a CEO has control over these assets, he/she is able to 
reduce his/her probability of dismissal due to the power he/she have over the future of his/her 
organization.  Similarly, in sport, coaches may also possess some forms of contacts and 




information which may be desirable to certain teams.  For example, coaches from college or who 
possess college connections may enjoy specific knowledge about prospective draft picks; 
professional coaches may own knowledge of division rival teams, or connections to those who 
do; coaches with family relatives coaching on different teams may be able to obtain specific 
information; and former players who worked with current players/coaches may have knowledge 
of their tendencies/tactics which could yield additional power for the coach.   
CEO’s tenure.  Also related to the board of directors’ allegiances and values is the 
CEO’s tenure (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  As CEO tenure increases, so does the cooptation of the 
board of directors, as well as the ability for a CEO to appoint more board members (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1989; Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  However, CEO tenure also 
contributes to CEO power, which seems to be more prevalent in the literature than the effect of 
CEO tenure on the board of directors’ allegiances and values (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; 
Holmes, 2011; Lausten, 2002; Pi & Lowe, 2011).  Other researchers concluded a negative 
relationship exists between executive tenure and dismissals (Cannella, 1995; Farquhar, 1995; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Frick et al., 2010; Lausten, 2002; Pi & 
Lowe, 2011; Parrino, 1997).  However, it should be noted a few studies identified a positive 
relationship between executive tenure and dismissals (Holmes, 2011). 
Interestingly, some scholars linked managerial youth with better performance.  Child 
(1974) found younger managers are more likely to increase income, net assets, and sales for their 
firm.  The relationship between managerial youth and organizational performance may be due to 
the aforementioned tendencies of younger and older workers, such as older workers’ preferences 
for maintaining the status quo or younger workers’ energy and motivation (Child, 1974).  




Moreover, some researchers found the ability of CEOs to have an effect on their organizations 
may decrease over time (Miller, 1991; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). 
Another idea regarding the effect of tenure on dismissals is based on the personal 
characteristics of the executive.  Holmes (2011) found tenure effected dismissals differently for 
executives whom had prior connections to the organization prior to securing their position, Black 
executives, and executives whom engaged in organizational deviance.  The relationship between 
tenure and dismissal probabilities for Black executives was more linear, deviant executives could 
be characterized by an inverted-U shape, and all other executives peaked around the fourth year 
of tenure and stayed around that level (Holmes, 2011). 
Non-linear relationships between executive tenure and dismissals are not new to the 
dismissal literature.  Eitzen and Yetman (1972) found a curvilinear relationship between head 
basketball coach tenure and organizational performance.  More specifically, tenure had a positive 
relationship with organizational performance until approximately 13 years of tenure when 
organizational performance began to decline (Eitzen & Yetman, 1972).  Similarly, Katz (1982) 
found the average tenure of a group working on a research and development project effected 
group performance in a curvilinear fashion, peaking between two to four years of average group 
tenure, which was consistent with previous studies identified by Katz (e.g., Pelz & Andrews, 
1966).  Based on these studies of basketball coaches and research and development project 
groups, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed that CEOs who accumulate enough time in 
office will experience a peak in performance at some midway point, but performance will be 
lower very early and very late in their tenure. 
Additionally, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed tenure would have to span five 
seasons, which they termed: (a) response to mandate, (b) experimentation, (c) selection of an 




enduring theme, (d) convergence, and (e) dysfunction.  These seasons of CEO tenure are what 
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed lead to this curvilinear relationship between tenure and 
performance.  A related concept was presented by Miller (1992) called the Icarus paradox in 
which success may lead to failure due to forces such as routine, complacency, over-confidence, 
and trying to repeat success in new and different contexts.  The Icarus paradox may also occur in 
sport, increasing the difficulty associated with winning back-to-back championships (Wolfe et 
al., 2005).  However, dynasties, such as the 1970s Pittsburgh Steelers, may use a special form of 
competence termed “small wins” which allow these organizations to negate the effects of the 
Icarus paradox (Wolfe et al., 2005).  With the exception of dynasties, this research indicates that 
executive tenure and firm performance may have an inverted U-shaped relationship.  This 
relationship may lead to the dismissal of low performing executives. 
Dismissal (or turnover for those studies that do not differentiate between the two) may 
not be based on incumbent power as much as choice of alternatives for both the firm as well as 
the executive (Borland & Lye, 1996).  As information regarding executive-firm matches 
increase, boards of directors may realize the expected future output of the executive may 
decrease below a threshold where an alternative match would yield higher expected future 
output, thus increasing the rate of separation (Borland & Lye, 1996).  Additionally, Borland and 
Lye (1996) explained after a certain amount of years in which tenure and experience 
accumulated, turnover will become less likely, due in part to the fact that executives are often 
only willing to pursue matches with higher expected output, but these opportunities tend to occur 
less frequently with tenure.  These reasons are some insights from Borland and Lye (1996) which 
indicate why tenure may have an inverted U-shaped relationship with turnover.  Also for those 
studies that do not differentiate between dismissals and turnover, the relationship may be due in 




part to retirement since tenure is a significant predictor of voluntary exits (Fizel & D’itri, 1997, 
1999).   
Farquhar (1995) noted executives are often assumed to remain with their organization 
until retirement and CEO departures which occur prior to the age of 65 are often classified by 
researchers as early exits.  The objective of CEOs often does not include remaining with a firm 
until they retire at the age of 65 (Farquhar, 1995).  Despite this observation by Farquhar (1995), 
Parrino (1997) suggested CEOs with less tenure may be more vulnerable than CEOs with higher 
tenure because retaining a poor CEO who is further from retirement may be substantially costlier 
to retain a CEO who is likely to retire in the following few years.  However, Parrino (1997) also 
provided another explanation for why there seems to be a negative linear relationship between 
executive tenure and dismissals.  Less tenure may also be indicative of less human capital which 
is another explanation of why CEOs with less tenure may be more susceptible to dismissal 
(Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Frick et al., 2010; Parrino, 1997). 
CEOs with less tenure are likely to have accumulated less human capital, which makes 
them more susceptible to dismissal (Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Frick et al., 
2010; Parrino, 1997).  Due to shorter tenures allowing for less human capital accumulation, there 
is a corresponding period of early vulnerability for CEOs (Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et 
al., 1988; Frick et al., 2010; Parrino, 1997).  An executive’s initial year in an organization is a 
critical learning period and challenges exhibited in this first year are strongly correlated with 
future performance and success (Berlew & Hall, 1966).  With this period of learning for less 
experienced executives, firms usually ease the level of position authority slowly from the 
chairman of the board of directors to the new CEO (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).  Similarly, it 
may be unusual for a team to give head coaches responsibilities such as those associated with 




being the general manager or director of player personnel.  These dual roles and increased 
responsibilities often take time to earn and team owners and general managers may be weary of 
giving the added responsibilities to an unproven first-year head coach who may not even be the 
head coach the following year according to the increased vulnerability to dismissals that new 
CEOs and head coaches face (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Even though Berlew and Hall (1966) 
provided theoretical evidence in support of grooming new executives in order to reap future 
benefits, there seems to be increasing tendencies over time to dismiss executives in search of 
short-term results (Cannella, 1995; Farquhar, 1995).  Or, perhaps, throughout time, information 
continues to be accumulated at a quicker rate to enable faster determinations of these executives’ 
future expected outputs (e.g., Borland & Lye, 1996). 
Time is an important factor in dismissals for a few different reasons.  Many scholars 
found that executives are dismissed earlier in their tenures than in previous years (Cannella, 
1995; Farquhar, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Huson et al., 2001).  If these early dismissals are 
proactive, they may benefit organizations by limiting reductions in firm value caused by low 
ability CEOs (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011).  Fredrickson et al. (1988) compared NFL head 
coaches to CEOs and explained similarities in their tenures.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) noted even 
though the mean tenure for NFL head coaches from 1970 through 1982 was about four years, the 
mode was one year of tenure.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) concluded that these descriptive statistics 
revealed the early vulnerability among executives in the professional football industry which has 
also been exhibited among CEOs in the food processing industry.  Cannella (1995) identified a 
couple potential detrimental outcomes could occur as a result of this shift toward earlier 
dismissals: executives being reluctant to engage in risky strategies and executives experiencing 
difficulties building long-term relationships with stakeholders. 




Contrary to earlier research regarding executives being highly susceptibility to dismissal 
within their first year (e.g., Cannella, 1995; Farquhar, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988), Holmes 
(2011) stated head coaches are often given leeway early in their tenures to establish themselves, 
however, this leeway diminishes as tenure increases. He also suggested coaches whose 
performance starts strong then deteriorates may be more susceptible to dismissal than coaches 
whose performance begins poorly but improves.  However, Wowak, Hambrick, and Henderson 
(2011) observed CEOs whom exhibit strong performance early in their tenures receive an 
especially high degree of job security, ceteris paribus. 
Recent literature provides contradictory evidence to the idea CEOs are getting dismissed 
earlier over time.  As an example, Haynes et al. (2015) discovered CEO tenure decreased from 
about 10 years on average in the 1990s to about 5.5 years in 2011; however, since 2011, 
dismissal frequencies decreased causing CEOs of S&P 500 companies to again enjoy tenures of 
closer to 10 years.  Therefore, even though the past few decades have shown that CEO tenures 
may have been decreasing, there may be a recent trend within the past few years which has 
begun to counter the effects of previous decades.  Perhaps boards of directors became aware of 
the negative outcomes associated with earlier and more frequent dismissals identified by scholars 
such as Cannella (1995). 
Time also effects dismissals in terms of the timing of performance levels.  Several 
researchers concluded recent short-term performance is a more significant factor in the dismissal 
decision than the executive’s career performance or future potential (Donoher et al., 2007; 
Farquhar, 1995; Haynes et al., 2015; Holmes, 2011; Wowak et al., 2011).  Wowak et al. (2011) 
found marginally significant evidence that recent, though not current, poor performance increase 
dismissal probabilities even more when an executive has been highly overpaid previously.  This 




recent performance is often measured in terms of the most recent two to three years (Fredrickson 
et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011; Wowak et al., 2011). However, organizations characterized as high 
performers within their industries may look to the more distant past (e.g., five years) 
(Fredrickson et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011).  Identifying the downside to more frequent dismissals 
and boards of directors’ focus on recent, short-term performance, Farquhar (1995) stated that 
chronic occurrences of short-term leadership within an organization that emphasizes quick 
results with limited emphasis on the long-term future of the organization could be detrimental to 
the organization.  These short-term expectations are often tied to stock prices which CEOs often 
try to inflate for personal gain due to their stockholdings. 
CEO’s stockholdings.  Similar to ownership in family-owned firms affecting the 
likelihood of dismissal for family member CEOs (Allen & Panian, 1982; Furtado & Karan, 1990; 
Huson et al., 2001), ownership in the form of stockholdings may also affect the likelihood of 
CEO dismissal.  Larger percentages of firm ownership through stockholdings possessed by the 
CEO decrease the probability of that CEOs dismissal because CEOs are able to increase their 
power through voting control (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Furtado & Karan, 1990; Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1980; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013).  Major stockholders can influence decisions regarding 
board of director membership, and subsequently the actions of those board members (Finkelstein 
et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Therefore, if a CEO is also a major stockholder, he/she is 
able to decrease his/her own likelihood of dismissal (Fama, 1980; Fredrickson et al., 1988; 
Wiersema & Zhang, 2013), especially among poor performing firms (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein 
et al., 2009).  Rather than merely voting for board members, the CEO often serves on the board 
of directors, typically as the chairman of the board of directors which provides a similar form of 




insulation from dismissal (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Rechner & Dalton, 1991; 
Wiersema & Zhang, 2011, 2013). 
CEO duality.  CEO duality is the term used to describe a CEO who also holds the 
position of chairman of the board of directors (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Rechner & Dalton, 
1991).  Though this duality may decrease the probability of dismissal from a voting control and 
board of directors influence standpoint (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Wiersema 
& Zhang, 2011, 2013), it may also affect dismissal through strategic risk taking.  Fralich (2012) 
defined strategic risk taking as engaging in risky behavior for strategic change, such as 
substantially increasing expenditures and incurring large financial debts.  Fralich (2012) found a 
CEO who also serves as the firm’s chairman of the board of directors is less likely to take 
strategic risks.  Therefore, these CEOs may not greatly increase firm growth, however, they may 
also avoid decreasing firm performance, and subsequently avoid dismissal as firm performance 
closely aligns with the rest of the industry. 
Additionally, being a CEO as well as an outside director at another firm increases a 
CEO’s knowledge and experience (i.e., human capital) as well as network (i.e., social capital), 
which both operate to further increase the prestige of a CEO (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012).  
In sport, it is uncommon to observe an individual performing duties for two competing 
organizations; however, dual roles are very common.  In college sport, many head coaches 
simultaneously held the role of athletic director; however, the trend of head coaches operating as 
athletic directors is a decreasing trend.  Whether examining a coaches with administrative 
responsibilities or a CEO with chairman of the board of directors responsibilities, this duality 
increases the executive’s power, largely because the executive has greater influence over their 
own dismissal decision (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Wiersema & Zhang, 2011, 




2013).  This situation (i.e., CEO duality) could be detrimental to shareholders because directors 
are supposed to hold executives accountable, which may not be occurring when the executive is 
an influential director (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Fredrickson 
et al., 1988).  By whatever means executives derive their power, more powerful CEOs are more 
likely to cast shadows which linger around their respective organizations long after they are gone 
(Quigley & Hambrick, 2012).  These shadows can affect the expectations of the successor 
(Gilmore & Ronchi 1995; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). 
Expectations and Attributions 
Several scholars concluded higher expectations of executives increase those executives’ 
dismissal probabilities (Bennett et al., 2003; Farquhar, 1995; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011; Pieper et al., 2014; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991).  However, 
board members may view executives’ abilities to affect performance in vastly different ways, if 
they believe the executive has much of an effect at all (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Lieberson & 
O’Connor, 1972; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985).  Referring to the various cognitions in 
which board members draw upon when evaluating CEOs, Fredrickson et al. (1988) identified 
that board members may vary in their criteria for evaluating performance, awareness of industry 
performance, and attributions of the ability of executives to change firm performance. 
Evaluating performance.  Organizational performance can be measured in a number of 
ways (Donoher et al., 2007).  A few of these ways include: bottom-line figures (e.g., profit, stock 
price, rankings, win percentage in sport; Donoher et al., 2007; Farquhar, 1995; Koning, 2003), 
degree of improvement based on past organizational performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988; 
Holmes, 2011), or efficiency based on resources available to the organization (Fizel & D’Itri 
1997, 1999; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006; Maxcy, 2013; Scully, 1994).  Decision makers 




charged with the responsibility of holding executives accountable do not all look at one measure 
of performance.  With various board members using different criteria to evaluate organizational 
performance, the criteria for evaluating what constitutes good performance may become unclear.  
Additionally, third parties may assist in creating performance expectations for board members 
(Farrell & Whidbee 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). 
External monitors of organizational performance may affect boards of directors’ 
expectations of the CEO (Farrell & Whidbee 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Wiersema & 
Zhang, 2011).  These external monitors provide forecasts of key performance indicators and 
“mediate information flows between companies and other market participants who may invest in 
or do business with these firms” (Pollock & Gulati, 2007, p. 347).  In some instances, these 
external monitors are third-party investment analysts who provide legitimate evaluations of the 
organization and its executives (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011).  Boards of directors respond to 
investment analysts’ forecasts and recommendations because the analysts influence investors 
whom are the boards of directors’ constituents (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011).  Thus, when 
analysts’ forecasts (e.g., reported annual earnings per share [EPS]) exceed actual firm 
performance, CEO turnover becomes more likely (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 
1991; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011).  The probability of CEO turnover further increases when the 
firm does not meet expectations based on analysts’ forecasts and either there (a) is a general 
consensus among analysts or (b) are many analysts devoting attention to that firm (Farrell & 
Whidbee, 2003).  Still, board members are not the only ones who are concerned about analysts’ 
perspectives, but executives are as well – and not only because of the effect analysts have on 
executive dismissals, but also due to their concern for establishing and preserving their own 
legitimacy among stockholders and analysts (Donoher et al., 2007).  This struggle to achieve and 




maintain legitimacy is also important to board members who will also make decisions to replace 
executives in an attempt to repair damage to the firm and its leaders’ legitimacy (Wiersema & 
Zhang, 2013).  The strong influence analysts have over executive dismissal decisions 
incentivizes executives to manipulate analysts’ recommendations and forecasts. 
Firms that manipulate analyst appraisals may do so via financial statements (Chen, 
Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2014) or the media (Cotter, Tuna, & Wysocki, 2006; Farrell & Whidbee, 
2003; Westphal & Graebner, 2010).  Attempting to analyze the effects of expectations which are 
free of noise created by executives whom manipulate analyst appraisals, some scholars have 
argued head coaches as executives in sport do not actively manage expectations which are 
measured in the form of point spreads (Humphreys et al., 2011).  Similar to analysts’ forecasts, 
point spreads are measures of organizational performance which can be compared to a relatively 
efficient market-based expectation of performance (Humphreys et al., 2011). 
However, betting market measures such as point spreads and odds to win sports contests 
are determined by gamblers who may be influenced by media statements made by internal 
organizational members such as head coaches.  Koning (2003) stated that external influences 
(e.g., fans and media) are likely to be strong determinants of coach dismissals.  Likewise, stock 
returns are a measure of firm performance that may also be influenced by stakeholder sentiment, 
however, in this case, instead of sports gamblers or fans, investors are the influential 
stakeholders (Chen et al., 2014).  Since this measure can also be influenced by external 
stakeholders, it is another example of a firm performance measure which is not entirely reliable 
for evaluating the performance of a firm or its CEO (Chen et al., 2014), though some board 
members may still opt to rely on it. 




Awareness of industry performance.  Intra-industry comparisons are another area 
where board members may vary when developing their expectations and attributions of CEOs.  
Both analysts (Donoher et al., 2007) and boards of directors (Greve, 1998) compare firm 
performance to the performance of industry competitors to gauge that firm’s performance.  If a 
firm’s performance is considerably lower than a given portion of competitor firms, the board of 
directors will be more likely to dismiss the CEO (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  A board of directors’ awareness of industry performance may also contribute to another 
socio-political factor of CEO dismissals: alternatives to the incumbent CEO.  A board of 
directors’ awareness of industry performance may increase the potential candidate pool to 
replace the incumbent CEO because these competitor industries may have talented top managers 
that possess a proven track record of success and industry knowledge. 
Analogous to an industry within a given economy might be a division or a conference in 
sports leagues which are often characterized by certain styles of play (e.g., “ground and pound,” 
“West-Coast offense”) or resources (e.g., financial, human).  A few studies examined head 
coaches performance relative to their conference or division and found that better performance 
against geographically close competitors reduced the probability of executive dismissal (Holmes, 
2011).  Additionally, Holmes (2011) examined the relative effect of industry competitors (i.e., 
strength of schedule) on head coach dismissals, but did not find the variable to be statistically 
significant, even though variations in college football team abilities are great.  However, these 
studies did not account for the stronger attribution to top management when performance in a 
given industry varies more (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Meindl et al., 1985).  
Therefore, when there is wider variation in an industry, low performing CEOs are even more 
likely to be replaced (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  However, anecdotally in 




sport, Major League Baseball (MLB), which is structured for teams to be less competitively 
balanced than in the NFL (Vrooman, 2009), has head coaches with longer mean tenures than the 
NFL (Mielke, 2007). 
Attributions of top management’s influence.  Coinciding with Fredrickson et al.’s 
(1988) theory of dismissals and the influence of industry variation representing management’s 
ability to affect performance is the idea that leaders of organizations may have little effect on 
organizational performance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993a; Smart, Winfree, & 
Wolfe, 2008).  The typical explanations for the ineffectiveness of leaders indicate that leaders are 
often constrained by various internal and external factors such as resources, pressures to 
conform, and regulations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993a; Smart et al., 2008).  
Some scholars argued leader ineffectiveness only occurs in certain situations and referred to the 
idea of managerial discretion as affecting the impact leaders have on organizations (Hambrick & 
Quigley, 2014).  Scholars further concluded the environment and circumstances surrounding 
leaders might produce varying effects across organizations and industries causing leader effects 
on organizational outcomes to range from minimal to substantial (Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). 
In addition to the various constraints faced by leaders attempting to influence 
organizational performance, boards of directors may feel specific managers are less able to affect 
organizational performance.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) explained one situation where certain 
CEOs may be viewed as more responsible for organizational performance: 
If an outsider is hired, the board has concluded either that the firm does not possess the 
necessary talent or that its intention to implement changes must be signaled to the outside 
world.  As a result, the board may have higher expectations of this outsider than they 
would have of an insider, which in turn will produce unusually strong attributions of 
organizational performance to the CEO.  (p. 265) 
 




Outsider expectations and attributions are likely to be stronger in the early years of a CEO’s 
tenure because as tenure increases, boards of directors will view outsider CEOs more as insiders 
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Therefore, being an outsider CEO presents an 
additional early vulnerability to dismissal and may best be modeled quantitatively with an 
interaction between CEO outsiderness and tenure (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011).  
Furthermore, Huson et al. (2001) found that rates of both outside successions and dismissals both 
increased over time and, thus, outsiderness, tenure, and the interaction between the two variables 
may vary over time.  When boards of directors seek outsiders to fill CEO vacancies, they signal 
firm weaknesses to the market (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  These 
weaknesses, in combination with the high average level of experience among outsiders (because 
insiders replacing their CEOs would likely not have previously been a CEO, whereas an outsider 
may already have CEO experience), may lead boards of directors to more generously 
compensate an outsider.  This higher compensation used to incentivize outsiders to take the top 
position within a firm with certain weaknesses may also contribute to the expectations and 
attributions associated with higher CEO dismissals rates (Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
Star compensation.  Star compensation is another variable which may contribute to 
boards of directors’ expectations and attributions of specific executives (Fredrickson et al., 1988; 
Wowak et al., 2011).  Star compensation may refer to extremely high initial pay packages 
compared to the predecessor (Fredrickson et al., 1988), other firm executives (Shen, Gentry, & 
Tosi, 2010), industry norms (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Frick et al., 2010), or past performance 
(Wowak et al., 2011).  These pay packages are intended to lure candidates with strong 
reputations whom are believed, by the board of directors, to possess unique talents which will 
produce benefits in excess of the compensation (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  




When board members decide to pay CEOs with star compensation, they are indicating their 
beliefs that the executive lured to the firm by the compensation will be able to directly influence 
firm performance (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Therefore, when boards of 
directors are more inclined to attributed organizational performance to the CEO and compensate 
that CEO with extremely high pay packages, expectations for that CEO increase (Fredrickson et 
al., 1988; Wowak et al., 2011).  With these higher expectations and stronger causal attributions 
of the CEO come higher dismissal probabilities for CEOs (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Allen & 
Chadwick, 2012). 
Some studies found no evidence to suggest that executive overpayment alone increases 
the likelihood of dismissal (Frick et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2010; Wowak et al., 2011), but when 
CEOs are overpaid and the firm’s current performance is poor, CEO dismissal probabilities 
increase (Wowak et al., 2011).  Wowak et al. (2011) concluded boards of directors avoid 
dismissing CEOs whom are worth substantially more than they are compensated until current 
performance substantially decreases, which is when dismissal probabilities for these CEOs 
substantially increase.  Among head coaches in German soccer, Frick et al. (2010) found a 
positive relationship between head coach compensation and probability of head coach dismissal, 
as well as probability of head coach resignation. 
Overpaid CEOs, as measured by actual pay exceeding estimated pay based on well-
established determinants of CEO pay, whose firm performance decreased below expectations in 
a previous year may elicit a retaliatory response from the board of directors which leads to CEO 
dismissal (Wowak et al., 2011).  Fredrickson et al. (1988) proposed the relationship between 
executive compensation and dismissal probabilities would weaken over time as the CEO forges 
more personalized relationships with the board of directors and gains more power within the 




firm.  Though boards of directors may form expectations by comparing executive compensation 
of current leaders to the compensation of predecessors, comparisons to predecessors are not 
strictly limited to compensation. 
Comparisons to predecessors.  As new leaders are appointed to high posts within 
organizations, comparisons to predecessors are inevitable (Gilmore & Ronchi, 1995).  These 
comparisons may be caused by leader transference – “a cognitive process whereby mental 
representations of previous leaders are activated and used for evaluation when new, similar 
leaders are encountered” (Ritter & Lord, 2007, p. 1683).  Though these comparisons often 
dwindle over time, these new leaders face much adversity early in their tenures due to these 
comparisons, and some leaders even face comparisons long into their tenures (Fredrickson et al., 
1988; Gilmore & Ronchi, 1995).  Memories of a former leader are not the only way past leaders 
may have an effect, but also through a continued presence within the organization (e.g., former 
CEO becomes the chairman of the board of directors or an influential outside advisor).  In sport, 
it is not unheard of for former coaches to secure front office positions (e.g., Mike Holmgren, 
John Idzik, Don Shula, Bill Walsh).  Similar to comparing current leaders with past leaders, 
boards of directors may also make comparisons between current and past organizational 
performance to form expectations. 
Previous organizational performance.  Boards of directors often look to past 
performance for expectations of current and future performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Greve, 
1998; Holmes, 2011).  Past performance is important for evaluating CEOs, regardless of the 
track record of the firm (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  As examples, historically high performing 
firms will be less likely to tolerate industry-average performance levels; historically low 
performing firms may see industry-average performance levels as a reason worthy of increasing 




executive compensation; and recently struggling firms may not be able to tolerate a slight 
decrease in performance as high performing firms might be able to (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  
Therefore, Fredrickson et al. (1988) argued that firms are more likely to dismiss their CEOs if 
previous firm performance was either very high or very low. 
In U.S. college football, Holmes (2011) found prior performance in the two years prior to 
the observed year led to a negative relationship between prior performance and dismissals.  This 
result is consistent with the idea that better performance should reduce probabilities of dismissal.  
However, Holmes (2011) suggested performance beyond those two previous years would form 
the organizations’ expectations, which were positively related to dismissals.  This finding from 
college football emphasizes Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) idea that industries with more variation in 
firm performance will behave in differently than industries with more similarly performing firms 
when dismissing executives for expectations based on past firm performance. 
Dissenting opinions.  With all of these various ways of forming expectations and 
attributions of leaders (e.g., comparisons of other firms in the industry, past leaders, and past 
performance in terms of generating profits, exceeding analysts’ forecasts, and efficiency), it is 
not unlikely for board members to have differing perspectives regarding the performance of the 
firm and the executive.  However, more dissent among board members about expectations and 
attributions of firm and executive performance may also increase probabilities of executive 
dismissal (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  In these 
situations of dissenting opinions of board members, negative information is more likely to be 
discussed and brought to the attention of other board members, to the detriment of the executive 
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  These dissenting 
opinions may be caused or enhanced within emergent industries where there is a general lack of 




information regarding what constitutes good performance in those industries and comparisons 
are more difficult to make (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Additionally, due to the uncertainty, lack 
of industry-related data for comparisons, and often extreme or highly varied performance levels 
among firms in these emergent industries, boards of directors are likely to attribute firm variation 
to the CEO, subsequently increasing dismissal likelihood (Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
Alternatives to the Incumbent 
The final socio-political factor affecting CEO dismissals presented by Fredrickson et al. 
(1988) is the availability of alternatives to the incumbent.  Though identified as an important 
element in the executive dismissal decision by several scholars (Fredrickson et al., 1988; 
Holmes, 2011; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980) and a major consideration (whether implicit or explicit) 
among boards of directors (Fredrickson et al., 1988), this fourth socio-political factor may be the 
most neglected in the extant literature.  The reason for the lack of attention given to the effects of 
available and qualified candidates is likely due mostly to data limitations which stem from the 
secretive nature of executive hiring processes among firms and lead to some researchers electing 
to omit the crucial variable from their studies (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Holmes, 2011).  
However, most researchers utilize proxies for candidate availability which have little to do with 
the actual candidates, such as various industry and firm characteristics (e.g., Crossland & Chen, 
2013; Parrino, 1997). 
Candidate pool proxies.  Early research examining the effects of qualified candidate 
availability on leader succession argued that larger organizations would have more potential 
replacements for incumbents (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  The rationale 
behind this claim was that larger organizations would, internally, have more top managers to 
choose as successors (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).  




Additionally, firm size could represent firm prestige (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Westphal & 
Khanna, 2003) which may draw more or better external candidates.  Since these early studies, 
many researchers included firm size as a variable to represent candidate availability in their 
managerial dismissal models (e.g., Agrawal, Knoeber, & Tsoulouhas, 2006; Farrell & Whidbee, 
2003; Huson et al., 2001).  However, rather than examining firm size in terms of the number of 
top managers within a firm whom may possess the requisite human capital to succeed the 
incumbent, researchers use measures of firm size such as the number of employees in a firm 
(Agrawal et al., 2006; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003) or even sales figures (Huson et al., 2001).  
Since sales figures are used an imperfect proxy for firm size, and firm size is used as an 
imperfect proxy for internal candidate availability, what may occur is a diluted representation of 
candidate availability which may not accurately reflect the effects of candidate availability on 
executive dismissals.   
Though the empirical evidence predominantly shows that larger organizations experience 
more leader turnover than smaller organizations (Agrawal et al., 2006; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; 
Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Grusky, 1961; Huson et al., 2001; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Wiersema & 
Zhang, 2013), the evidence is not clear exactly why this is occurring.  The relationship between 
firm size and executive turnover may be due in part to the availability of alternative candidates to 
replace the incumbent (Fredrickson et al., 1988); however, it may also be due to larger firms 
being more bureaucratized and complex (Grusky, 1961; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980), resistant to 
change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Fralich, 2012), scrutinized by stakeholders (e.g., media, 
analysts, public) (Daboub et al., 1995; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013), or likely to engage in deviant 
behavior (Baucus, 1990; Baucus & Near, 1991; Daboub et al., 1995; Donoher et al., 2007).  




Another proxy identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) as useful for estimating the 
availability of qualified candidates was the number of firms in an industry.  The idea behind the 
number of firms in an industry as a proxy for qualified candidate availability is simple: CEOs 
often come from within the same industry as the hiring firm, and therefore, more firms in the 
industry is indicative of more available and qualified candidates (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Jalal 
& Prezas, 2012).  However, since the labor market for CEOs is often a national one, Crossland 
and Chen (2013) specified the criteria for the number of intra-industry firms representing 
candidate availability must be country-specific.  In North American sport leagues, the number of 
teams gradually increased throughout time, as did the number of coaches per team.   
The final proxy for available alternatives to the incumbent CEO which was identified by 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) is the predecessor’s subsequent connectedness.  As previously 
mentioned, former CEOs may remain connected to an organization after departing as CEO in a 
variety of ways, including becoming the chairman of the board of directors, a board member, or 
a consultant (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  These continued associations between the organizations 
and former CEOs may signal to internal and external stakeholders that a strong and able 
candidate is available to replace the incumbent (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Furthermore, the mere 
presence of the former executive in a position such as chairman of the board of directors may 
cause negative and dissenting opinions of the incumbent executive to arise if the incumbent’s 
performance is anything less than flawless (Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
Additional insights on candidate availability and executive dismissal.  Since 
Fredrickson et al. (1988), few studies offered additional insight regarding the availability of 
qualified candidates to replace the incumbent executive.  Parrino (1997) shared Fredrickson et 
al.’s (1988) sentiment that a strong external candidate is an important determinant of CEO 




dismissals and elaborated that the potential benefit received by a firm for replacing a CEO grows 
with the quality of the candidate pool.  Parrino (1997) also confirmed the importance boards of 
directors place on industry experience noting that only about 7% of fired CEOs in their sample 
were succeeded by new CEOs whom did not clearly possess industry-specific human capital.  
Similarly, examinations of sport industries note that head coaching vacancies in elite leagues are 
unlikely to come from external leagues (Mielke, 2007; Solow et al., 2011).  Mobbs (2013) stated 
boards of directors can act quickly when faced with a CEO dismissal decision if they have a 
talented replacement whom can immediately replace the incumbent such as a board member or 
an internal candidate.  However, the frequency of outside successions, as well as CEO turnovers, 
have increased throughout time (Huson et al., 2001). 
Summary of Socio-Political Dismissal Forces 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) established a framework for examining executive dismissals 
based on socio-political forces, rather than solely relying on organizational performance as a 
determinant.  Since its publication, numerous scholars have built upon the foundation 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) established, often delving deeper into these four socio-political forces.  
Though, overall, the wealth of literature examining these four socio-political forces has 
contributed to the increased understanding of executive dismissals among scholars, it has also led 
to some confusion.  For example, Holmes (2011) used performance variables as measures of the 
socio-political force of allegiances and values, stating that dismissal decision-makers value 
performance.  However, Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) interpretation of values was based on 
motives for being on the board of directors rather than valuing high performance. 
Complications within the executive dismissal literature have arisen with respect to the 
three other socio-political forces as well.  Incumbent CEO power is viewed by most scholars as a 




resource that can decrease the likelihood of dismissals, however, depending on the source and 
type of power (e.g., excessive control over subordinates), it could have detrimental effects 
(Griffin & Lopez, 2013; Sims, 2010).  When discussing expectations and attributions, 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) identifies differences between industries with respect to executive 
dismissals, however, scholars often examine executives from various industries without 
addressing the effects different industries may have on dismissal rates.  Since Fredrickson et al. 
(1988), additional differences in industries which may affect executive dismissals have been 
identified such as levels of deviant behavior (Daboub et al., 1995) or executive discretion 
(Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995).  Similarly, in sport, some leagues and levels of competition 
may be more deviant, allow for more head coach discretion, or have more variation among firms 
in terms of performance–all of which would be more likely to lead to dismissals.  However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests this may not be occurring and further research is required. 
Finally, the availability of qualified alternatives to the incumbent executive is an area that 
has been substantially lacking in the literature, mostly due to the difficulty in establishing 
candidates whom comprise a candidate pool for a given executive position.  Firm size is often 
used to proxy for candidate availability, however, this method is crude and could be problematic 
due to being correlated with several other factors which may affect dismissals (e.g., firm prestige 
and attention, the complexity of a firm’s structure, a firm’s ability to change, executive 
deviance).  Though several scholars have emphasized the importance of candidate availability in 
the executive dismissal process, very little is known about candidates who are promoted to 
executive positions. 





 Because the availability of qualified candidates to replace an incumbent executive could 
be a consideration of dismissal decision makers (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 
1988), understanding who those potential successors are is critical.  Therefore, knowledge of the 
promotion process and from where executives may come under various circumstances is 
necessary for understanding executive dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  However, the process for filling executive vacancies is different than the process for 
filling lower level managerial vacancies due to the differences in duties of the higher and lower 
level managerial positions (Borman & Brush, 1993; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969; Selznick, 1957). 
Executive Successors 
Executive successors can come from many different places in terms of the successor’s 
association with the executive-seeking firm or industry, former position held and level of success 
in that position, certifications or memberships, geographic location, and demographics.  
Furthermore, there are various ways the succession may occur in terms of planning, which may 
involve unexpected or planned predecessor departures.  Each one of these attributes of the 
successor and succession event are important in terms of understanding the candidate pool 
available when boards of directors make dismissal decisions as well as how the succession event 
is going to affect performance. 
Successor associations with firm/industry. Successors may be internally or externally 
associated with the firm or industry.  In the Alternatives to the Incumbent section, the importance 
of industry-specific human capital and its relevance to boards of directors seeking candidates 
from within the industry (Crossland & Chen, 2013; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Jalal & Prezas, 
2012; Parrino, 1997) was reviewed.  For those boards of directors considering a successor from 




within their industry, another decision exists: whether to select successors from inside or outside 
their own firm.  Multiple factors may influence the decision to select an inside or outside 
successor such as firm performance and size. 
Research examining executive hiring processes concluded when firms are performing 
well, promoting internal managers to the top post in the firm is preferred because these internal 
promotions are less disruptive to the organizational processes responsible for generating the 
increased performance levels (Carroll, 1984; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Grusky, 1961).  However, 
when firms are not performing well, external candidates are often preferred as successors 
because they are viewed as more capable of implementing strategic change to increase firm 
performance (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Fredrickson et al., 1988; 
Furtado & Karan, 1990; Hamidullah, Wilkins, & Meier, 2009; Ocasio, 1999).  This result, 
however, may be contingent upon the existence of an heir apparent to replace the incumbent 
executive as well as the incumbent executive’s maintaining a connection with the firm after the 
incumbent’s departure and possibly influencing the selection of the incumbent’s successor 
(Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).  Though internal successors are more likely than external 
successors in firms experiencing high levels of performance, these firms often offer fewer 
internal promotion opportunities since executives are less likely to be dismissed in times of good 
performance (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2006; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  However, opportunities 
for promotion in successful firms may also be dependent on firm size. 
There is also a distinction between small and large firms’ preferences for successors, 
whereby large firms often appoint insiders and small firms often appoint outsiders to lead their 
firms (Fredrickson et al., 1988).  The difference in executive hiring practices between large and 
small firms may be a result of larger firms having more managerial depth which can be more 




adequately used to select suitable candidates (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Parrino, 1997).  
Additionally, the complex and bureaucratic nature of these larger organizations may also 
contribute to the willingness to create and ability to withstand more frequent succession events 
(Grusky, 1961).   
Though there is evidence that firm performance, firm size, and other socio-political 
factors influence whether boards of directors will appoint an insider or an outsider to their top 
post, firms may increasingly choose outsiders throughout time (Huson et al., 2001).  These 
outsiders may be viewed as detrimental to potential goals of succession planning (Farquhar, 
1995).  The increase in outsider successions may be due, in part, to the advantage outsiders have 
over internal candidates for high-level managerial positions (Acosta, 2010).  Acosta (2010) 
found previous promotions within a firm decrease the probability of future promotions within the 
firm.  Perhaps this finding is due to a lack of diverse experiences, networks, and backgrounds 
which may be valued by decision makers charged with making personnel decisions. 
Furthermore, Acosta’s (2010) conclusions may assist in explaining why talented top managers 
and interim CEOs often leave the firm after not being selected as CEO (Cannella & Shen, 2001).  
Additionally, the ability to predict future success in a given position is contingent upon positions 
previously held (Longley & Wong, 2011). 
Former position held and level of success.  Successors to CEOs are either former CEOs 
or have been promoted to CEO.  Successors with more general management experience typically 
have more relevant expertise to CEO positions than executives from more specialized 
backgrounds such as marketing (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).  However, consistent with the 
idea that better performing firms have fewer opportunities for upward mobility (Fee et al., 2006; 
Fredrickson et al., 1988), non-former CEOs typically come from firms with better performance 




than successors with CEO experience (Elsaid, Wang, & Davidson, 2011).  Nevertheless, the 
stock market reacts more favorably to firms that appoint former CEOs as opposed to successors 
with no CEO experience (Elsaid et al., 2011).  Additionally, this positive reaction occurs despite 
former CEOs being hindered by past experiences which cause decisions to be made based on 
past experiences that occurred in different contexts (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015).  Since the 
contexts have changed, but the CEOs decisions are based on the old context, the new decisions 
may be detrimental to firm performance (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015). 
Rather than a former CEO making a lateral move to be the CEO of another organization, 
boards of directors may choose to promote a non-former CEO internally or externally.  Among 
organizations which promote internal managers to their top posts, individual performance may 
not be valued at all in the selection decision (Fee et al., 2006).  In contrast, hiring organizations 
tend to promote external managers when those managers exhibit high levels of individual 
performance with little regard for the performance of the external managers’ organization (Fee et 
al., 2006).  However, promotions based on past performance which occurred at a lower level 
may not be an accurate indicator of future performance at a higher level (Longley & Wong, 
2011), though they may be indicative of future movement along the career ladder (i.e., career 
ceilings and floors, promotions and demotions) (Rosenbaum, 1979).  Therefore, understanding 
managerial mobility at the highest level of organizations requires and understanding of factors 
affecting managerial mobility at every level of an organization. 
Factors Affecting Promotions 
 Several studies have examined determinants of promotions at various levels within the 
organizational hierarchy, which is important because of the differences in duties and promotion 
criteria at each level (Borman & Brush, 1993; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969; Selznick, 1957).  




However, some factors influencing promotions are not unique to organizational levels, such as 
education (Tharenou, 1997) or demographic homogeneity (Kanter, 1977; Useem & Karabel, 
1986; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  Furthermore, factors affecting promotion are not limited to 
duties, promotion criteria, or individual attributes, but also macroeconomic, societal, industry, 
organizational, and political considerations (Kanter, 1977; Ferris, Buckley, & Allen, 1992; Ng, 
Sorensen, Eby, & Feldman, 2007; Raelin, 1997). 
 Different criteria are used for evaluating prospective executives than for supervisory 
managers for several reasons (Selznick, 1957, Ferris et al., 1992).  First, duties among executives 
and lower-level managers differ, and therefore, those entrusted to make the hiring or promotion 
decisions must consider different characteristics of the candidates as well as factors internal and 
external to the organization.  Hersey and Blanchard (1969) separated managers into three levels: 
top managers, middle managers, and supervisory managers.  Further, they identified skills 
needed for each level manager to be effective which included technical, human, and conceptual 
skills.  While each level of management mostly needs human skill in Hersey and Blanchard’s 
(1969) generic conceptualization of skills each level of management needs, top managers need 
more conceptual than technical skill, supervisory managers need more technical than conceptual 
skill, and middle managers need an even amount of technical and conceptual skill. 
Therefore, when decision makers decide whom to hire or promote, this decision may be 
contingent upon the duties of the position and how well candidates display the characteristics 
required for those duties.  Because top management positions often require more conceptual 
skills than technical (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969), and conceptual skill is based more on 
interpretation than concrete measures, top managers may rely more on networks and political 
behavior (Ferris et al., 1992).  However, near the top of the organizational hierarchy, top 




managers cannot solely rely on political behavior and networks without exposing weaknesses in 
their abilities, often demonstrated by past performance (Ferris et al., 1992).  Therefore, a 
combination of political behavior and ability are required for promotion to the highest 
organizational ranks (Ferris et al., 1992). 
Other studies have examined traits related to career advancement.  Some traits are simply 
more likely to guide an employee towards promotions, such as ambition, desires to lead, or 
desires to excel in the workplace (Tharenou, 1997), whereas other traits are may be more 
desirable for personnel managers.  Among the traits which may be more desirable to personnel 
managers, there are both physical and personality traits.  Physical traits include traits such as sex 
(Tharenou, 1997) or attractiveness (Morrow, McElroy, Stamper, & Wilson, 1990), whereas 
personality traits include traits such as self-confidence (Tharenou, 1997). 
 Promotions are contingent upon several environmental factors beyond the control of the 
promotion candidates and hiring decision makers.  Among these environmental factors are 
economic conditions, societal characteristics, industry differences, and organizations’ staffing 
policies (Ng et al., 2007).  Under favorable economic conditions, firms are more likely to create 
new positions, vertically and horizontally, which also increases opportunities for external 
candidates (Ng et al., 2007).  In contrast, under unfavorable economic conditions, firm 
downsizing causes layoffs and demotions (Ng et al., 2007).  Numerous societal characteristics 
could also affect job mobility, such as international and domestic conflicts, technological 
advances, civil rights issues, or public policies (Kanter, 1977; Ng et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, 1992).  
For example, unionization, and policies which strengthen unions, decrease involuntary exits and 
external mobility (Ng et al., 2007). 




Societal characteristics, such as policies aimed at changing levels of diversity within 
organizations, may have beneficial effects on mobility for certain populations (e.g., older, 
minority, veteran populations), but adverse effects for others (Ng et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, 1992).  
Differences between industries and organizations within industries also contribute to job 
mobility.  Both industries and specific organizations have varying reward mechanisms, 
employment goals, and other unique characteristics.  Examples of these industry- and 
organization-specific characteristics include women being overrepresented in clerical positions, 
high-wage industries experience less job mobility due to infrequent firm departures, and 
organizational emphases on internal development or acquiring external talent (Ng et al., 2007). 
 Promotions are contingent upon several factors.  Hiring and promotion decision makers 
must consider the needs of the organization and the qualifications of the candidates.  However, 
economic, societal, industry, and organizational factors may also dictate job mobility.  Therefore, 
similar to the case of executive dismissals, promotions are based on much more than just past 
performance.  As decision makers search for candidates to replace organizational leaders, 
questions arise regarding the effect a succession will have on the organization. 
Executive Successions 
Executive successions are of great interest to organizations (Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Parrino, 1997; Pedace & Smith, 2013), shareholders (Ertugrul & 
Krishnan, 2011; Farquhar, 1995; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), and scholars 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  Despite this great 
interest in executive successions, studies examining the effects of executive succession have, 
collectively, provided mixed or inadequate results (Farquhar, 1995; Kesner & Sebora 1994; 
Karaevli, 2007; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991).  Faced with several executive succession studies that 




often provided mixed results, Kesner and Sebora (1994) provided a review of the executive 
succession literature from the 1960s to the early 1990s and classified the literature into several 
categories.  Much of the literature regarding executive successions has revolved around the 
categories of (a) successor origin, (b) succession rates, and (c) post-succession organizational 
performance. 
Successor Origin 
Early research by Grusky (1963) utilized a unique data set to empirically examine the 
effects of successor origin on post-succession performance.  The data Grusky (1963) used were 
professional baseball league mid-season manager changes.  Grusky (1963) compared baseball 
teams that promoted internally with those that acquired new managers from outside the team to 
see which teams performed better following a succession and found insider successions to be 
more beneficial to team performance than outsider successions.  The finding that insider 
successions are better for firm performance have been duplicated by several studies since Grusky 
(1963), such as Allen, Panian, and Lotz’s (1979) similar study of professional baseball manager 
successions and Zajac’s (1990) study of corporate CEOs. 
Contrary to the aforementioned evidence of outsider successions being disruptive to 
organizations, Warner et al. (1988) examined executive successions reported in the Wall Street 
Journal and found outside successions to have a positive effect on post-succession firm stock 
prices.  Kesner and Sebora (1994) noted several researchers using various performance measures 
as dependent variables (e.g., sales, profits, return on investment) found contradictory evidence 
regarding the effects of insiders and post-succession organizational performance, further 
contributing to the mixed results attributable to successor origin. 





The literature examining succession rates includes two main streams of research: 
determinants of succession rates and consequences of high succession rates.  Grusky (1961) was 
one of the first researchers to empirical examine succession rates.  Grusky (1961) contrasted 
larger and smaller revenue-generating Fortune 500 companies and found succession rates to be 
higher among larger companies. Grusky (1961) attributed to the increased bureaucratic nature of 
larger organizations.  Though the finding of increased succession rates among larger firms has 
been supported by many studies following Grusky (1961) (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Farrell & 
Whidbee, 2003; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Huson et al., 2001; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Wiersema 
& Zhang, 2013), the rationale provided by Grusky (1961) based on organization bureaucracy 
levels has been challenged (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
Other scholars added to the succession rate literature by finding an inverse relationship 
between firm performance and frequency of succession (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994; Warner et al., 1988).  Additionally, Pfeffer and Moore (1980) found dissenting 
opinions about the executive to lead to higher succession rates, Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) 
discovered the executive’s ownership of the firm to be inversely related to succession rates, and 
Allen (1981) uncovered CEO power to be inversely related to succession rates.  Examinations of 
the determinants of succession rates in the 1960s led to examinations of the effects of succession 
rates on organizational performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
Post-Succession Organizational Performance 
Similar to other succession-related studies (e.g., the successor origin debate), scholars 
again found mixed results regarding post-succession organizational performance.  These mixed 
results led to three theories of executive successions: (a) the Common Sense Theory, (b) the 




Vicious Circle Theory (also commonly referred to as the Vicious Cycle Theory), and (c) the 
Ritual Scapegoating Theory.  Furthermore, the ambiguous results regarding the effects of 
executive successions led many researchers to examine the circumstances affecting the effects of 
executive successions. 
Circumstances affecting post-succession organizational performance.  Several 
circumstances may affect the effect successions have on organizational performance.  Many of 
these circumstances have been being empirically tested for almost half a century, however, 
statistical tests continue to become more sophisticated.  Among these circumstances are (a) 
executive-firm fit, (b) the ability of the executive and the organization, (c) the timing of the 
succession, and (d) the time span in which the organizational performance is measured following 
the succession event. 
Research in the 1970s began emphasizing the importance of examining more factors 
related to post-succession organizational performance than a mere succession event (Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994).  Much of the post-succession organizational performance research in the 1970s 
was devoted to examining the effects of executive-firm fit on post-succession organizational 
performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  Overall, the results of the studies examining the effect of 
executive-firm fit on post-succession organizational performance indicate post-succession 
organizational performance increases more in cases of better executive-firm fit relative to those 
cases of sub-optimal executive-firm matches (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
Studies regarding the moderating effects of the executive’s and organization’s abilities on 
post-succession organizational performance have used several methods of capturing this 
relationship.  Probably the most studied circumstance affecting post-succession organizational 
performance is the ability of the team prior to a succession event.  Several scholars throughout 




the decades of succession research have agreed post-succession organizational performance is, at 
least in part, determined by the performance of the organization prior to the succession event 
(Allen et al., 1979; Brown, 1982; Eitzen & Yetman 1972; Friedman & Singh 1989; Karaevli, 
2007; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986). 
Common Sense Theory.  The Common Sense Theory is simple: boards of directors 
replace poor performing CEOs to improve firm performance, thus creating a positive relationship 
between executive successions and organizational performance (Dohrn et al., 2015; Gamson & 
Scotch, 1964; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Soebbing, Wicker, & Weimar, 
2015).  Evidence of the Common Sense Theory has been found in both the context of head 
coaches in sport (Maxcy, 2013) as well as CEOs in non-sport settings (Huson et al., 2004; 
Weisbach, 1988). 
 Vicious Circle Theory.  Contrary to the Common Sense Theory, the Vicious Circle 
Theory states that executive successions are disruptive processes that decrease organizational 
performance (Dohrn et al., 2015; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994; Soebbing et al., 2015).  Similar to the Common Sense Theory, evidence 
supporting the Vicious Circle Theory has been found in both sport (Fizel & D’Itri, 1997, 1999; 
Grusky, 1963; Soebbing & Washington, 2011) and non-sport industries (Carroll, 1984; 
Haveman, 1993b). 
Ritual Scapegoating Theory.  The third theory of organizational performance following 
executive succession is the Ritual Scapegoating Theory.  The Ritual Scapegoating Theory states 
that the occurrence of an executive succession event has no significant effect on organizational 
performance.  Rather, executive successions merely reflect a perceived change in organizational 
direction, however, do not necessarily cause actual changes in organizational performance 




(Dohrn et al., 2015; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; 
Soebbing et al., 2015).  Consistent with the other two theories of post-succession organizational 
performance, evidence to support the Ritual Scapegoating Theory has also been found in both 
sport (Brown, 1982; Cannella & Rowe 1995; Eitzen & Yetman 1972; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 
1986) and non-sport settings (Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Samuelson, Galbraith, & McGuire, 
1985). 
Several other researchers examined the post-succession organizational performance 
theories by providing possible explanations for the mixed results (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  
Among the explanations, researchers found the pre-succession performance of the organization 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985), successor competence 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986), and executive compensation (Zajac, 
1990) may moderate the effects of post-succession organizational performance. 
Timing.  The timing of successions can have an impact on organizational performance in 
a few different ways, including the optimal time to dismiss an executive as well as the time of 
year.  In terms of choosing the right time to dismiss an executive, without regard to time of year, 
Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) found waiting too long to dismiss an executive could be 
substantially detrimental to an organization.  More specifically, boards of directors that wait to 
dismiss a CEO increase their probability of filing for bankruptcy by about 4%, increase their 
probability of delisting their stock by about 8% (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011).  However, boards 
of directors that elect to proactively dismiss their CEO experience a decrease in their firm’s share 
price by almost 5%, yet there is no significant share price decrease for CEOs being fired too late 
following poor performance (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). 




Succession timing could also affect subsequent organizational performance based on the 
time of year the succession event occurs.  To examine this phenomenon, many scholars analyzed 
sport data to identify whether there is a difference between dismissing an executive during the 
season as opposed to during the off-season and have compared seasons in sport to similar peak 
seasons outside of sport (de Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007; Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005).  
That is, most industries and firms experience highs and lows throughout a given year which 
provide opportunities for turnover among top executives to mitigate potential performance 
disruptions (de Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007; Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005).  Literature 
examining performance during and between seasons in team sports indicates during season 
successions are more disruptive than between season successions (Allen et al., 1979; Brown, 
1982; de Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007; Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005). 
How researchers decide to define organizational performance, in terms of time, may also 
affect results regarding the effect succession events have on organizational performance.  Day 
and Lord (1988) identified that under certain circumstances short term performance may increase 
following a succession event, for example, when the new executive is able to increase morale, 
external funding, or stockholders’ perceptions.  However, long-term increases in organizational 
performance are often created by acquiring and developing personnel or technology, 
restructuring the organization, or other means of strategic change–all of which often require a 
new executive to be in office for at least a few years (Day & Lord, 1988). 
Though many studies examined the effects of successions, and reached varying 
conclusions based on the three theories of succession, it is evident post-succession performance 
is contingent upon more factors than simply the existence of a succession event.  Factors 
influencing the effect a succession will have on subsequent performance include executive-firm 




fit, executive/organization ability, succession timing, and post-succession performance 
measurements.  However, before trying to understand organizational performance following 
successions, a deeper understanding of dismissals is required (Fredrickson et al., 1988). 
Conclusion 
 Executive dismissals and successions can be difficult to accurately examine for several 
reasons.  The sport industry provided important data to assist in examining executive dismissals 
and successions; however, difficulties still exist in identifying factors related to dismissals, and 
subsequently, successions.  Fredrickson et al. (1988) developed a framework to better understand 
executive dismissals, which, in turn, would provide for a better understanding of successions but 
this model of CEO dismissals is not perfect.  Research based on their four socio-political forces 
of CEO dismissals often resulted in inconsistent or contradictory results.  These inconsistent or 
contradictory results may be due to misinterpretations of the model, difficulties operationalizing 
the four socio-political forces, errors in accurately measuring organizational performance or any 
of the four socio-political forces, or an incomplete model proposed by Fredrickson et al. (1988). 
 Executive dismissals and successions are also contingent upon successors, candidate 
pools, and determinants of promotions.  Though executive successions require and understanding 
of executive dismissals, executive dismissals require an understanding of candidate pools, and 
candidate pools require an understanding of promotions from the lowest rung of the career 
ladder, they are often disjoined in the literature.  Executive dismissal research typically identifies 
candidate pools based on firm and industry size proxies which are often based on sales figures, 
number of employees in a firm, or number of firms in an industry.  These proxies do not consider 
how tall or wide organizational structures are or whom qualified candidates to replace executives 
are.  Furthermore, several studies have examined various levels of management as if they were 




evaluated by decision makers using the same criteria despite job duties for these positions being 
vastly different. 
 A large body of previous literature examines issues such as executive successions, 
executive dismissals, and career trajectories, however, without understanding the antecedents of 
executive successions, fully understanding executive successions themselves may not be 
possible.  Additionally, Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model of CEO dismissals remained a leading 
theory for understanding executive dismissals for almost three decades and has been influential 
in molding research questions and empirical examinations within that time span.  Furthermore, 
minimal revisions or additions to the dismissal model have been proposed in that time. 
There are several opportunities for future research stemming from the literature in this 
review.  Future research may be able to expand upon Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) executive 
dismissal model or adapt the model to different types of firms or industries (e.g., family owned 
firms, public sector).  One socio-political force not discussed in the Fredrickson et al. (1988) 
model that influences dismissals as well as the other four socio-political forces is negative 
deviant behavior exhibited by executives and their firms.  Empirical examinations of the 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) model may also benefit from establishing whom qualified candidates 
are for executive positions in various industries and allowing a pool of candidate to be 
incorporated into the dismissal model, rather than proxies based on sales figures or firms within 
an industry. 
Several studies have examined the impact of executive dismissals on subsequent 
organizational performance, however, the impact of a dismissal on an executive’s future career 
prospects is less understood.  Recent studies examining the glass cliff have examined how 
female executives are disproportionately positioned in less successful firms and positions, 




however, further studies regarding the effects of these positions on later career outcomes are 
needed.  Sport provides an interesting context to examine these issues due in part to policies such 
as the Rooney rule which may encourage minorities to take opportunities that could hurt their 
reputations.  Furthermore, the future opportunities, successes, and failures of minorities whom 
have been dismissed can be easily monitored and measured. 
With respect to sport-based executive dismissal and succession studies, establishing how 
sports and coaching staff hierarchies and responsibilities differ may be useful in correcting 
discrepancies between sport studies as well as compared to studies in various non-sport 
industries.  Additionally, there are several opportunities to examine the sport-based studies from 
non-sport journals identified in the Recent Organization and Management Studies Using Sport 
section of this review.  Within the Recent Organization and Management Studies Using Sport 
section, future research opportunities are discussed for examining the relationships between 
status and organizational performance as well as human capital, employee mobility, and 
organizational performance.  However, several other future research opportunities exist both 
inside and outside the realm of executive successions.  For example, within the realm of 
dismissals and promotion research, the influence of public funding for venues or the presence of 
geographically close rival firms may have an effect on dismissals and promotions.  Outside the 
realm of dismissals and promotions, issues such as momentum and the hot hand effect can 
examine moderating effects of factors such as age, race, education, or ability to handle pressure. 
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